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Foreword
Drylands—defined here to include arid, semi-arid, and dry subhumid 
zones—are at the core of Africa’s development challenge. Drylands make up 
about 43 percent of the continent’s land surface, account for about 75 percent 
of the area used for agriculture, and are home to about 50 percent of the popu-
lation, including a disproportionate share of the poor. Due to complex interac-
tions among many different factors, vulnerability in drylands is high and is 
rising, jeopardizing the long-term livelihood prospects for hundreds of mil-
lions of people. Climate change, which is expected to increase the frequency 
and severity of extreme weather events, will exacerbate this challenge.
Most of the people living in the drylands depend on natural resource-based 
livelihood activities, such as herding and farming, but the capability of these 
activities to provide stable and adequate incomes is eroding. Rapid population 
growth is putting pressure on a deteriorating resource base and creating condi-
tions under which extreme weather events, unexpected spikes in global food 
and fuel prices, or other exogenous shocks can easily precipitate full-blown 
humanitarian crises and fuel violent social conflicts. Forced to address urgent 
short-term needs, many households have resorted to unsustainable practices, 
resulting in severe land degradation, water scarcity, and biodiversity loss. 
African governments and their partners in the international development 
community stand ready to tackle the challenges confronting drylands, but 
important questions remain unanswered about how the task should be under-
taken. Do dryland environments contain enough resources to generate the 
food, jobs, and income needed to support sustainable livelihoods for a fast 
growing population? If not, can injections of external resources make up the 
deficit? Or is the carrying capacity of drylands so limited that out-migration 
should be encouraged? 
To answer these questions, the World Bank teamed with a large coalition of 
partners to prepare this book, which is designed to contribute to the ongoing 
dialogue about measures to reduce the vulnerability and enhance the resilience 
xx  FOREWORD
of populations living in drylands. Based on analysis of current and projected 
future drivers of vulnerability and resilience, the book identifies promising 
interventions, quantifies their likely costs and benefits, and describes the policy 
trade-offs that will need to be addressed when dryland development strategies 
are devised. 
Sustainably developing the drylands and conferring resilience to their 
inhabitants will require addressing a complex web of economic, social, politi-
cal, and environmental vulnerabilities. Good adaptive responses have the 
potential to generate new and better opportunities for many people, cushion 
the losses for others, and smooth the transition for all. Implementation of these 
responses will require effective and visionary leadership at all levels, from 
households to local organizations, national governments, and a coalition of 
development partners. This work, along with an accompanying series of back-
ground papers, is intended to contribute to that effort.
 Makhtar Diop
 Vice President, Africa Region
 The World Bank 
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Overview
The development challenge posed by drylands 
Drylands—defined for purposes of this book based on the widely used Aridity 
Index1 to include arid, semi-arid, and dry subhumid zones—account for three-
quarters of Sub-Saharan Africa’s cropland, two-thirds of cereal production, and 
four-fifths of livestock holdings. In East and West Africa—the focus of this 
book—drylands are home to over 300 million people, and they account for a 
large share of the poor, including many of those lacking access to basic services 
such as health care and education (Map O.1). 
Today frequent and severe shocks, especially droughts, limit the livelihood 
opportunities available to millions of households and undermine efforts to 
Map O.1 Dryland regions of West and East Africa
Source: ©Harvest Choice, IFPRI, 2015. Reproduced, with permission from Zhe Guo, 2015; further permission 
required for reuse.
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eradicate poverty in the drylands. These shocks regularly cause large drains on 
government budgets and consume a significant portion of the region’s interna-
tional development assistance, especially in the absence of robust social protec-
tion systems and rapidly scalable safety nets. As a result, scarce resources are 
diverted away from pursuing longer-term development goals and redirected to 
mobilizing costly short-term responses to humanitarian crises. In 2011 around 
US$4 billion was spent on humanitarian assistance to the Sahel and the Horn of 
Africa, equivalent to over 10 percent of total Official Development Assistance 
to all of Sub-Saharan Africa (OECD 2015). The challenges threatening the liveli-
hoods of many of the groups that live in drylands are compounded by their 
social and political marginalization, which muffles their voices and limits their 
ability to influence political processes that affect their well-being.
If the current situation is precarious, the future promises to be even more chal-
lenging. By 2030 the number of people living in the drylands of East and West 
Africa is expected to increase by 65 to 80 percent (depending on the fertility sce-
nario). Over the same period climate change could result in an expansion of the 
area classified as drylands, by as much as 20 percent under some scenarios, for the 
region as a whole, with much larger increases in some countries (Map O.2). This 
would bring more people into an ever more challenging environment. 
Map O.2 Shift and expansion by 2050 of dryland areas due to climate change
Source: Estimates based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) data
Note: The map shows the extent to which drylands (defined to include all zones with an aridity index 
0.05–0.65) could shift and expand by 2050 as a result of climate change. To visualize the largest possible 
impacts, the map reflects the fastest growth of GHG (greenhouse gas) concentration (RCP 8.5 [Representative 
Concentration Pathways]) under the driest of a set of over 40 climate models.
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Scope of inquiry: Focus of this book
In response to a series of humanitarian crises, especially the drought-induced 
emergencies that occurred in the Horn of Africa in 2011 and the Sahel in 2012, 
national governments and the international development community have 
scaled up efforts to tackle the challenge of vulnerability in drylands through 
initiatives such as the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR)–Sahel and West 
Africa (facilitated by OECD) and the Global Alliance for Action for Drought 
Resilience and Growth (facilitated by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development [USAID]). These ongoing efforts are helping to address the recur-
ring crises in the drylands, but the challenge is to ensure that the solutions they 
provide are not only temporary. Permanently reducing the vulnerability of the 
people living in drylands will require sustained efforts to attack the underlying 
root causes of their problems, using policies and programs that extend beyond 
relatively short electoral cycles. This book focuses on what should be the focus 
of the next generation of interventions aimed at enhancing the resilience of 
dryland populations in the face of demographic, economic, environmental, and 
climatic change. 
If current trends continue, over the next two decades dryland regions of 
Africa will experience strong population growth. Higher population density in 
the drylands, combined with increasing interest from outside investors in large-
scale commercial agriculture and extractive industries, will put additional pres-
sure on the region’s fragile natural resource base, pushing it in some cases 
beyond its regenerative capacity. As competition for resources intensifies, con-
flicts over land, water, and feed are likely to multiply, reducing the ability of 
governments, development agencies, and local communities to manage the 
impacts of droughts and other shocks. 
In this context, building resilience to droughts and other shocks is of para-
mount importance. When households and communities are repeatedly hit by 
shocks and lack the means to respond, they then have difficulty accumulating 
the human, physical, and natural capital needed to lift themselves out of pov-
erty. For this reason, building resilience to shocks is not necessarily a goal in 
itself, but remains an essential pre-condition for achieving higher level develop-
ment goals, such as poverty eradication, sustainable improvements in living 
conditions, and food security. 
This book focuses on the medium-term prospects (over the next two 
decades) for increasing the resilience to drought and other shocks of people 
living in dryland areas of East and West Africa. Increasing resilience will not 
automatically lead to poverty eradication; for poverty to be eradicated, a num-
ber of additional actions will have to be taken, for example, improving health 
services, strengthening educational systems, and improving access to markets 
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for inputs and outputs. But while increasing resilience is not a sufficient condi-
tion for poverty eradication, it is most likely a necessary one, because it is hard 
to imagine how households that are unable to cope with the impacts of drought 
and other shocks can save enough to augment their endowment of productive 
assets and increase their income generation potential. 
The questions concerning vulnerability and resilience addressed in this book 
must be understood against the backdrop of an extremely dynamic environ-
ment. Dryland regions of Africa are already undergoing sweeping changes that 
are affecting the livelihoods of millions of households. Because the ongoing 
transformation of the drylands is being propelled by demographic drivers that 
have a great deal of momentum, the key question for policy makers is how best 
to manage the demographic, social, and economic changes that are coming. 
Currently, most of the people living in the dryland regions of East and West 
Africa rely on herding and farming for their livelihoods. Over the longer run, 
structural transformation of the economy may generate opportunities for new 
livelihood activities that are less vulnerable to the impacts of droughts and other 
shocks. In the short to medium term, however, the key policy question concerns 
the extent to which current livelihoods can be made more resilient. In that con-
text, this book examines two main areas of intervention, which are considered 
complementary.
1. Improving current livelihood activities: For the foreseeable future, most of 
the people living in drylands in East and West Africa will continue to make 
their living from herding and farming. For that reason, the book considers 
what can be done to make current livelihood activities more productive, 
more stable, and more sustainable, through investments supported by policy 
reforms and institutional change. The emphasis is on technological and man-
agement choices that have the potential to increase the returns from pasto-
ralism, agro-pastoralism, and crop farming. Complementary activities in 
areas such as family planning, education, job creation, and financial markets 
are recognized as having a major influence on livelihood activities, but these 
complementary activities are not analyzed in detail.
2. Strengthening social protection programs including safety nets: In many 
parts of the drylands, even the most productive, stable, and sustainable liveli-
hood activities will not be fully immune to the effects of droughts and other 
shocks. Households that rely on herding or farming as principal livelihood 
sources will continue to be exposed to droughts and other shocks, which 
depending on their frequency and severity can negatively affect incomes and 
plunge large numbers of people into poverty. For that reason, the book 
examines the degree to which social protection programs including safety 
nets can be used to strengthen the ability of dryland populations to cope 
effectively with the impacts of droughts and other shocks.
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Improving current livelihood activities and strengthening social protection 
programs have significant potential to reduce vulnerability and enhance resil-
ience of populations living in drylands, but both are likely to face limits, par-
ticularly in the face of technological, financial and fiscal constraints. In light of 
these limits, policy makers will need to consider a third set of interventions, 
namely, encouraging dryland populations to switch to alternative livelihood 
activities that are less vulnerable to droughts and other shocks. By assessing the 
scope and limitations of the first two types of interventions, this report helps 
define the importance across the group of countries analyzed of the third type 
of intervention. The book does not attempt to identify or analyze in detail the 
alternative livelihood activities that may offer the brightest prospects for dry-
land populations in East and West Africa; those tasks fall outside the scope of 
the present study and remain topics for future research.
Geographically the book focuses on dryland zones in East and West Africa, 
where vulnerability to drought and other shocks is highest. Many of the insights 
generated by the analysis have broader applicability, however.
Conceptual framework: The determinants of resilience
Prospects for sustainable development of drylands are assessed in this book 
through the lens of resilience. But what exactly is meant by resilience? Most defi-
nitions of resilience relate to the ability of people or ecosystems, or both, to 
withstand and recover from shocks. In the context of drylands, the most impor-
tant shocks are meteorological shocks, especially droughts, which are the main 
focus of the discussion that follows. Other shocks that are considered but not 
analyzed in detail include health shocks, price shocks, and conflict-related 
shocks. 
In the absence of a single, widely accepted definition of resilience, this book 
uses a dimension-based approach (detailed in Box O.1). Resilience—under-
stood here to mean the ability of people to withstand and respond to droughts 
and other shocks—is affected by three types of factors: 
• Exposure is the degree to which people are subject to droughts and other 
shocks, which depends mainly on where they live. 
• Sensitivity is the degree to which people are affected by droughts and other 
shocks, which is determined by the nature and composition of their income 
sources and assets. 
• Coping capacity is the ability of people to mitigate the impact of droughts 
and other shocks after they occur, through own resources, or support from 
friends, relatives, or the government. 
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Other conditions being constant, the resilience of a household in the face of 
droughts and other shocks increases the lower its exposure, the lower its sensi-
tivity, and the greater its coping capacity. Resilience is determined by the inter-
play of all three dimensions, so attempts to understand resilience in terms of 
just one or two dimensions can produce a misleading picture. For example, 
when relatively few people are living below the poverty line, it would be easy to 
conclude that the coping capacity of the population is relatively high, since most 
households have enough assets to be able to recover from a drought, should a 
drought occur. Based on such reasoning, policy makers might use the poverty 
BOX O.1
The dimensions of resilience
Exposure can be defined as the frequency and degree to which a household is 
subject to being hit by droughts and other shocks. A household whose assets 
are located in an area in which severe droughts occur once in every 5 years on 
average is more exposed than a household whose assets are located in an area 
in which severe droughts occur once in every 15 years on average. Exposure is 
an exogenous dimension of vulnerability, that is, outside the control of the 
household in the short run. 
Sensitivity is the degree to which a household is affected by droughts and 
other shocks when they occur. For a given level of exposure, a household that 
derives a large share of its income from shock-affected activities (e.g., rainfed 
cropping and pasture-based livestock production) will have a higher sensitivity 
to the shock, other things equal, than a household that derives a small share of 
its income from shock-affected activities. Sensitivity is determined in large part 
by past decisions made by a household regarding the nature and mix of its 
assets (and by its livelihood strategy). Changing the nature and mix of assets 
(and the livelihood strategy) is one of the main avenues the household can fol-
low to enhance its resilience.
Coping capacity refers to the ability of a household to mitigate the impact 
of droughts and other shocks after they occur. Access to financial resources 
(from its own savings, from friends or relatives, or from social safety nets) can 
help the household make up for an income shortfall resulting from, for exam-
ple, a drop in production following a weather-induced shock. Liquidating pro-
ductive assets to mitigate the negative impacts of current shocks may reduce 
the ability of the household to mitigate the impacts of future shocks, i.e., it will 
reduce the household’s resilience. Since it is unlikely that all risks can be avoided 
by diversifying household assets and altering income-generating activities to 
reduce exposure to future shocks, resilience-enhancing strategies usually con-
sist of a combination of actions to reduce sensitivity to shocks and actions to 
increase coping capacity.
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headcount as an indicator of vulnerability. But focusing in this way on a single 
dimension of resilience could lead policy makers to overlook the fact that even 
though most households have enough assets to recover from a drought, the 
livelihood strategy that allowed them to accumulate those assets may be 
extremely sensitive to droughts. If this is the case, recurrent droughts could 
cause households to move in and out of poverty over time. In such a scenario, 
the population at risk should be understood to include not only the people that 
are poor today, but also the people who risk becoming poor tomorrow because 
their income is sensitive to droughts.
The importance of using a multidimensional approach to understand resil-
ience can be seen by looking at the experience of several thousand Ethiopian 
households that participated in a series of surveys carried out during the period 
1994–2009. Many of these households transitioned in and out of poverty, so 
during a period when the overall poverty headcount was gradually coming 
down, the fortunes of individual households were much more variable. On aver-
age, in any given year 16–17 percent of households started out poor and stayed 
poor, 18–19 percent of households started out non-poor and fell into poverty, 
16–20 percent of households started out poor and climbed out of poverty, and 
45–48 percent of households started out non-poor and remained non-poor (for 
details, see Scandizzo et al. 2014). 
The Ethiopia household level evidence generates two important insights. 
First, policies that succeed in bringing some people out of poverty at a particu-
lar point in time do not necessarily guarantee that, as a result of subsequent 
shocks, many of those people will not fall back into poverty. Second, enhanced 
resilience is a pre-condition for sustained reduction and eventually eradication 
of poverty. As a result, it makes sense to explore policies and interventions that 
can increase resilience (as these will lay the foundation for poverty reduction); 
these policies and interventions should holistically address all three dimensions 
of resilience. 
Vulnerability in drylands if transformation is not managed
If current trends continue, how are patterns of vulnerability in African drylands 
likely to evolve? An original modeling framework developed for this book 
(referred to as the umbrella model because it integrates the results of more nar-
rowly focused analyses carried out at the level of individual sectors) was used to 
assess the likely impacts of projected changes in the main drivers of resilience. 
The purpose of the umbrella modeling exercise was to assess the magnitude of 
the coming challenge and identify opportunities for policy interventions. The 
exercise generated a number of important insights, as follows. 
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The number of people living in East and West Africa drylands who are 
exposed to droughts and other shocks will grow considerably. In the absence of 
significant out-migration, by 2030 the population living in rural areas of the dryland 
countries is projected to grow by 15–100 percent (depending on the country).
Economic growth will reduce the share of people living in drylands who 
are sensitive to droughts and other shocks, but probably not fast enough to 
overcome the effects of demographic growth. As GDP growth generates new 
employment opportunities in the manufacturing and services sectors, the share 
of the population living in drylands and dependent on livestock-keeping and 
crop farming is likely to decrease. Nevertheless, in the presence of rapid popula-
tion growth and increasing competition for resources from outside investors, 
the absolute number of people who depend on livestock-keeping and crop 
farming and who are exposed and sensitive to droughts and other shocks will 
likely outpace the exits out of agriculture. As a result, the total number of people 
dependent on agriculture is projected to increase (Figure O.1).
Economic growth will generate additional resources that can be used to 
cope with droughts and other shocks, but growth needs to become more 
pro-poor. If GDP continues to grow in line with historical rates and the growth 
Figure O.1 Number of people in drylands projected to be dependent on agriculture in 
2030 (2010=100, medium fertility scenario)
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The figures in the chart represent the number of dryland people projected to be dependent on agricul-
ture in 2030 in relation to the corresponding figure in 2010. So for example, a figure of 140 indicates a 40 
percent increase over the 2010 level of agricultural employment. For each country, the range is defined by 
different scenarios of per capita GDP growth, which is expected to generate some exit of employment out of 
agriculture as a result of structural transformation of the economy. The details of the calculation are provided 
in the appendix.
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elasticity of poverty reduction averages 0.75 (a value that denotes relatively 
inequitable growth, such as that being observed in many African countries), the 
number of people in the drylands who depend on agriculture and live below the 
poverty line will increase in virtually every country (exceptions could include 
Burkina Faso in West Africa and Uganda in East Africa).
Faster, more inclusive growth could reduce the incidence of vulnerability 
in drylands, but it will not eliminate vulnerability altogether. Under an opti-
mistic scenario that assumes that growth is both fast and equitable (unfortu-
nately at odds with recent experience), the number of vulnerable people living 
in drylands could decrease by up to 40 percent in East Africa and up to 10 
percent in West Africa (Figure O.2). Despite these gains, the number of people 
needing assistance when droughts or other shocks occur is likely to exceed the 
reach of existing social protection systems, which suggests that large-scale 
humanitarian assistance would still be needed on a regular basis.
Investment in the education of girls can help mitigate the size of the chal-
lenge, but it will not fully resolve the problem. Investment in the education of 
girls has been shown to lower fertility rates over the medium to long term. As 
fertility rates fall, so does the number of people who are likely to need public 
assistance. The impact of reducing fertility rates, while non-negligible, is likely 
to be insufficient to address the problem. Using the UN low fertility population 
projections as a first-order approximation of the effects of fertility reduction 
Figure O.2 Vulnerable people in drylands in 2030 (2010=100, medium fertility scenario)
Source: Authors’ calculations
Note: The figures in the chart represent the number of dryland people projected to be employed in agriculture 
and having an income below the poverty line in 2030, compared to the corresponding number in 2010. For 
example, a value of 140 indicates a 40 percent increase by 2030 in the number of poor people employed in 
agriculture, compared to 2010. For each country, the range is defined under alternative scenarios involving 
different assumptions on per capita GDP growth and growth elasticity of poverty reduction. In particular, in the 
high-end scenario, growth rates and the income elasticity of poverty reduction are assumed to be at the 75th 
percentile of the distribution of the corresponding historical values. In the low-end scenario, they are assumed 
to be at the 25th percentile of the historical distribution. In the reference scenario selected, growth rates are 
set at the historical, country-specific average, while the growth elasticity of poverty reduction is set for all 
countries at the level of 0.75. Further details of the calculation appear in the appendix.
WestEast
Vu
ln
er
ab
le
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
in
 2
03
0 
(in
de
x,
 2
01
0=
10
0)
 
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
High end Scenario selected Low end
Ug
an
da
Ta
nz
an
ia
Et
hi
op
ia
Ke
ny
a
Ni
ge
r
Ch
ad
Se
ne
ga
l
Ni
ge
ria
To
go M
ali
M
au
rit
an
ia
Be
ni
n
Cô
te
 d
’Iv
oi
re
Gu
in
ea
Lib
er
ia
Ga
m
bi
a
Sie
rra
 Le
on
e
Gu
in
ea
-B
iss
au
W
es
t A
fri
ca
 A
ve
ra
ge
Ea
st 
Af
ric
a A
ve
ra
ge
Ov
er
all
 A
ve
ra
ge
Bu
rk
in
a F
as
o
Gh
an
a
xliv  CONFRONTING DROUGHT IN AFRICA’S DRYLANDS 
policies, the increase by 2030, compared to 2010, in the number of people vul-
nerable to droughts and other shocks could be reduced by a third (Figure O.3). 
Options for increasing resilience 
By 2030 economic growth leading to structural change will allow some of the people 
living in drylands to transition to non-agriculture based livelihood strategies, reduc-
ing their vulnerability. Many other people living in drylands will continue to rely on 
livestock-keeping and crop farming. For the latter group, a number of best-bet inter-
ventions described in this book have the potential to make a significant difference 
in reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience. This book evaluates the key 
opportunities and challenges associated with these interventions, and it draws a 
number of conclusions that have important implications for policy making.
Livestock-keepers in the drylands can be made more resilient through 
investments in improved management practices combined with support to 
new, complementary income sources. Pastoralism and agro-pastoralism are 
the predominant forms of livestock-keeping throughout large parts of the dry-
lands. Many pastoralists, particularly those at the lower end of the income spec-
trum, are vulnerable to falling into poverty (or sinking deeper into poverty) 
because their herds are not large enough to provide a reliable income stream in 
Figure O.3 Vulnerable people in drylands in 2030 (2010=100, different fertility scenarios)
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The figures in the chart represent the number of dryland people projected to be employed in agriculture 
and having an income below the poverty line in 2030, compared to the corresponding number in 2010. For 
example, a value of 140 indicates a 40 percent increase by 2030 in the number of poor people employed in 
agriculture, compared to 2010. For each country, the range is defined by the three scenarios of population 
growth contained in the UN World Population Prospects (2012 Revision - http://www.un.org/en/development/
desa/publications/world-population-prospects-the-2012-revision.html).
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the face of erratic rainfall, recurring outbreaks of disease, continual conflict, and 
other shocks. In 2010 only 30 percent of households in the Sahel and the Horn 
of Africa possessed enough livestock assets to stay out of poverty in the face of 
recurrent droughts. With human population growth outstripping growth in 
livestock numbers, that share is projected to drop to 10 percent by 2030. Many 
livestock-keeping households (some 60 percent of the projected 2030 popula-
tion) will feel pressure to drop out of livestock-based livelihoods, with the 
remaining 30 percent of households projected to stay in the system despite 
remaining vulnerable to droughts and other shocks.
Strategic interventions could slow the rate at which poor households feel 
pressure to abandon livestock-keeping, while at the same time boosting the 
income of those who remain. Productivity-enhancing interventions—such as 
providing improved animal health services, ensuring early off-take of young 
male animals, destocking quickly in the face of approaching drought, and 
ensuring improved access to grazing areas—could raise the share of resilient 
households by 50 percent (Figure O.4). These gains would be achieved from a 
Figure O.4 Impact of improved animal health and early offtake of young bulls on the 
resilience status of livestock dependent households in 2030
Source: de Haan et al. 2014
Note: The figures in the chart represent the shares of households that are estimated to fall, without and with 
resilience interventions, into one of three categories. Resilient households are those that own herds above a 
resilience threshold required to withstand a sequence of high and low rainfall years similar to those experi-
enced in the last 20 years. Pushed-out households are those that own herds below a lower survival threshold, 
so that they are unlikely to sustain themselves even in an average rainfall year. Vulnerable households are 
those whose herd size falls between the survival threshold and the resilience threshold. These households 
own enough animals to remain above the poverty line in an average year, but not enough to cope effectively 
during drought years. The figure refers to aggregated results for Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, Nigeria, 
Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
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low starting point, however, so a large share of households would still remain 
vulnerable or feel pressure to drop out of livestock-keeping altogether (85 per-
cent in pastoral areas, 70 percent in agro-pastoral areas). All told, more than 3 
million households in 10 dryland countries could become resilient thanks to 
these interventions, at a cost of US$0.5 billion per year, or US$160 per house-
hold made resilient.
The scope for productivity-enhancing investments to increase livestock pro-
duction in the drylands is limited by constraints on feed availability and by the 
rate at which animals can reproduce. Still, resilience of livestock-keeping house-
holds could be increased by interventions falling outside the domain of conven-
tional livestock improvement programs—for example, policies designed to 
bring about a more equitable distribution of livestock assets: these could take 
the form of subsidized credit to enable smallholders to reach a minimum herd 
size, or progressive taxation of wealthier livestock owners. Some of these mea-
sures are prone to abuse, however (e.g., preferential credit programs), and oth-
ers are likely to generate opposition from powerful groups with vested interests 
(e.g., progressive taxation regimes). If the potential disadvantages limit the 
scope for implementation, then it will be important to identify interventions 
that provide new income sources for poor livestock-keepers, such as programs 
that provide payments for environmental services. This will help limit exits 
from livestock-keeping and reduce the likelihood that those who continue to 
rely on livestock-keeping as their principal livelihood source will remain poor 
and vulnerable to shocks.
Improved crop production technologies can deliver sizeable resilience 
benefits by boosting productivity in rainfed agriculture. By 2030, if no action 
is taken, the number of farming-dependent households in the Sahel and the 
Horn of Africa that are poor and vulnerable to droughts and other shocks is 
projected to increase by around 60 percent. Interventions designed to improve 
the productivity of rainfed crops have the potential to dampen that increase 
considerably. Simulations of the impacts of the best-bet crop intensification 
technologies (e.g., drought and heat-tolerant varieties, improved fertility man-
agement, rainwater harvesting) on the productivity of key staples grown in dry-
lands (maize, sorghum, and millet) suggest that the number of drought-affected 
poor households could be reduced by 10–80 percent compared to a “Business 
As Usual” scenario, depending on the country and aridity zone. To ensure adop-
tion, governments will need to address the technical, institutional, and financial 
challenges associated with the deployment of the best-bet technologies.
Adding trees to current farming systems can further increase resilience. 
Trees can improve the productivity and stability of crop and livestock produc-
tion systems by providing multiple benefits that tend to stand up well in the face 
of weather shocks. Tree-based systems include systems based on farmer man-
agement of naturally occurring species (generally more appropriate in drier 
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zones), as well as systems involving deliberate planting of economically useful 
species (generally more appropriate in more humid zones). When farmer-man-
aged natural regeneration of native species is combined with the other produc-
tivity-enhancing technologies discussed in this book, the impact is 
impressive—the projected number of poor, drought-affected people living in 
drylands in 2030 falls 13 percent with low-density tree systems and more than 
50 percent with high-density tree systems (Figure O.5). An important feature of 
tree-based systems is that, while the adoption costs must be incurred up front, 
the resulting benefits often take years to materialize. This can be problematic, 
because the long time lag to realize investment returns reduces the attractive-
ness of tree-based systems in the drylands, where farmers generally must focus 
on meeting their families’ immediate consumption needs in the face of uncer-
tain production environments. For this reason, getting farmers to adopt the 
technology is likely to require significant public support. 
Irrigation can provide an important buffer against droughts, particularly 
in the less arid parts of the drylands. Analysis carried out for this book sug-
gests that irrigation development is technically feasible and financially viable on 
5–9 million hectares in the drylands (the number varies depending on assump-
tions made about capital investment costs and the minimum required level of 
financial returns). The area suitable for irrigation is disproportionately located 
Figure O.5 Number of drought-affected households that could be made resilient by 
adopting different agricultural technologies
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: FMNR = Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration. The numbers represent households that by 2030 could 
become resilient to droughts by adopting different packages of resilience interventions. The figure presents aggre-
gated results for Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, Nigeria, Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
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in more humid parts of the drylands (Map O.3). Up to 10 percent of the area 
currently being cropped in dry subhumid zones could be developed for irriga-
tion, compared to only 2–3 percent of the area currently being cropped in arid 
and semi-arid zones. If this potential can be exploited, crop production losses 
suffered during droughts would be reduced, thereby reducing the number of 
drought-affected people by around 1 million, which is a 19 percent improve-
ment compared to a package of interventions without irrigation. Most irrigation 
systems cannot provide reliable protection in the face of severe drought events, 
however. Some large-scale irrigation systems (estimated to be viable in 1.0–2.5 
million hectares of dryland zones) have greater capacity to withstand more 
severe drought, but expansion of large-scale irrigation is likely to be constrained 
by extremely high capital investment costs.
Cross-cutting interventions to enhance resilience
Other interventions discussed in this book offer additional opportunities to 
increase the resilience of dryland populations, as follows. 
Integrated landscape management could help to restore degraded areas 
in the drylands, boost productivity, and improve livelihoods. Restoring 
degraded drylands by addressing the drivers of land degradation, discouraging 
unsustainable uses of natural resources, and scaling up improved land and water 
management practices can enhance the resilience of many poor and vulnerable 
Map O.3 Potential for development of small- and large-scale irrigation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: © IFPRI. Reproduced with permission, from Xie et al., 2015; further permission required for reuse. 
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herders and farmers. Integrated landscape management approaches provide a 
potentially useful instrument for pursuing multiple objectives in the presence 
of a diverse set of actors. Investment in integrated landscape management pro-
grams, which support coordination and long-term collaboration among differ-
ent groups of land managers and stakeholders, can enhance and safeguard 
restoration efforts, lower risks related to water shortages and land degradation, 
diversify income sources, support sustainable intensification, and reduce con-
flicts. Implementation of landscape approaches can be challenging, however, 
because of limited knowledge of the potential benefits, as well as institutional 
and coordination barriers to implementation. 
Reducing barriers to trade could contribute significantly to the resilience 
of people living in drylands by making food more available and more afford-
able, including after a shock hits. The potential to develop well-integrated and 
competitive regional markets in African drylands is today being thwarted by 
barriers to trade. African agriculture continues to underperform relative to 
agriculture in other developing regions. While the causes of this underperfor-
mance are complex and varied, one contributing factor is the very low use of 
improved production inputs, especially modern plant varieties, fertilizer, crop 
chemicals, and animal health products. The low use of production inputs is due 
in part to their high cost and limited availability, a situation exacerbated by 
direct and indirect trade barriers. In addition to limiting the availability of 
vitally needed production inputs, trade barriers found throughout the drylands 
hamper flows of food and amplify price spikes, which can have severe implica-
tions when an extreme weather event, animal disease epidemic, or outbreak of 
conflict has restricted local food supplies, requiring imports of food to meet 
temporary shortfalls. Uncertainty caused by ad hoc trade measures also dis-
courages investments in storage and trade infrastructure that would buffer price 
shocks. Initiatives to reduce barriers to trade in agricultural inputs and food will 
have to overcome political resistance, however, as well as pervasive mistrust 
between government officials and trade communities. More transparent and 
better information for civil society on the presence and effects of trade barriers 
and for government on the realities in local food markets may facilitate reforms. 
Strengthening social protection programs
Social protection programs will be a key component of successful integrated 
resilience strategies in the drylands, in which these programs can play two very 
different but complementary roles, as follows. 
Social protection programs can provide crucial safety nets to protect the 
most vulnerable people in times of crisis, at lower cost than humanitarian 
assistance. Currently, humanitarian assistance is often the default response to 
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droughts and other shocks. Humanitarian assistance can save lives after a shock 
has occurred, but it does little to strengthen resilience to future shocks. A growing 
body of evidence suggests that when a shock has occurred and assistance is 
urgently needed, it is much more cost-effective to scale up existing social protec-
tion programs, as opposed to relying on emergency aid raised through appeals. 
Policy makers therefore need to devise strategies for establishing and maintaining 
adequate safety net programs, which will mean addressing large institutional and 
financial challenges that many African countries presently are unable to meet. 
The ability of social protection programs to provide safety nets to all vul-
nerable people in drylands in times of need will come under increasing 
strain as a result of population growth. Assuming that GDP continues to grow 
at historical rates and that future growth reduces poverty at historical rates, by 
2030 the cost of providing cash transfer support to drought-affected popula-
tions is likely to be unaffordable in many dryland countries (Figure O.6).
In addition to serving as instruments that can be used to deliver safety net 
support, social protection programs can help build resilience at the house-
hold and community levels. Well-designed social protection programs can 
facilitate the delivery of many of the best-bet interventions described above. 
Transfers of cash, food, or other goods offered to households in the aftermath 
of a drought or other shock can be accompanied by training in the use of pro-
ductivity-enhancing technologies that allow vulnerable households to generate 
additional income. By using this additional income to build assets, these house-
holds can improve their ability to cope when the next shock hits, reducing the 
financing needed in future years to support shock-affected people.
Scalable safety nets can provide cost-effective protection against many 
shocks, but even the strongest safety nets are unlikely to offer complete protec-
tion against some low-frequency, high-severity events. For this reason, there 
will always be a need for risk transfer mechanisms, to ensure that additional fiscal 
resources can be mobilized at short notice to deal with the effects of severe shocks. 
Generally speaking, however, humanitarian assistance should be the option of last 
resort, rather than the alternative of choice for crisis situations.
Enhancing preparedness with disaster risk management 
instruments
Disaster Risk Management (DRM) instruments can be key components of strat-
egies to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience in drylands. DRM 
approaches can be effective in reducing sensitivity to droughts and other shocks 
(e.g., by putting in place screening tools and early warning systems, prioritizing 
infrastructure investments to increase resilience to climate shocks, or 
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introducing building codes and guidelines) as well as in improving coping 
capacity after a shock has hit (e.g., by supporting investments in preparedness, 
mobilizing sovereign disaster risk financing, making available agricultural 
insurance for farmers and herders, and supporting social protection programs 
for the poorest). DRM programs currently have limited coverage in the dry-
lands, however, and because few programs have the capacity to scale up rapidly 
in response to shocks, during times of crisis most governments rely on humani-
tarian appeals. This is inefficient and expensive. DRM programs need to be 
designed and implemented in a way that is responsive to the particular dynam-
ics of poverty and vulnerability in the drylands.
Evaluating options: Assessing the relative merits of 
resilience-enhancing interventions
The scope for enhancing the resilience of dryland population in the face of 
droughts was assessed using results of the umbrella model. 
Figure O.6 Share of 2030 GDP required to bring the drought-affected population to the 
poverty line
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The chart shows the cost of bringing, in an average year, all drought-affected people to the international 
poverty line through cash transfers, assuming perfect targeting (the cost is expressed as a percentage of 2030 
GDP for drylands, assumed proportional to the share of the population living in drylands). The cost is calculated 
taking into account the country-specific depth of poverty, as proxied by 2010 poverty gap index obtained from 
the World Bank PovCalnet3 database. Figures for 2030 GDP are based on the reference growth scenario as 
defined in the appendix. The reference line (1 percent of GDP), indicates the consensus value in the social pro-
tection literature on the resources governments should be willing to spend in social safety nets.
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First, the umbrella model was used to project the likely future incidence of 
vulnerability in the drylands under a set of plausible assumptions about popula-
tion increases, economic growth, and income distribution. By 2030, the number 
of vulnerable, drought-affected people living in drylands is projected to be 60 
percent higher than in 2010. After 2030, the impacts of droughts and other 
shocks will likely become even greater as climate change increases the frequency 
and severity of droughts and other extreme weather events.
Next, the umbrella model was used to estimate the ability of various resil-
ience-enhancing interventions to reduce the number of drought-affected people 
projected to be living in drylands in 2030. The interventions tested include: 
(1) improved productivity of livestock systems, (2) measures to expand the cov-
erage and improve the productivity of irrigated agriculture, (3) measures to 
improve the productivity of rainfed cropping systems, and (4) improved natural 
resource management (in particular the use of tree-based systems). 
Potential impacts of livelihood interventions
Interventions designed to strengthen current livelihoods could considerably 
reduce the number of drought-affected people living in drylands in 2030. 
Adoption of the resilience-enhancing interventions would limit the increase in 
the number of drought-affected people to 27 percent above 2010 levels (Figure 
O.7). This represents a significant improvement over the no-intervention 
“Business as Usual” scenario, in which the number of drought-affected people 
increases by close to 70 percent compared to 2010. This result points to the 
importance of stepping up actions to encourage the adoption of the best-bet 
interventions. One needed action is to mobilize resources to pay for the effective 
dissemination of the technologies, estimated to range between US$0.4 and 
US$1.3 billion per year (depending on the assumption made about the accuracy 
of spatial targeting). Another needed action is to make sure that equity consid-
erations are considered adequately in the design and implementation of resil-
ience interventions (see Box O.2).
In some countries, improving current livelihood strategies will not be 
enough. While resilience-enhancing interventions can help to slow the increase 
in the number of drought-affected people everywhere, only in some countries 
(Ethiopia, Uganda, and to a lesser extent Nigeria and Kenya) would the inter-
ventions reduce the number of drought-affected people relative to the 2010 base-
line. In several countries (including Niger, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, and to a 
lesser extent Chad), even after adoption of the resilience-enhancing interven-
tions, the number of drought-affected people would increase relative to the 2010 
baseline, although less than in the business as usual scenario.
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In countries where the impact of resilience-enhancing interventions is 
likely to be modest, fiscal realities may limit the use of social safety nets. In 
countries likely to experience large increases in the number of drought-affected 
people, fiscal realities may limit the use of safety net programs to provide sup-
port following severe shocks. For example in Niger, Mali, and Senegal, even 
assuming all the resilience-enhancing interventions are adopted, the cost of 
using cash transfers to bring all drought-affected people up to the poverty line 
is likely to far exceed 1 percent of GDP, the consensus value in the social protec-
tion literature on the resources governments should be willing to spend on 
social safety nets (Figure O.8). In these countries, the policy choices boil down 
to reducing the number of people covered by social safety nets, limiting the 
amount of support provided per person, or relying on humanitarian assistance 
to fill the fiscal gap.
The fiscal dividend of resilience-enhancing interventions: 
A country typology
In considering the potential of the best-bet interventions to reduce vulnerability 
and increase resilience among populations living in drylands, it is important to 
Figure O.7 Potential of best-bet interventions to reduce the numbers of drought-affected 
people living in drylands in 2030 (2010=100)
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The figures in the chart represent the number of dryland people projected to be dependent on agri-
culture in 2030 in relation to the corresponding figure in 2010. For example, a figure of 140 indicates a 40 
percent increase over the 2010 level of agricultural employment. For each country, the range is defined by 
different scenarios of per capita GDP growth, which is expected to generate some exit of employment out of 
agriculture as a result of structural transformation of the economy. The details of the calculation are provided 
in the appendix.
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note that the interventions will have two types of effects—direct and indirect. 
Investments in livestock and crop farming systems will directly reduce the num-
ber of drought-affected people by improving the productivity and sustainability 
of current livelihood strategies. In addition, these investments will indirectly 
contribute to improved resilience in the drylands by freeing up public resources 
that would otherwise have to be used for emergency responses. These resources 
can be re-directed to programs designed to strengthen the resilience of vulner-
able segments of the population. They can be thought of as the “fiscal dividend” 
produced by resilience-enhancing interventions. 
The presence or absence of this fiscal dividend can be used to define a policy-
relevant typology of countries, distinguished according to the differing ability 
of the resilience-enhancing interventions to reduce the cost of protecting vul-
nerable livelihoods in the drylands. 
In Niger, Mali, and Senegal (referred to here as Group A), where opportuni-
ties to reduce sensitivity and increase coping capacity among vulnerable house-
holds are limited, the resilience-enhancing interventions have the potential to 
reduce the cost of supporting drought-affected people using safety nets, but the 
BOX O.2
Recognizing equity considerations
Cost-effectiveness is one factor that policy makers and development practi-
tioners must take into account in designing dryland development policies and 
programs, but it is not the only factor. As everywhere, efforts to reduce vulner-
ability and build resilience in drylands are complicated by political economy 
factors. Because any change in the status quo is likely to bring benefits to some 
groups and impose costs on other groups, the desirability of alternative inter-
ventions must always be assessed taking into account equity considerations. 
For example, expanding irrigation schemes into previously uncultivated land 
benefits the farmers who gain access to irrigation services, but it harms pasto-
ralists who had been able to take advantage of feed resources on the previ-
ously uncultivated land. Conversely, improving veterinary services to reduce 
animal mortality rates benefits the livestock keepers who see their herds 
increase, but it harms the farmers who subsequently experience more frequent 
invasions of their fields by free-roaming animals. 
Development interventions are often portrayed as activities that can improve 
the welfare of all, but since interventions inevitably play out against established 
distributions of wealth and power, they are rarely Pareto efficient—usually 
there are winners and losers. These considerations loom especially large in 
many dryland regions of Africa, where competition for scarce resources in a 
context of political instability has fueled recurring cycles of conflict.
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residual cost remains well above the 1 percent of GDP benchmark. Many people 
living in drylands in these countries are likely to remain vulnerable, even after 
the resilience-enhancing interventions have been implemented and safety net 
programs put in place. In these countries, where coping capacity is likely to 
remain limited and sensitivity to shocks high, an important policy priority is to 
reduce overall exposure by way of interventions to promote alternative liveli-
hoods both inside and outside of drylands.
In Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Nigeria (referred to here as Group B), where 
opportunities to reduce sensitivity among vulnerable households are somewhat 
greater, the resilience-enhancing interventions combined with safety net spend-
ing at the 1 percent of GDP level fully cover the drought-affected population 
living in drylands. But after the resilience-enhancing technologies have been 
disseminated and safety net programs strengthened, few resources would be left 
that could be invested in helping drought-affected people become resilient over 
the longer term. In Group B countries, the need to promote alternative liveli-
hood strategies is likely to be less urgent than in Group A countries, but these 
countries will have little or no fiscal space to respond to contingencies (e.g., 
Figure O.8 Cost of cash transfers needed to support drought-affected people in drylands 
in 2030 (with and without interventions)
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The chart shows the cost in an average year of bringing all drought-affected people to the international 
poverty line through cash transfers, assuming perfect targeting (the cost is expressed as a percentage of 2030 
GDP for drylands, assumed proportional to the share of the population living in drylands). The cost is calculated 
taking into account the country-specific depth of poverty, as proxied by the 2010 poverty gap index obtained 
from the World Bank PovCalnet database. Figures for 2030 GDP are based on the reference growth scenario 
as defined in the appendix. For each country, the higher end of the range is the Business as Usual scenario; the 
lower end of the range is a scenario of adoption of the productivity enhancing technologies analyzed through-
out the book. The difference between the higher and lower end of the range is the benefit in terms of savings 
of the cash transfers required to bring all drought affected people to the poverty line.
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extreme drought events), and, more importantly, they will have limited 
resources available to invest in making vulnerable populations more resilient 
over the longer term. An important priority for these countries is to develop 
mechanisms for rapidly mobilizing contingent financing to respond to occa-
sional extreme crises. 
In Kenya, Chad, Ethiopia, and Mauritania (referred to here as Group C), 
where opportunities to reduce sensitivity and increase coping capacity among 
vulnerable households are considerable, once the resilience-enhancing inter-
ventions have been implemented, all remaining drought-affected people living 
in drylands can be supported by safety nets, at a combined cost well below 1 
percent of GDP. In these countries, resources that previously might have been 
needed to respond to droughts and other shocks can in future be invested in 
making dryland populations more resilient over the longer term. Key priorities 
for Group C countries include scaling up investments in resilience-enhancing 
interventions (to turn into reality the potential fiscal dividend) and identifying 
strategies for productively investing the fiscal dividend.
Promoting new livelihoods to manage the transformation 
The results of the umbrella modeling exercise highlight the possibilities and the 
limitations of interventions designed to improve the productivity of current 
livelihood strategies in the drylands. In considering the policy implications, 
however, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the future will not be 
identical to the past. 
Rapid population growth in drylands will exacerbate many existing 
challenges, but population growth will also bring new opportunities. 
Increased population density in the drylands will create opportunities for 
profitable commerce and trade, increased economic specialization, and 
enhanced value addition. Similarly, increased population density in the dry-
lands will generate economies of scale in the provision of essential public 
services (such as education, health care, water and sanitation, communica-
tions, and security), thereby reducing the corresponding cost. In short, popu-
lation growth in the drylands could prove vital in overcoming the traditional 
problem that has contributed to the underdevelopment of many dryland 
areas—namely, that the sparse population distributed over vast areas has 
made markets thin and costly, discouraging both public and private invest-
ment in the provision of goods and services.
Seizing the emerging opportunities will be possible only to the extent that 
higher population density combined with increasing expropriation by state 
and external investors will not lead to increased competition for natural 
resources, especially land, water, and biomass. Increased competition will 
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likely put added pressure on resources, which could give rise to increased con-
flict. For this reason, as population growth outstrips the ability of current liveli-
hood strategies to provide adequate incomes for all, public policy will have to 
focus on generating new livelihoods, less reliant on natural capital, and more on 
human and physical capital.
Livestock-keeping and crop farming can continue to be important com-
ponents of the livelihood strategies of people living in drylands. These activi-
ties will have to be complemented by new sources of income, however—not 
only post-harvest value adding activities related to the processing of agricultural 
products, but also employment in the services and manufacturing sectors. 
Because this change will require exits from agricultural and natural resources-
based livelihoods and migration to employment in other sectors, the solution 
to the problems of drylands to a significant extent will come from outside the 
drylands.
Policy recommendations
Enhancing the resilience of people living in the drylands will require a 
combination of interventions to improve current livelihoods and interven-
tions to strengthen safety nets. An overarching recommendation emerging 
from the analysis reported in this book is that policy makers in dryland coun-
tries and their partners in the development community may want to look 
more closely at each of the two types of interventions, to assess their potential 
in more detail than has been possible here, taking into account local circum-
stances and development priorities. The Country Programming Framework 
prepared in the aftermath of the 2011 drought by the countries of the Horn of 
Africa is an important step in that direction. Strategic plans formulated at the 
country level and at the regional level should be updated regularly and broad-
ened and deepened as new knowledge becomes available, focusing especially 
on the medium to long term and quantifying to the extent possible the techni-
cal and financial potential of alternative interventions. With respect to the two 
types of interventions, this book presents detailed recommendations, which 
are summarized in Box O.3.
Improving current livelihood activities and strengthening social protection 
programs have significant potential to reduce vulnerability and enhance resil-
ience of populations living in drylands, but both strategies are likely to face 
limits. The scenario analysis carried out using the umbrella model shows that 
even if current livelihood strategies can be improved and social protection pro-
grams strengthened, significant numbers of households will remain vulnerable 
to droughts and other shocks while lacking the resources to cope effectively 
when a drought strikes. For these households, policy makers will need to devise 
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BOX O.3
Summary of recommendations to make current 
livelihoods more resilient
(1) Livestock
• Increase production of meat, milk, and hides in drylands by developing 
sustainable delivery systems for animal health, promoting increased market 
integration, and exploiting complementarities between drylands and 
higher rainfall areas. 
• Enhance the mobility of herds by expanding and ensuring adequate and 
equitable year-round access to grazing and water and by improving secu-
rity in pastoral zones.
• Develop livestock early warning systems (LEWSs) and early response sys-
tems to reduce the adverse impacts of shocks.
• Identify additional and alternative livelihood strategies, including through 
systems of payment for environmental services.
(2) Farming
• Accelerate the rate of varietal turnover and increase availability of hybrids.
• Improve soil fertility management.
• Improve agricultural water management.
• Promote the development of irrigation, including both rehabilitation of 
existing capacity, as well as expansion, up to the viable potential (a max of 
about 10 more million hectares); and focusing on small-scale systems, with 
good access to markets for cash crops. 
(3) Natural resource management 
• Promote farmer-managed natural regeneration (FMNR) to establish a range 
of beneficial trees throughout the drylands.
• Invest in tree germplasm multiplication and promote planting of location-
appropriate high-value species especially in dry subhumid areas.
• Develop opportunities to add value to tree products produced in the 
drylands.
(4) Social protection
• Establish and gradually expand the coverage of national adaptive safety 
net programs that promote resilience of the poorest people.
• Use social protection programs to build capacity of vulnerable households 
to climb out of poverty, but maintain the ability to provide humanitarian 
assistance in the short run.
• Respond to emergencies by scaling up existing programs, rather than rely-
ing on appeals for humanitarian assistance.
• Tailor social protection programs to address the unique circumstances of 
dryland populations.
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strategies to facilitate the transition to alternative livelihood activities. While the 
results of the umbrella modeling exercise help in defining the extent to which 
alternative livelihood strategies will be needed, this book does not present 
detailed analysis of the policy reforms and the complementary investments in 
human and physical capital that will be needed to help poor and vulnerable 
households in the drylands transition out of natural resource-based livelihoods 
to productive employment in other sectors, nor does it make specific recom-
mendations relating to these policy reforms and investments. These types of 
interventions falls outside the scope of the present inquiry, and further work 
will be needed to cover them adequately.
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Note
1.  First proposed by Budyko (1958) and subsequently endorsed by the United Nations 
Environment Programme as part of the preparations for the United Nations 
Conference on Desertification.
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1Chapter 1
The Central Role of Drylands in 
Africa’s Development Challenge
Michael Morris, Raffaello Cervigni, Zhe Guo, Jawoo Koo
The dramatic humanitarian crises caused by the crippling droughts that have 
ravaged the Horn of Africa and the Sahel in recent years have once again 
brought to the forefront of the development debate the chronic vulnerability of 
many of the people living in dryland regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. Breaking 
the recurring cycle of drought, suffering, and impoverishment will not be easy. 
To design the resilience-enhancing interventions needed to shield people living 
in drylands from the droughts and other shocks that they regularly experience, 
policy makers and donor partners must be able to identify the vulnerabilities 
that keep so many households mired in poverty, project how these vulnerabili-
ties will evolve over time, and evaluate the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of interventions that have the potential to improve and stabilize the 
livelihood strategies on which the most vulnerable households depend. 
Definition of “drylands”
What exactly are “drylands”? While commonly used, the term has different 
interpretations. For reasons of simplicity, and consistent with widespread prac-
tice, in this book “drylands” are defined on the basis of the Aridity Index (AI). 
Under this approach, which has been endorsed by the 195 parties to the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and which is also 
being used by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
drylands are defined as regions having an AI of 0.65 or less (for details, see 
UNEP 1997). Drylands furthermore can be sub-divided into four zones: hyper-
arid (AI 0–0.05), arid (AI 0.05–0.20), semi-arid (AI 0.20–0.50), and dry subhu-
mid (AI 0.50–0.65). 
Part A. Key issues and challenges
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Because the hyper-arid zone is incapable of supporting crop and livestock 
production activities, it is very sparsely populated, making it of little interest to 
policy makers. For purposes of this book, “drylands” is therefore defined as the 
area characterized by an AI of 0.05–0.65, encompassing the arid, semi-arid, and 
dry subhumid zones (Map 1.1).
Reasons for concern about drylands 
Defined based on the AI, as above, drylands in Sub-Saharan Africa cover about 
13.9 million km2 (Map 1.1). They are home to about 425 million people and 
account for 70 percent of the region’s cropland, 66 percent of cereal production, 
and 82 percent of livestock holdings (figures refer to 2010). Most drylands are 
marginal environments characterized by challenging agro-climatic conditions 
and endowed with limited resources to support primary production activities, 
such as livestock-keeping and farming, so they tend to be hotspots of natural 
resource degradation. In addition, because of the remoteness of many drylands, 
the rule of law is often weak, leading to unusually high levels of conflict in dry-
lands that further exacerbate the vulnerability of local populations. The fragility 
of current livelihood strategies in drylands is often compounded by the social 
and political marginalization of many of the groups that live in drylands, which 
Map 1.1 Dryland regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, defined in terms of the Aridity Index
Source: ©Harvest Choice, IFPRI, 2015. Reproduced, with permission from Zhe Guo, 2015; further permission 
required for reuse.
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muffles their voices and limits their ability to influence political processes that 
affect their well-being (Kerven and Behnke 2014). For all of these reasons, dry-
lands are home to a large share of the region’s poor, as well as many of those 
lacking access to basic services, such as health care, education, water, and 
sanitation.
Today in the drylands, frequent and severe shocks—especially those caused 
by recurring extreme and prolonged droughts—limit the livelihood opportuni-
ties available to millions of poor households and undermine efforts to eradicate 
poverty. In the absence of robust social protection systems and rapidly scalable 
safety nets, these shocks cause large drains on government budgets and con-
sume a significant portion of the region’s international development assistance. 
As a result, scarce resources are diverted away from pursuing longer-term devel-
opment goals and redirected to mobilizing costly short-term responses to 
humanitarian crises. In 2011 around US$4 billion was spent on humanitarian 
assistance to the Sahel and Horn of Africa alone, equivalent to 10 percent of 
total Overseas Development Assistance to all of Sub-Saharan Africa (OECD 
2015). 
If the current situation is precarious, the future promises to be even more 
challenging. By 2030 the population living in drylands is expected to grow by 
58–74 percent (depending on the fertility scenario), putting increased pressure 
on a resource base already severely stretched. Over the same period, climate 
change could result in an expansion of the area classified as drylands (up to 20 
percent under some scenarios), bringing more people into environments in 
which livelihood options are limited and in which opportunities to ensure resil-
ience are severely constrained. Higher population density in the drylands will 
put additional pressure on a fragile resource base, pushing it in some cases 
beyond its natural regenerative capacity. This could escalate social conflicts over 
land, water, and biomass. At the same time, higher population density will bring 
new development opportunities linked to greater market size, increased eco-
nomic specialization, and enhanced value addition, as well as possibilities to 
achieve cost savings in the provision of vital services such as education, health 
care, water and sanitation, energy, communications, and security. 
Because the ongoing transformation of the drylands is being propelled by 
demographic drivers that have a great deal of momentum, it is in many respects 
inevitable. In this context the key question for policy makers is how to best 
manage the coming demographic, social, and economic changes to achieve the 
best possible outcomes. As governments and donor partners contemplate the 
design of the next generation of policies and programs for the drylands, it is 
important to know whether traditional pursuits, especially livestock-keeping 
and crop farming, can be made sufficiently productive and stable in the face of 
demographic, economic, and climatic change to provide secure livelihoods for 
the entire population. If the scope for sustainable intensification is limited, 
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fundamental transformations of the predominant livelihood systems may be 
needed to avoid increasingly frequent and ever more consequential humanitar-
ian crises.
The stakes extend far beyond the drylands themselves. The facts that dry-
lands are home to such a large share of Africa’s population and account for such 
a large proportion of the region’s total food supply mean that population 
dynamics and agricultural activities in drylands affect the demographics and 
food security of the continent as a whole. In addition, because many people 
living in drylands lack the resilience needed to recover from droughts and other 
shocks, drylands are home to disproportionate numbers of the region’s poor. 
For this reason, it will be impossible to meet many of the long-term develop-
ment goals shared by African governments and donor partners—including the 
World Bank Group’s twin goals of reduced poverty and shared prosperity—
unless the problems of drylands are addressed.
Objectives of this book
What are the prospects for making poor households living in dryland regions 
of Africa resilient in the face of the crippling droughts and other shocks that so 
regularly disrupt their livelihood activities, often with devastating conse-
quences? Will economic growth alone solve the problem by providing these 
households with the resources needed to protect themselves from the effects of 
droughts and other shocks? To what extent can technical interventions increase 
the productivity, stability, and sustainability of the livestock-keeping and crop 
production activities on which most of these households depend? If economic 
growth and technical interventions are likely to fall short, what other options 
are available to secure the well-being of vulnerable populations? 
The World Bank Group, in collaboration with many partners—including 
FAO, IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute), ILRI (International 
Livestock Research Institute), ICRAF (World Agroforestry Centre [known as 
the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, ICRAF before 2002), 
ICARDA (International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas), 
ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics), 
CIRAD (Agricultural Research for Development), CILSS (Permanent Interstates 
Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel), and WRI (World Resources 
Institute)—recently carried out a major study designed to address these ques-
tions. Taking advantage of the rich set of data, knowledge, and analytical tools 
that have become available in recent years, the study team developed an original 
quantitative framework that allowed it to project through 2030 patterns of vul-
nerability in African drylands and test the likely impacts of a series of policy 
reforms and technical interventions. This book presents key findings and 
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recommendations emerging from the study. Focusing primarily on the two big-
gest vulnerability hotspots—the Sahel region of West Africa and the Horn of 
Africa region in East Africa—the book sheds light on the factors contributing 
to vulnerability among dryland populations, identifies strategies for enhancing 
the resilience of the millions of households that depend on traditional liveli-
hood strategies, such as livestock-keeping and farming, and draws a number of 
conclusions that have important implications for policy making and program 
design.
The book has three principal objectives: 
1. Characterize current and future challenges to reducing vulnerability and 
increasing resilience in the drylands of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
2. Identify interventions that can enhance the resilience of populations living 
in the drylands, estimate the cost of these interventions, and assess their 
effectiveness. 
3. Provide an evidence-based framework that can be used to improve decision 
making on alternative options to enhance resilience.
Based on a comprehensive review of the evidence, the book argues that two 
distinct yet complementary approaches will be needed to reduce vulnerability 
and increase resilience in dryland regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, as follows: 
1. Improve current livelihood activities: For the foreseeable future, most of 
the people living in drylands in East and West Africa will continue to make 
their living from herding and farming. For that reason it will be important 
to make current livelihood strategies (especially pastoralism, agro-pastoral-
ism, and crop farming) more productive and more resilient. The book there-
fore examines in detail technical options for improving current livelihood 
strategies, and it uses a range of modeling approaches to assess the potential 
impacts of different technical interventions in terms of making existing live-
lihood strategies more productive and more resilient. 
2. Strengthen social protection programs including rapidly scalable safety 
nets: In many parts of the drylands, even the most productive, stable, and 
sustainable livelihood activities will not be fully immune to the effects of 
droughts and other shocks. For this reason, it will be necessary to put in 
place social protection programs including rapidly scalable safety nets to 
address the needs of those lacking the resilience to cope effectively with the 
effects of droughts and other shocks. Therefore this book examines in detail 
the feasibility and likely cost of using safety nets and other types of social 
protection programs to provide assistance to those in need. 
Improving current livelihood activities and strengthening social protection 
programs have significant potential to reduce vulnerability and enhance 
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resilience of populations living in drylands, but both are likely to face limits, 
particularly in the face of technological, financial, and fiscal constraints. In 
light of these limits, policy makers will need to consider a third set of inter-
ventions, namely, those that encourage dryland populations to switch to alter-
native livelihood activities that are less vulnerable to droughts and other 
shocks. By assessing the scope and limitations of the first two types of inter-
ventions, this book helps define the importance, across the group of countries 
analyzed, of the third type of intervention. The book does not attempt to iden-
tify or analyze in detail the alternative livelihood activities that may offer the 
brightest prospects for dryland populations in East and West Africa; that 
would require high-level analysis of long-term structural transformation pro-
cesses affecting the dryland counties, combined with a series of “deep-dive” 
analyses focusing on associated topics, such as demographics, health, educa-
tion, and employment. Those tasks fall outside the scope of the present study 
and remain topics for future research.
Value-added of this book
Several features of this book distinguish it from the many other books, studies 
and reports that have focused on questions of vulnerability and resilience in the 
drylands of sub-Saharan Africa. 
First, the study whose results are presented here was carried out by a large 
team of collaborators representing the full range of organizations that are active 
in dryland development initiatives, including government agencies, regional 
organizations, multilateral development agencies, research institutes, and non-
governmental organizations. These many collaborators brought with them a 
range of perspectives and a wealth of knowledge that are reflected in a study of 
unparalleled scope and unprecedented depth.
Second, the study team developed a comprehensive analytical framework 
that incorporates insights derived from work done in many different sectors. In 
addition to exploring opportunities to increase productivity through sustain-
able intensification of current livelihood strategies (such as livestock-keeping 
and crop production), the analytical framework considers opportunities to 
reduce vulnerability and increase resilience in drylands through investments in 
social protection instruments, improved connectivity, and disaster risk manage-
ment programs.
Third, the approach used by the study team is evidence based. Because of the 
technical difficulty and high cost of conducting surveys in sparsely populated 
and physically remote dryland areas, credible data on the activities of dryland 
populations are often lacking. For this reason, the study team invested consider-
able time and effort into assembling data sets that could be used to carry out 
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rigorous quantitative analysis. Modeling efforts focused on a number of areas, 
including the dynamics of dryland livestock systems, the technical and eco-
nomic potential for irrigation development in drylands, the potential for sus-
tainable intensification of rainfed cropping systems in drylands, and the likely 
evolution of vulnerable populations living in drylands.
Limitations of the book
This book presents a wealth of analytical results that go beyond previously avail-
able knowledge, but even so, it suffers from a number of shortcomings. Three 
are worth mentioning. First, the coverage is geographically limited. The primary 
focus is on the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, two hotspot regions featuring 
extensive dryland areas that have been particularly hard hit in recent decades. 
Despite the best efforts of the study team to find and exploit all available data 
sets for these two focal areas, gaps remain in the empirical record, particularly 
in countries that have suffered extended periods of conflict and in countries that 
have lacked capacity to collect, process, and publish statistics. The scope of cov-
erage is relatively good in the Sahel, where the main resilience analysis covers 
approximately 85 percent of the projected 2030 population. It is more limited in 
the Horn of Africa, where the main resilience analysis covers approximately 69 
percent of the projected 2030 population. 
Second, even in areas for which data are available, the data do not cover all 
relevant topics. There is much we still don’t know about drylands—with respect 
to their physical features; the characteristics of the resident plant, animal, and 
human communities; and the dynamic processes that shape the interactions 
between physical features and living communities. 
Third, despite the efforts of the study team to adopt a broad view in analyzing 
vulnerability and resilience in the drylands, because of time and resource limi-
tations, it was necessary to restrict the focus of analysis; as a result, certain topics 
were not covered in depth. For example, while it is well known that conflict 
contributes to the vulnerability of many of the people living in the Sahel and the 
Horn of Africa, the topic of conflict was not covered in depth, as this would have 
required extensive analysis from a social, cultural, and political economy per-
spective of the historical forces that over time have shaped distributions of 
wealth, power, and influence and given rise to present-day conflicts. 
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9Chapter 2
Resilience and its Determinants:  
A Conceptual Framework
Michael Morris, Raffaello Cervigni
Analyzing resilience: Conceptual and data challenges
Prospects for sustainable development of drylands are assessed in this book 
through the lens of resilience. But what exactly is meant by resilience? While 
there are many ways to define resilience, most definitions highlight the ability 
of people or ecosystems to withstand and recover from short-term shocks, in 
this case understood to mean mainly droughts. The approach used in this book 
is consistent with common practice, but it is not as broad as some approaches 
in that it focuses more broadly on people rather than ecosystems (see Box 2.1 ).
BOX 2 .1
Resilience: Ecological and socioeconomic approaches
Consistent with the focus of many governments and of much of the develop-
ment community, this book uses the concept of resilience as a framework for 
assessing the effectiveness of potential interventions to increase incomes, 
reduce poverty, and improve the welfare of people living in drylands. It is 
important to recognize, however, that the concept of resilience is used here in 
a way that differs from the way it is often used in the biological and human 
sciences, where it has a long and useful intellectual lineage. In the biological 
and human sciences, resilience typically refers to systems, not individuals, and a 
distinction is often made between the resilience of a system and the stability of 
a system (Holling 1973 cited in Kerven and Behnke 2014). Resilience refers to 
the persistence of a system and its ability to absorb change and disturbance 
and maintain the same relationships. In contrast, stability represents the ability 
of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance; the 
more rapidly it returns and the less it fluctuates, the more stable it is. Critically, 
resilience may come at a cost in terms of exposure to risk and the maintenance 
(continued next page)
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This book uses a simple conceptual framework for analyzing resilience in 
African drylands, one that attempts to reconcile the key features of resilience 
with the constrained realities of data availability in Africa. The starting point for 
analysis is the observation that drylands tend to be particularly exposed to 
droughts, which in combination with other factors contributes to particularly 
unfavorable development outcomes in drylands. 
Using Nigeria as an example, the Palmer Drought Severity Index can be used 
to show the differential occurrence and severity of drought phenomena in dry-
land zones (Map 2.1). Over the period 1950–2008, severe drought events lasting 
two or more years occurred with much greater frequency in the drier northern 
part of Nigeria than in the more humid central belt or the well-watered south-
ern part. The extremely dry northwestern part of the country was a particular 
hotspot, with severe drought events occurring in more than 30 percent of all 
years.
The droughts that disproportionally affect drylands contribute to consis-
tently negative development outcomes. Evidence of this comes from a series of 
surveys carried out between 2008 and 2013 in six countries (Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) under the World Bank-supported Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS). While these six countries do not 
of a diverse set of responses to risk. Resilience may also come at a cost to indi-
vidual organisms; what is resilient, survives, and persists is the system or com-
munity, not an individual component within it.
In this book the primary focus is on people—communities, households, and 
their individual members—rather than on livelihood systems as such. The dis-
tinction is important because it allows us to recognize that even though the 
livelihood systems found in drylands may be resilient over the longer term, they 
also tend to be unstable in the short to medium-term, subjecting the people 
who rely on those livelihood systems to significant swings in fortune when 
shocks hit, as they frequently do. Systems analysts argue correctly that dryland 
livelihood systems, such as pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, and farming, have 
demonstrated a remarkable ability to recover from major shocks; however, gov-
ernment authorities and development practitioners cannot simply ignore the 
considerable instability that occurs along the way. When shocks hit—for exam-
ple, the severe droughts that ravage many dryland areas on a regular basis—it 
may be true that the prevailing livelihood systems are likely to recover eventu-
ally, but in the short run the humanitarian consequences are severe: crops fail, 
animals die, and people go hungry and eventually starve. Governments, the 
development community, and humanitarian organizations obviously cannot 
ignore these short-term effects.
Box 2.1 (continued)
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represent the entire range of countries that are the focus of this book, all contain 
significant dryland areas, and as such, they provide useful insights that are of 
relevance to drylands generally.
Consistent with expectations, across the six countries included in the LSMS 
sample, the incidence of poverty is higher in dryland zones than in other more 
humid zones, and the poverty headcount increases with the level of aridity 
(Figure 2.1). The overall averages mask considerable variability between indi-
vidual countries, especially in terms of the level of poverty, but the relative 
Figure 2.1 Poverty headcount by aridity zone, selected countries, 2010
Source: D’Errico and Zezza 2015
Note: Based on data collected in selected countries with significant drylands: Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Uganda.
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Map 2.1 Distribution of drought hotspots in Nigeria, 1950–2008
Source: Authors’ calculation
Note: Severe drought is defined as Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) less than –3.
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incidence across aridity zones is quite consistent, with the poverty headcount 
being higher in more arid zones in all countries except Tanzania.
Not surprisingly, the higher levels of poverty observed in dryland zones are 
associated with higher levels of food insecurity (Figure 2.2), which in turn 
affects health indicators (Figure 2. 3). 
Figure 2.2 Average food consumption score, drylands vs. non-drylands, 2010
Source: D’Errico and Zezza 2015
Note: Food security is a complex phenomenon that cannot be easily captured by any one indicator. In this 
figure, the Food Consumption Score (FCS, Wiesmann et al., 2009) is used to approximate food security. The 
FCS is based on the weighted frequency (number of days in a week eaten) of 8 food groups: staples, pulses, 
vegetables, fruits, meat/fish/egg, milk, sugar, oil. A higher score is purported to indicate a greater food security.
Figure 2.3 Underweight children, drylands vs. non-drylands, 2010
Source: D’Errico and Zezza 2015
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The LSMS data show a link between drylands and negative development 
outcomes, but the picture is static, because the LSMS data were collected in each 
country through a one-off survey. Resilience refers to the ability of households 
to cope successfully with droughts and other shocks; since coping activities take 
place over time, resilience is an inherently dynamic concept. For this reason, 
accurate measurement of resilience requires panel data—that is, data collected 
from households at multiple points in time. In addition, because resilience is 
complex and multi-faceted, it cannot be understood unless data are available on 
several types of variables:
 1. The frequency and severity of droughts or other shocks; 
 2. Multiple household characteristics that determine why some households 
respond better than others to shocks of similar nature; and
 3. Development outcomes (e.g., poverty, nutrition score, health status).
In many countries in East and West Africa, high-quality data on these vari-
ables are not available. In the relatively few cases where high-quality data are 
available, frequently they are available for only one point in time, which is 
severely limiting when it comes to analyzing resilience, because data from a 
single point in time reveal little about the movements by individual households 
in and out of poverty. This is an important limitation, as there may be significant 
differences in the causes of—and eventual solutions to—chronic structural pov-
erty on the one hand and transient stochastic poverty on the other (Carter and 
Barrett 2006, Barrett and Carter 2013).
Scandizzo et al. (2014) analyzed the dynamics of vulnerability and resilience 
at the household level using a unique set of panel data for Ethiopia collected 
over a 16-year period (four rounds of surveys were conducted between 1994 
and 2009). These authors found that over the 16 years covered by the panel, 
many households in the sample transitioned in and out of poverty, so during a 
period when the overall poverty headcount was gradually coming down, the 
fortunes of individual households tended to be highly variable (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Shares of households in transition across poverty status, Ethiopia (1994–2009)
Year Move into poverty (%)
Stay  
poor (%)
Stay  
non-poor (%)
Move out of  
poverty (%)
1994 NA NA NA NA
1999 18 17 45 20 
2004 19 16 48 16 
2009 18 17 46 19 
Source: Scandizzo et al. 2014
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The amount of movement among households in the sample is surprisingly 
high. On average in any given year, approximately 18–19 percent of households 
started out non-poor and fell into poverty, 16–17 percent of households started 
out poor and stayed poor, 16–20 percent of households started out poor and 
climbed out of poverty, and 45–48 percent of households started out non-poor 
and remained non-poor. An important insight emerging from these results is 
that conventional measures of poverty can conceal as much as they reveal. 
Within a given population, many combinations of completely different lifetime 
stories can give rise to the same poverty headcount. This means that policy 
makers and development practitioners need to have a good understanding of 
the dynamic factors that determine vulnerability and resilience at the household 
level if they are going to design effective dryland development policies.
In the absence of panel data, efforts to understand the determinants of vulner-
ability and resilience in drylands typically rely on cross-sectional data. Analysis of 
cross-sectional data can produce important insights into the factors associated 
with negative development outcomes, but these insights often lack the degree of 
specificity needed for the design of policies specific to drylands (see Box 2.2).
The determinants of resilience
Mindful of the limitations of currently available socioeconomic and climatic 
data, which make it difficult to estimate directly the resilience of households 
living in the drylands, this book uses an approach based on the identification of 
the likely determinants of resilience, rather than on the measurement of resil-
ience itself.
Resilience—understood here to mean the ability of individuals, households, 
and/or communities to withstand and respond to droughts and other shocks1 
—is determined by three factors: 
• Exposure can be defined as the nature and degree to which the income-
generating assets of a household are located in places where they are subject 
to droughts and other shocks. A household whose assets are located in an 
area in which severe droughts occur once in every 5 years on average is more 
exposed than a household whose assets are located in an area in which severe 
droughts occur once in every 15 years on average. Exposure is an exogenous 
dimension of vulnerability, that is, it is beyond the control of the household 
in the short run. 
• Sensitivity is the degree to which a household is affected by droughts and 
other shocks. For a given level of exposure, a household that derives a large 
share of its income from drought-affected activities (e.g., rainfed cropping, 
pasture-based livestock production) will have a higher sensitivity to 
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BOX 2 .2
The challenge of analyzing dryland poverty through 
cross-country analysis
In an effort to identify the main correlates of poverty in dryland zones in six 
countries, D’Errico and Zezza (2015) estimated a probit model in which a binary 
poverty variable was regressed on a set of control variables that included 
household demographic characteristics (a vector H including household size, 
dependency ratio, and gender of the household head); household assets (a 
vector A including average education of adult members, land owned, livestock 
owned, and an index of access to infrastructure); and a set of variables S indi-
cating the distance of the household from school and health facilities. They 
controlled for the number of income sources to which the household has 
access in order to capture the extent to which income diversification may be 
associated with lower probability of being poor. Finally, they controlled for a 
range of agro-climatic and soil variables T. Included in the regressions were the 
Aridity Index and soil quality (as measured by organic carbon content), to assess 
whether those are systematically correlated with poverty status. Much of the 
concern with livelihoods in drylands is associated with the idea that households 
in drylands are exposed to a higher level of climate hazards compared to the 
average household. To capture the effect that these hazards may have on wel-
fare, D’Errico and Zezza introduced as additional right-hand side variables the 
long-term coefficients of variation of maximum temperature and precipitation 
during the growing season. 
The model can be written as: Pr (Yi =1|Xi) = Φ(Xi β)
where Xi = f (Hi ,Ai, Si, Ti, Di), and Φ is the standard cumulative distribution 
function. The dependent variable is an indicator set equal to 1 if a household 
falls below the poverty line, and 0 otherwise. D is a vector of country fixed 
effects. The subscript i denotes the households. The approach used is fairly 
standard in country-level poverty analyses, and as always the results should be 
interpreted as showing correlation but not necessarily causality. 
The model results show that better access to land is associated with lower 
poverty in all aridity zones (except in arid zones, where the coefficient is not 
statistically significant). Similarly, greater income diversification is correlated 
with lower poverty across all zones. Somewhat surprisingly, livestock ownership 
is strongly correlated (negatively) with poverty in non-dryland zones, but the 
correlation is insignificant in dryland zones. The effect of the infrastructure 
index appears to decline with the decline in aridity, being 7 times larger in arid 
areas and 3 times larger in semi-arid areas than in non-dryland areas. This find-
ing suggests that infrastructure investments in dryland areas could have a par-
ticularly pronounced effect on reducing poverty.
(continued next page)
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droughts, other things equal, than a household that derives a small share of 
its income from drought-affected activities. Sensitivity is determined in large 
part by past decisions made by the household regarding the nature and mix 
of its assets and by its livelihood strategy. Changing the nature and mix of 
assets, as well as the livelihood strategy, is one of the main avenues the house-
hold can follow to enhance its resilience.
• Coping capacity refers to the ability of a household to mitigate the impact 
of droughts and other shocks after they occur. Access to financial resources 
(from its own savings, from friends or relatives, or from social safety nets) 
can help the household make up for an income shortfall resulting from, for 
example, a drop in production following a drought. Liquidating productive 
assets to mitigate the negative impacts of current droughts may reduce the 
ability of the household to mitigate the impacts of future droughts, that is, it 
will reduce the household’s resilience. 
Since it is unlikely that all risks can be avoided by diversifying household 
assets and altering income-generating activities to reduce exposure to future 
shocks, resilience-enhancing strategies usually consist of a combination of 
actions to reduce sensitivity and actions to increase coping capacity.
The methods used to estimate the number of people exposed, sensitive to, 
and unable to cope with droughts and other shocks are described in Chapter 4.
The vulnerability (and by extension the resilience) of a given household 
depends on the combined effect of these three factors. A household is vulnerable 
when, by virtue of its physical location, livelihood activities, and assets, it is 
exposed to droughts and other shocks, sensitive to droughts and other shocks, 
and lacks the capacity to cope effectively when a drought or some other shock 
An interesting aspect of the modeling results relates to the rainfall, tempera-
ture, and soil quality attributes. Rainfall variability is associated with significantly 
higher probability of households being poor in both arid and semi-arid areas, but 
the coefficient on rainfall variability is not significantly different from zero in non-
dryland areas. In contrast, the coefficient on the variability in maximum tempera-
ture is not significant for drylands as a whole. Finally, in dryland zones the organic 
carbon content of the soil, a proxy for soil fertility, appears to be associated with 
a lower probability of being poor, while no association between poverty and soil 
fertility is detected for non-dryland areas.
The overall picture that emerges from this analysis is that the quantity and 
quality of land resources, access to infrastructure, and exposure to variability in 
rainfall are strongly correlated with poverty. By and large, the correlates of pov-
erty in dryland zones do not appear to be structurally different from the corre-
lates in non-dryland zones.
Box 2.2 (continued)
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occurs. Conversely, a household is resilient when it is not exposed to droughts and 
other shocks, or is insensitive to droughts and other shocks, or is able to cope 
effectively when a drought or some other shock occurs. In the aggregate the resil-
ience of a country in the face of droughts and other shocks increases the lower the 
share of the population exposed, the lower the share of people sensitive, and the 
greater the share of exposed and sensitive people who are able to cope. Over time, 
resilience is determined by the interplay of all three of these dimensions. 
The approach used in this book takes into account all three dimensions of 
resilience, considering the current situation in drylands and also projecting how 
the three dimensions are likely to evolve in future under a number of plausible 
scenarios. The approach has the advantage of avoiding the pitfalls of defining 
policies for drylands based on the individual determinants of resilience. For 
example, when relatively few people have incomes that are so low as to place 
them below the poverty line, it would be easy to conclude that the coping capac-
ity of the population is relatively high, since most households dispose of enough 
assets to be able to recover from a drought, should a drought occur. Based on 
this reasoning, policy makers might focus on the poverty headcount as a good 
indicator of vulnerability.
But focusing in this way on a single dimension of resilience could obscure the 
fact that even though most households dispose of enough assets to recover from 
a drought, the livelihood strategy that allowed them to accumulate those assets 
may be very sensitive to droughts. If this is the case, even if households do not 
suffer from chronic structural poverty, they may still be subject to stochastic tran-
sient poverty, as recurrent droughts will cause them to cycle in and out of poverty 
over time (Carter and Barrett 2006, Barrett and Carter 2013). That being the case, 
the population at risk should be understood to include not only the people that 
are poor today, but also the people who risk becoming poor tomorrow because 
their income is exposed and sensitive to drought and other shocks.
As the Ethiopia experience shows, policies that succeed in lifting some peo-
ple out of poverty at a particular point in time do not necessarily guarantee that, 
as a result of subsequent shocks, many of these people will not fall back into 
poverty. As a result, it makes sense to explore policies and interventions that can 
address simultaneously all three dimensions of resilience. 
The policy significance of the determinants of resilience
In considering interventions to reduce vulnerability and improve resilience in 
the drylands, three types of interventions can be distinguished:
 1. Interventions that reduce exposure: These are interventions that cause 
households to take actions before a shock occurs so as to avoid the shock, 
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including by moving to a region in which droughts occur less frequently or 
less severely. For example, governments can encourage increased mobility 
among pastoralists, allowing them to move within or between countries to 
avoid drought hotspots, or they can facilitate migration away from drought-
prone zones by supporting the development of growth poles outside of 
drylands.
 2. Interventions that reduce sensitivity: These are interventions that cause 
households to take actions before a shock occurs so as to reduce the effects 
of the shock when it hits, for example, by diversifying their income sources 
or adopting more robust production technologies. For example, govern-
ments can support the adoption of drought-resistant crop varieties or pro-
mote the uptake of irrigation.
 3. Interventions that improve coping capacity: These are interventions that 
allow households to take actions after a shock has hit to speed their recovery 
from the effects of the shock, for example, by selling off animals, drawing 
down savings from a bank account, or relying on remittances from relatives. 
Alternatively, governments can provide improved access to social safety nets 
or enact policies to support the establishment or expansion of insurance 
markets.
What should the mix be of the three types of interventions, taking into 
account that the relative merits of each will differ depending on country cir-
cumstances? In some countries, it might make sense to focus efforts on increas-
ing coping capacity of vulnerable households, for example, by strengthening 
social safety nets or introducing affordable private insurance instruments. In 
other countries, there may be significant scope for reducing the sensitivity of 
vulnerable households, for example, by supporting the uptake of better livestock 
and farming technologies. In still other countries, where the fiscal cost of scaling 
up safety nets is high and the opportunities to make livelihoods less sensitive to 
shocks are limited, the priority might be to promote alternative livelihood strat-
egies or encourage the movement of vulnerable people away from drylands. 
Shocks affecting drylands
In the context of drylands, four types of shocks warrant attention from policy 
makers:
1. Meteorological shocks can be caused by weather in the short run or by cli-
mate change in the long run.
2. Health shocks can affect plants, animals, or people.
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3. Price shocks occur when households are subject to fluctuations in the prices 
of goods and services that they purchase or sell.
4. Conflict can lead to disruption of livelihood activities, loss of property dis-
placement, and/or bodily injury including death. 
This book focuses primarily on meteorological shocks, specifically droughts, 
with which vulnerability in the drylands is most often associated. Less attention 
is paid in the book to the other three types of shocks, each of which has unique 
causes that call for specialized solutions.
Resilience in the drylands is also affected by longer-term processes that over 
time undermine livelihood activities, such as land degradation and climate 
change. Because the effects of these longer-term processes are gradual, they 
rarely precipitate immediate humanitarian crises and therefore tend not to 
attract as much attention. While the impacts of these processes may not be felt 
immediately, they have the capacity to cause losses at extremely large scale, 
which is why they are briefly discussed in the following section of the chapter.
Relationship between resilience and poverty
What is the relationship between resilience and poverty? The way the terms are 
used in this book, there is a relationship between the two, but it is not direct and 
linear. Resilience is determined by the three factors described above—exposure, 
sensitivity, and coping capacity. To allow estimation of the numbers of people 
who are resilient, that is, able to recover from the effects of a shock, the poverty 
line is used to determine coping capacity: households that following a shock see 
their income fall below the poverty line are deemed unable to cope (i.e., these 
households are considered non-resilient), whereas households that following a 
shock see their income remain above the poverty line are deemed able to cope 
(i.e., these households are considered resilient). Whether a given household will 
see its income fall below the poverty line following the occurrence of a shock 
depends on the household’s income level before the onset of the shock, its 
degree of exposure to the shock, and the sensitivity of its livelihood strategy to 
the effects of the shock. Relatively poor households that started out just above 
the poverty line may be considered resilient if they are not highly exposed to the 
shock or if their income is not sensitive to the effects of the shock; relatively 
wealthy households that started out well above the poverty line may be consid-
ered non-resilient if they are highly exposed to the shock or if their income is 
extremely sensitive to the effects of the shock. In summary, poverty influences 
resilience, but it does not determine resilience.
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Note
1.  This definition focuses on people, not on ecosystems (see Box 2.1). For simplicity, 
the book refers mainly to households, since most data are collected at the household 
level.
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Chapter 3
Vulnerability in Drylands Today
Raffaello Cervigni, Michael Morris, Pasquale Scandizzo, Sara 
Savastano, Adriana Paolantonio, Federica Alfani, Alberto Zezza, Zhe 
Guo, Marco D’Errico, Riccardo Biancalani, Sally Bunning, Monica 
Petri, Mohamed Manssouri, Carol Kerven, Roy Behnke
Quantifying the dimensions of vulnerability across 
livelihood types
How many people living in dryland zones in East and West Africa are vulner-
able? Who are these people, and what are their livelihood strategies? What types 
of resources are needed by these people to become resilient? And how are the 
numbers of vulnerable people likely to evolve over the long run as the popula-
tion grows and the economy transforms?
If these questions are to be answered, vulnerability and resilience must be 
defined in a way that makes the two concepts easily measurable. In this book 
the following definitions are used to arrive at quantitative estimates of the num-
bers of vulnerable and resilient people living in drylands: 
• People exposed to droughts and other shocks are defined as people living 
in dryland areas, that is, areas classified according to the Aridity Index as 
hyper-arid, arid, semi-arid, or dry subhumid. Because most population data 
for African countries are not geo-referenced, it was necessary to spatialize 
UN population data using gridding methods routinely used in the literature. 
A major source was the dataset developed at the Columbia University Center 
for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) under the 
Global-Urban Mapping project (GRUMP) (for details see SEDAC 2015).
• People sensitive to drought are defined as the share of people dependent 
on agriculture, evaluated based on recent International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) estimates of the employment shares of agriculture (Fox et al. 2013), 
and assuming that people below working age depend on agriculture in the 
same proportion as people above working age. All those dependent on 
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agriculture are assumed to be equally sensitive to droughts and other 
shocks. This is admittedly a simplification, since the income share derived 
from agriculture varies across households. However, data needed to assess 
consistently across countries the income share derived from agriculture are 
not readily available. Survey-based evidence (Figure 3.1) suggests that in 
dryland areas, the share of income coming from farming and livestock-
keeping is at least 60 percent of the total, so this assumption should not 
bias the analysis excessively.
• People unable to cope with the effects of droughts and other shocks are 
defined as the proportion of exposed and sensitive people living below the 
international poverty line of US$1.25 per person per day. Separate estimates 
of rural and urban poverty rates are rarely available, so the national (overall) 
poverty rate was used. The resulting estimates of the number of vulnerable 
people are undoubtedly conservative, because (1) poverty is usually higher 
in rural areas than in urban areas and (2) poverty is usually higher in dryland 
areas than in non-dryland areas.
Recognizing that in drought years, people dependent on agriculture experi-
ence income losses, in some of the analyses carried out for this book the number 
of people unable to cope is estimated using other poverty lines. Based on World 
Food Programme (WFP) survey evidence, it is assumed that households with 
incomes exceeding the international poverty line of US$1.25 per person per day 
by 15 percent, 30 percent, and 45 percent would become unable to cope in the 
Figure 3.1 Income sources, drylands vs. non-drylands, selected countries, 2010
Source: D’Errico and Zezza 2015
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event of mild, moderate, and severe droughts, respectively. In each case, the 
corresponding poverty headcount is estimated based on income distribution 
data obtained from the PovCalnet1 database. 
Using the previous definitions it is possible to estimate the dimensions of 
vulnerability and resilience in the drylands of Africa in the baseline year of 2010 
(Table 3.1). Throughout the entire region, of the total 424 million people living 
in drylands (exposed to drought and other shocks), approximately 240 million 
were dependent on agriculture (sensitive to droughts and other shocks). Of 
these, some 97 million people were living below the poverty line (unable to cope 
with droughts and other shocks). In East and West Africa, the two sub-regions 
that are the main focus of this book, the equivalent numbers were 306 million 
people exposed, 186 million people sensitive, and 71 million people unable to 
cope with the effects of droughts and other shocks. Most exposed to droughts 
and other shocks were the people living in the driest zones, including the hyper-
arid, arid, and semi-arid zones. In these three zones, the population unable to 
cope with the effects of droughts and other shocks was on the order of 46 
Table 3.1 Dimensions of vulnerability in Africa’s drylands, 2010 (million people)
Regions/aridity zones Exposed Sensitive Unable to cope
Eastern Africa 150.6 96.6 29.2
A. Hyper-arid 4.7 2.9 0.5
B. Arid 30.5 18.8 3.9
C. Semi-arid 64.5 41.7 11.0
D. Dry-subhumid 50.9 33.1 13.8
Western Africa 155.5 89.9 42.2
A. Hyper-arid 0.9 0.5 0.2
B. Arid 19.2 12.2 4.8
C. Semi-arid 90.6 53.2 26.3
D. Dry-subhumid 44.8 23.9 11.0
Sub Total East and West Africa 306.1 186.4 71.5
Central Africa 13.0 8.5 5.1
B. Arid 0.1 0.1 0.0
C. Semi-arid 3.2 1.9 0.5
D. Dry-subhumid 9.7 6.6 4.6
Southern Africa 105.6 44.2 20.8
A. Hyper-arid 0.1 0.0 0.0
B. Arid 1.8 0.5 0.2
C. Semi-arid 56.8 20.7 7.8
D. Dry-subhumid 47.0 23.0 12.8
Grand Total 424.7 239.2 97.3
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million people, or roughly 15 percent of the total dryland population in East 
and West Africa.
Among the people who are exposed, sensitive, and unable to cope, in any 
given year only some will actually experience a drought or other type of shock. 
Since the frequency, geographical scale, and severity of shocks is stochastic, this 
number will vary considerably from year to year. The crop model developed by 
the African Risk Capacity (ARC) team, in combination with weather data 
reflecting the historical record of the past 20 years, was used to estimate the 
average share of people that is expected to be affected by drought annually. 
Depending on the country, the average share of people living in drylands 
expected to be affected by drought in any given year ranges from 7–20 percent, 
with an overall average of 14 percent (Figure 3.2). 
The estimated distribution of drought impacts is shown in Map 3.1. As dis-
cussed later in the book, these figures have particular policy significance because 
they determine the amount of resources that will have to be committed on a 
long-term basis to fund social safety nets needed to provide support to all of the 
people affected by droughts.
Figure 3.2 Percent of people vulnerable to and affected by drought, selected countries, 2010
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The figures appearing to the right of the bars indicate the average number of drought-affected people, 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of vulnerable people.
0 5 10 15 20 30 40 50
Gambia 16
Mauritania 7
Togo 20
Benin 17
Côte d’Ivoire 13
Ghana 7
Uganda 15
Senegal 15
Mali 18
Chad 12
Kenya 11
Niger 17
Burkina Faso 15
United Republic of Tanzania 14
Ethiopia 9
Nigeria 18
Vulnerable Vulnerable and affected
Millions
VULNERABILITY IN DRYLANDS TODAY  25
Estimating vulnerability across livelihood strategies
Three representative livelihood strategies were identified for use in (1) project-
ing the likely consequences of the ongoing demographic and socioeconomic 
transformation of the drylands, and (2) assessing the scope for increasing resil-
ience through the technical interventions. These strategies are:
1. Livestock-keeping only (“pastoralist households”)
2. Mixed livestock-crop production (“agro-pastoralist households”)
3. Crop production only (“farming households”)
In the absence of detailed census data, it is difficult to know exactly how 
many people are engaged in each of these three livelihood strategies. The 
approach used for this book was to combine information obtained from 
Map 3.1 Projected number of drought-affected people, annual average, selected countries, 2010
Source: © African Risk Capacity Agency, 2015. Reproduced, with permission from Joanna Syroka, 2015; fur-
ther permission required for reuse.
Note: Using as a baseline the 2010 population, the map shows the number of vulnerable people in each poly-
gon likely to be affected by drought in a 12 month period. The number of vulnerable people was calculated 
based on the number of people dependent on agriculture and living below the international poverty line. The 
number of people likely to be affected by drought was estimated with the help of the ARC model using crop 
yield simulations (for details, see Fallavier and Cervigni 2014). Rainfall data for the past 21 seasons, considered 
to be a representative distribution of the rainfall could have been experienced in 2010, were used to gener-
ate for each polygon 21 estimates of the drought-affected population; these were then used to calculate the 
annual average (or expected) drought-affected population. The map shows drought “hotspots,” identified in 
terms of the average absolute number of people affected. The average absolute number provides a composite 
picture of the expected frequency and magnitude of drought events in a given polygon and the number of 
people considered at risk from drought in that polygon. An increase in either factor will increase the annual 
average number of drought-affected people in a given polygon.
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socioeconomic surveys, mainly those found in the World Bank Survey-based 
Harmonized Indicators Program (SHIP) database, with estimates from agro-
ecological analysis. In particular the calculations were:
• The number of people engaged in crop production only (“farming house-
holds”) was estimated based on the number of rural households that reported 
not owning any livestock (in a few countries where data on livestock owner-
ship were not available, expert judgment was used).
• The number of people engaged in livestock production was estimated as the 
residual (i.e., those not engaged in crop production only). To distinguish 
between people engaged in livestock-keeping only (“pastoralists”) and peo-
ple engaged in mixed livestock-crop production (“agro-pastoralists”), the 
ILRI/FAO map of livestock production systems was superimposed on the 
population map. People living in locations associated with livestock-only 
production systems were assumed to be pastoralists, and people living in 
locations associated with mixed crop-livestock systems were assumed to be 
agro-pastoralists. (Details of the calculations appear in de Haan et al. 2015.) 
The results of these estimations for East and West Africa are summarized in 
Table 3.2. In 2010, of the approximately 171 million people living in drylands 
and dependent on agriculture, about 26 million were pastoralists, 105 million 
were agro-pastoralists, and 40 million were crop farmers.
At the level of individual countries, agro-pastoralists are usually the domi-
nant group, but not always, as the relative importance of the three livelihood 
strategies varies as a function of local agro-ecological and socioeconomic char-
acteristics (Figure 3.3).
Table 3.2 Estimated agriculture-dependent population, East and West Africa, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2010 
Population
Dependent  
on 
agriculture
of which
Crop farming Pastoralism Mixed farming
Drylands 247.7 171.2 39.5 26.2 105.5
East Africa 92.2 64.7 17.6 12.7 34.3
West Africa 155.5 106.5 21.9 13.5 71.1
Non drylands 269.0 195.7 57.3 13.0 125.4
East Africa 109.6 78.2 20.8 4.4 53.1
West Africa 159.4 117.5 36.5 8.6 72.3
Total 516.7 366.9 96.8 39.3 230.8
Source: Population data from UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), breakdown by aridity zone from IFPRI 
(International Food Policy Research Institute).
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Having established basic order-of-magnitude estimates of the determinants 
of vulnerability among dryland populations, as well as of the distribution of 
people across main livelihood types, the rest of this chapter discusses key 
aspects of the development challenge faced by people living in drylands. These 
relate to natural capital (Section on land degradation), physical capital (Section 
on access to infrastructure), and social capital (Section on political economy 
factors affecting resilience).
Selected drivers of vulnerability
Land degradation
What is the relationship, if any, between land quality and resilience? More spe-
cifically in the context of this book, to what extent does land degradation influ-
ence patterns of vulnerability and resilience in dryland regions of Africa?
These seemingly straightforward questions turn out to be difficult to answer 
for two reasons. First, land quality characteristics are often evaluated differently 
by different groups of users, making empirical measurement of land quality con-
ceptually challenging. Second, even when there is agreement about how land 
quality characteristics should be measured, the needed data may be lacking. 
Between 2006 and 2011 the Land Degradation Assessment in Drylands 
Project (LADA)—funded by GEF (Global Environment Programme), imple-
mented by UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), and executed by 
Figure 3.3 Estimated dryland population dependent on agriculture in 2010 by country and 
livelihood type (millions of people)
Source: Authors’ calculations
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FAO—created a database and a set of associated analytical tools for use in for-
mulating informed policy advice on land degradation in drylands at global, 
national, and local levels. Using available global datasets, a Global Land 
Degradation Information System (GLADIS) was developed that can be used to 
assess land quality status and trends based on four biophysical parameters (bio-
mass, biodiversity, soil, and water). In order to avoid the perspective bias 
described above, an effort was made to maintain a neutral point of view; thus, 
land quality was evaluated based on all potential uses, rather than in terms of 
its usefulness for one purpose or another.
As part of this study, information available through GLADIS was used to 
assess two key characteristics of land in the dryland regions of Africa: land 
degradation status and land degradation trends. The results of this assessment 
(reflected in Figure 3.4 and Map 3.2) generated several important insights:
• Much of the land in dryland zones of Africa is currently degraded; on aver-
age, the land in dryland zones is more degraded than the land in non-dry-
land zones.
• Much of the land in dryland zones of Africa is becoming more degraded, but 
not everywhere. In some locations, land quality is improving, thanks to 
large-scale land reclamation projects and re-greening efforts. 
Figure 3.4 Shares of total land area by land degradation classes
Source: Biancalani, Petri, and Bunning 2015
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• In dryland zones of Africa, land quality status does not appear to be highly 
correlated with population density, that is, land is not necessarily more 
degraded in areas in which population density is highest. 
• In dryland zones of Africa, land quality trends are highly correlated with 
population density, that is, land quality is getting worse in areas in which 
population density is highest.
The productivity and sustainability of the livelihood strategies that currently 
dominate in the drylands (herding and crop production) are sensitive to many 
of the factors included in the land quality indices reported by GLADIS, so the 
extent of highly degraded land in drylands and the negative trends observed in 
many locations provide grounds for concern. At the same time, the fact that the 
trend is positive in quite a few locations in the drylands shows that with the 
appropriate mix of policies, institutions, and supporting investments, land deg-
radation processes can be slowed and even reversed. 
Slowing and reversing land degradation in the drylands is an important pri-
ority, with the potential to affect positively the livelihoods of millions of poor 
and vulnerable households. An even greater priority is promoting the adoption 
of sustainable land management practices in areas that are still relatively unaf-
fected by degradation and in which the potential of the land is not yet being 
Map 3.2 Land degradation classes, Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: © Biancalani, Petri, and Bunning 2015. Used with permission.
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fully exploited (as evidenced by the existence of large yield gaps in livestock 
and/or crop production systems). In the latter areas, use of sustainable land 
management measures could raise productivity while preventing land degrada-
tion and increasing resilience of the interested populations.
It is important to stress that resilience is not only affected by land degradation as 
such. The progressive reduction of land productivity due to degradation processes 
implies a reduction in income, which in turn increases vulnerability. Implementation 
of sustainable land management measures, while not without costs, is essential for 
reversing the vicious circle triggered by land degradation, and for increasing and 
stabilizing land productivity and contributing to livelihoods and development. 
Access to infrastructure
What is the relationship, if any, between isolation and resilience? More specifically, 
to what extent does a household’s ability to access urban centers—home to services 
and markets—affect vulnerability and resilience in dryland regions of Africa?
The question is important, because many dryland zones are poorly served by 
transportation infrastructure, and travel times to the nearest large town are 
extremely high in many areas (Map 3.3).
Map 3.3 Travel time to the nearest town of 100,000 people, dryland zones, 2010
Source: Authors
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As can be seen in Map 3.3 travel time to the nearest large town increases with 
the level of aridity. This means that people living in the most arid zones are also 
the most likely to be disconnected from urban centers (Figure 3.5).
The relatively greater degree of isolation of people living in drylands contrib-
utes to their vulnerability and lack of resilience. A large body of literature con-
firms the view that geography matters enormously for economic activities and 
welfare, with the impacts transmitted mainly through differences in access to 
markets, access to natural resources, incidence of infectious diseases, and effec-
tiveness of governance (for examples, see Bloom and Sachs 1998; Hentschel et 
al. 2000; Jalan and Ravallion 2002; Ravallion and Datt 2002). More recently, 
Stifel and Minten (2008) examined the effects of isolation on agricultural pro-
ductivity in Madagascar. They discovered a strong inverse relationship between 
isolation and productivity, which they attributed to (1) transportation-induced 
transaction costs, (2) the inverse relationship between plot size and productiv-
ity, (3) increasing price variability and extensification onto less fertile land, and 
(4) insecurity. While comparable studies have not yet been done for many dry-
land regions in Africa, the same factors presumably are at play, as discussed at 
greater length in Chapter 8.
Figure 3.5 West Africa: Share of population at 4 hours or more travel from nearest market
Source: Authors
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Political economy factors affecting resilience
The conceptual framework used in this book to gain insights into the determi-
nants of vulnerability and resilience in drylands considers how existing liveli-
hood strategies may be affected by exogenous shocks, especially droughts. The 
impacts of these shocks on individual groups in the population may be consid-
erably influenced, positively or negatively, by state policies and programs. In 
dryland regions of Africa, as nearly everywhere else in the world, state policies 
and programs are rarely neutral in terms of the costs they impose and the ben-
efits they confer. Designed and implemented by human agents, they tend to 
favor the interests of groups with sufficient economic and political power to 
influence the political process. In cases where the interests of all groups in soci-
ety are well represented, policies and programs can lead to efficient and equi-
table use of resources, thereby advancing the interests of all. But in cases where 
state-sanctioned actors are able to exert unchecked power, this may lead to the 
expropriation of resources, which can exacerbate the vulnerability of dryland 
populations and undermine their resilience. 
This is not just a theoretical matter. In many dryland countries in East and 
West Africa, uneven distributions of wealth and power combined with differing 
abilities to influence public policy have resulted in the de facto marginalization of 
certain groups. Most notable among these are many nomadic pastoral groups, 
whose ability to engage effectively in political processes often is impeded by their 
low numbers, peripatetic lifestyle, limited economic power, and lack of integra-
tion into mainstream society. The marginalization of many pastoral groups is 
perpetuated by an internally reinforcing cycle: lacking wealth and power, these 
groups are not able to make their voices heard in the political dialogue, hence they 
are not able to gain access to essential resources and services that might allow 
them to increase their wealth and gain political power, leaving them trapped in 
poverty and perpetually unable to influence the political process.
The marginalization of many dryland groups can be seen in the skewed dis-
tribution of social services, particularly for human health and education. These 
are often poorly provided in dryland areas, for a number of reasons including 
insufficiency of national government budgets, distance from national capitals, 
and high unit costs of provision in areas of low population density (UNDP/
UNCCD 2011). These factors come into play to an even greater extent in pasto-
ral areas, where they are combined with the difficulties of serving mobile popu-
lations, further cultural and political marginalization of pastoralists from 
national mainstreams, and pastoralists’ own mistrust of external service provid-
ers. The consequences can be dramatic. For example, with respect to health 
services, dryland areas of Kenya and Ethiopia lag far behind other areas in vac-
cination coverage for measles and other diseases (Figure 3.6).
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Similarly with respect to education services, gross enrollment ratios for pri-
mary school-age children are low across dryland countries of East Africa, with 
even lower ratios among pastoral children (Figure 3.7). Eighty-one percent of 
Kenyan adults and 87 percent of Ethiopian adults resident in dryland pastoral 
areas have received no formal education, which places them in a position of 
vulnerability when dealing with those more educated and better connected to 
national political structures. Education facilitates livelihood diversification and 
resilience to food crises. 
Figure 3.6 Childhood vaccination coverage, Kenya and Ethiopia
Source: Adapted from Ali and Hobson (2005)
Figure 3.7 Primary education gross enrollment ratios (GER), IGAD countries, 1999–2001
Source: Based on data appearing in Morten and Kerven (2013) and Carr-Hill and Peart (2005)
Note: IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) countries are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, 
Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda.
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These observed disparities in coverage are due to poor public services provi-
sion, not to lack of interest or demand for the services by dryland communities. 
Survey evidence from East Africa indicates that pastoralists rank basic human 
needs interventions, including health and education provision, as among their 
most desired development projects (McPeak, Little, and Doss 2012). The strong 
correlation between formal education, salaried employment, and a secure, diver-
sified livelihood explains their interest in education. Households with a member 
who has passed through secondary education are more likely to have members in 
salaried employment, to receive remittances, and to have higher cash income, 
higher food expenditures, and higher savings. But the benefits of improved educa-
tion extend beyond the expansion of livelihood opportunities for individuals. 
Improved education is also required if pastoral communities are to successfully 
manage their own self-help associations or equip themselves to better defend their 
ownership of natural resources against commercial or government appropriation. 
Finally, improved education advances the interests of segments of dryland soci-
ety—youth and women—that may be disadvantaged in terms of their social or 
economic standing and, hence, be more vulnerable to risk. 
The lower level of social services received by some of the groups living in the 
drylands, which is reflected in clear discrepancies in many key development 
indicators, makes it clear that vulnerability and resilience cannot be understood 
as phenomena with purely technical causes that call for purely technical solu-
tions. If policies and programs are to be effective in attacking the root causes of 
vulnerability, they need to be designed taking into account the technical, social, 
and political dimensions of vulnerability and resilience. Although development 
agencies are often on uneasy ground in dealing with overtly political issues, in 
order to be effective in attacking the roots of vulnerability, interventions will 
sometimes need to target explicitly marginalized groups who for various rea-
sons may be absent from the policy dialogue. 
At the same time, engaging effectively with all groups can be challenging, 
because the mere fact of getting them to participate may not be sufficient. 
Marginalized peoples, of necessity keen observers of the politics around 
resource use and control, may not necessarily show their hand in public forums 
but rather may suspect outsiders of strategic thinking and give strategic answers 
in response (Browne, Nunez, and Jonker 2008). Development agencies, both 
national and international, may launch “participatory” consultation and plan-
ning processes with the goal of eliciting the needs of marginalized groups, but 
they may be blinded to the fact that these processes do not always succeed. 
Meanwhile, well-placed individuals or groups may continue to operate behind 
the scenes to further improve their position, further distancing the less well-
placed from access and control of critical resources.
In some respects, the challenge of bringing marginalized groups into the 
policy discourse has grown more difficult in recent years as the reach of the 
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global economy has expanded. State agencies and government officials are fre-
quently self-interested players in the commercial developments that are rapidly 
taking place in the drylands. As recently as a few decades ago, struggles over the 
control of dryland natural resources revolved for the most part around compet-
ing local elements within rural society. This is no longer the case. Globalization, 
improved transport and communications, the international market value of 
agricultural commodities, and the increasing presence of the state in rural areas 
has awakened international interest in dryland resources and has improved the 
capacity of outside groups to appropriate them. Three essential and valuable 
natural resources—water, land, and wildlife—have recently become more 
exposed to external appropriation, leading to the increased incidences of dis-
possession of the rural communities that formerly used them. 
While not always recognized by the development community, political con-
siderations such as those described here will surely influence the effectiveness 
and the distributional impact of the technical interventions that are discussed 
in the following pages. These considerations will reappear in the concluding 
chapters when policy implications are discussed, because policies and programs 
to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience can be designed in ways that 
strengthen the ability of dryland groups to make their voices heard and hold 
their governing institutions to account. 
Note
1.  PovCalNet is an online analysis tool for global poverty monitoring maintained by 
the World Bank Group. See http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/.
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Chapter 4
Vulnerability in Drylands Tomorrow: 
Business as Usual Raising Ominous 
Prospects
Raffaello Cervigni, Michael Morris, Pierre Fallavier, Zhe Guo, Brent 
Boehlert, Ken Strzepek
Estimating vulnerability in 2030: A scenario modeling 
approach
An original modeling framework developed expressly for this book (referred to 
as the umbrella model) provides a common analytical framework for integrating 
findings emerging from the background analysis carried out in different sectors. 
The umbrella model can be used to project changes in the numbers of vulner-
able people living in drylands under a range of scenarios, to evaluate the ability 
of different interventions to reduce the impacts of droughts, and to estimate the 
corresponding cost. The umbrella model provides a coherent, albeit simplified, 
analytical framework that can be used to anticipate the scale of the challenges 
likely to arise in drylands, as well as generate insights into the opportunities for 
addressing those challenges. 
This chapter briefly summarizes the key elements of the umbrella model (a 
more detailed description appears in Fallavier and Cervigni 2014). In addition, 
it describes the main features of the 2030 business as usual (BAU) baseline sce-
nario, which assumes no interventions are implemented to reduce the number 
of drought-affected people. Next, Chapters 5 through 11 describe a series of 
interventions that have the potential to improve the productivity and sustain-
ability of dryland livelihood strategies. Chapter 12 returns to the umbrella 
model and explores the scope for using these interventions to reduce vulnera-
bility and increase resilience in the drylands. 
A brief description of the umbrella model 
To enable comparisons with the 2010 baseline figures presented in Chapter 3, 
the umbrella model was used to produce 2030 projections of the three 
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components of vulnerability (numbers of people living in drylands who will be 
exposed to droughts and other shocks, sensitive to droughts and other shocks, 
and unable to cope with droughts and other shocks):
• People exposed to droughts and other shocks are defined as people living 
in drylands in 2030. The number was obtained by spatializing the UN popu-
lation projections in accordance with the GRUMP dataset used to deter-
mine the 2010 baseline. Differences in urban and rural rates of growth are 
built into the UN projections, reflecting the ongoing trend toward increas-
ing urbanization. Three sets of estimates were generated, one for each of the 
three UN fertility scenarios (low, medium, high). As with the 2010 baseline, 
for each scenario the numbers are broken down by aridity class and subna-
tional jurisdiction.
• People sensitive to droughts and other shocks are defined as people living 
in drylands in 2030 and dependent on agriculture. Because economic growth 
in dryland countries will be accompanied by structural transformation, the 
share of agricultural employment in total employment is projected to decline; 
therefore, the umbrella model scales down agricultural employment as a 
function of economic growth, with the scaling factor derived from a cross-
country regression carried out on large sample of developing countries 
worldwide. GDP growth per capita in 2030 was calculated for each dryland 
country by applying to the 2010 baseline growth an increase estimated on 
the basis of historical GDP growth recorded in each country during the 
period 1980–2010. To accommodate uncertainty about future GDP growth, 
three scenarios were modeled (slow, medium, fast), reflecting the 25th, 50th, 
and 75th percentiles of the distribution of the historical average growth rates 
(each average in the sample is calculated based on a 20-year period).
• People unable to cope with the effects of droughts and other shocks are 
defined as people living in drylands in 2030 and dependent on agriculture 
and living below the international poverty line (US$1.25 per day). The num-
ber of people living in poverty was calculated by applying to 2030 per capita 
GDP (estimated as described above) an elasticity coefficient representing the 
growth elasticity of poverty reduction (GEPR). To accommodate uncertainty 
regarding the degree to which future growth will result in poverty reduction, 
three scenarios were modeled: (1) pro-poor growth (GEPR takes on the 75th 
percentile of the distribution of values observed over the past 20 years); 
(2) non-pro-poor growth (GEPR takes on the 25th percentile of the distribu-
tion observed over the past 20 years; and (3) intermediate case (GEPR fixed 
at 0.75 for all countries). This approach is designed to capture the overall 
experience of growth in Africa, which often has not been particularly pro-
poor, while avoiding potential distortions that could result if the most recent 
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GDP growth and GEPR values were simply extrapolated (since both param-
eters may have experienced short-term upward or downward spikes).1
Results: Vulnerability estimates for 2030
Consistent with expectations, under the BAU scenario, exposure, sensitivity, and 
inability to cope all are projected to grow considerably compared to the 2010 
baseline. Important differences can be discerned between countries, however. In 
addition, the assumptions about future rates of GDP growth and about the 
impacts of future GDP growth on poverty reduction make a big difference.
The number of people living in drylands who are exposed to droughts and 
other shocks will grow considerably. Barring an unexpected acceleration in 
rural-urban migration (i.e., beyond the trend already built into the UN popula-
tion projections), by 2030 the population living in rural areas of the dryland 
countries is projected to grow between 40 and 120 percent (Figure 4.1). 
Economic growth will reduce the share of people living in drylands who are 
sensitive to droughts and other shocks, but probably not fast enough to over-
come the effects of demographic growth. As GDP growth generates new 
employment opportunities in the manufacturing and services sectors, the share 
of the population living in drylands and dependent on livestock-keeping and 
crop farming is likely to decrease. Nevertheless, in the presence of rapid popula-
tion growth, the absolute number of people who depend on these two predomi-
nant livelihood strategies and who are exposed and sensitive to droughts and 
Figure 4.1 Projected rural population in 2030 (2010=100, medium fertility scenario)
Source: Authors’ calculations
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other shocks will likely outpace the exits out of agriculture. As a result, the total 
number of people dependent on agriculture is projected to increase everywhere 
compared to 2010 levels (Figure 4.2). 
For many countries, the projected increase falls between 40 and 80 percent, 
but in a few countries it is much higher (100 percent or more for Chad and 
Niger). With a few exceptions (Chad and Nigeria), the results are not very sensi-
tive to the assumptions made about future GDP growth.
On aggregate, resilience in drylands will increase only in the presence of 
growth that is both rapid and more equitable. Three scenarios were considered 
to explore the likely impacts of different rates of growth and different poverty-
reducing effects of growth (Figure 4.3). A pessimistic, low-end scenario assumes 
that growth will be slow and non-pro-poor. An optimistic, high-end scenario 
assumes that growth will be rapid and pro-poor. An intermediate scenario (used 
for the rest of the analysis) assumes that growth will be moderate and that the 
poverty-reducing effect will be modest (GEPR = 0.75). In most countries in East 
and West Africa, only under the high-end scenario does the number of poor 
people decrease (signifying an increase in the ability to cope with the effects of 
drought and other shocks). This result is not universal, however; Niger and 
Chad are notable exceptions. Under the intermediate scenario, the number of 
poor people increases significantly (signifying a decrease in the ability to cope 
Figure 4.2 People living in drylands projected to be dependent on agriculture in 2030 
(2010=100, medium fertility scenario)
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The slow GDP growth scenario is based on the bottom 25 percent of historical growth; the fast GDP 
growth is based on the top 25 percent of historical growth; and the medium GDP growth scenario assumes a 
continuation of long-term average historical GDP growth. 
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with the effects of drought and other shocks). Across the entire set of countries, 
the number of poor people increases by 45 percent. The increase is smaller in 
East Africa (40 percent) compared to West Africa (55 percent). The increase is 
particularly high in Senegal (80 percent) and Niger (100 percent).
Investment in girls’ education can mitigate but not fully address the vulnerabil-
ity challenge. Investment in the education of girls has been shown to lower fertility 
rates over the medium to long term (UNESCO 2011, Summers 1992). As fertility 
rates fall, so does the number of people who are likely to need access to safety nets. 
The impact of reducing fertility rates, while non-negligible, is likely to be 
limited, however. Using the UN low fertility population projections as a first-
order approximation of the effects of fertility reduction policies, the increase by 
2030 in the number of people vulnerable to shocks could be reduced by 45 
percent to 30 percent (Figure 4.4).
These sobering results underline the enormity of the challenge facing African 
governments and the development community more widely. They point to the 
importance of assessing the ability of different types of interventions to increase 
the resilience of the poorer segments of the dryland population. 
Effects of climate change on future vulnerability 
The BAU projections generated using the umbrella model do not take into 
account one factor that could significantly affect the calculus of vulnerability and 
Figure 4.3 Vulnerable people in drylands in 2030 (2010=100, medium fertility scenario)
Source: Authors’ calculations
Note: The low-end scenario is characterized by growth that is slow (bottom 25 percent of historical perfor-
mance) and non-pro poor (bottom 25 percent of historical performance of the growth elasticity of poverty 
reduction – GEPR). The high-end scenario is characterized by growth that is fast (top 25 percent of historical 
performance) and pro-poor (top 25 percent of GEPR distribution). The intermediate scenario selected for the 
rest of the analysis (reference scenario) is characterized by growth that is modest (equivalent to the long-run 
historical average) and whose effect on poverty is moderate (GEPR value fixed at 0.75).
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resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa. That factor is climate change. The extent, rate, 
and likely consequences of climate change are difficult to predict with confidence, 
and there are considerable differences between the projections made by the lead-
ing climate models, but the preponderance of evidence suggests that climate 
change is likely to have significant impacts worldwide. In Sub-Saharan Africa 
those impacts are likely to include shifts in the distribution of drylands and 
expansion in their size, as well as increases in the frequency and severity of 
extreme weather events experienced within drylands. Under scenarios of faster 
warming and more pronounced drying, by 2050 the size of drylands in East and 
West Africa could increase by as much as 40 percent (Map 4.1). 
These projections suggest that by 2050, climate change could exacerbate the 
challenges posed by drylands, compounding the effects of rapid population 
increases and modest growth. It is important to note, however, that climate mod-
els do not always agree, particularly in terms of the effects of climate change on 
precipitation. There is considerable uncertainty not only about the magnitude of 
the coming changes but also about the direction. To get a fuller picture of the 
range of possible outcomes, a wide range of scenarios was analyzed to evaluate the 
impacts on the extent of drylands areas. (Box 4.1). 
The conclusion is that in some scenarios where wetter conditions are projected 
to prevail, drylands could actually shrink in size, reducing by as much as 30 per-
cent the population in East and West Africa living in drylands (Figure 4.5).
Since the time horizon considered in this analysis is 2030 (when many of the 
projected effects of climate change may not yet have materialized), for the most 
part historical weather patterns were used in assessing the effects of droughts 
Figure 4.4 Vulnerable people in drylands in 2030 (2010=100, different fertility scenarios)
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The growth scenario considered is based on an average GDP growth and a fixed 0.75 GEPR value).
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Map 4.1 Shift and expansion by 2050 of dryland areas due to climate change 
(high-end scenario)
Source: Author’s estimates based on GCM outputs from the CMIP5 ensemble (used in IPCC’s 5th Assessment 
Report)
Note: The map shows the extent to which drylands (defined to include all zones with an aridity index between 
0.05 and 0.65) could shift and expand by 2050 as a result of climate change. To visualize the largest possible 
impacts, the map reflects the fastest growth of GHG concentration (RCP 8.5) under the driest of a set of over 
99 climate scenarios.
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BOX 4.1
Methodology for projecting shifts in dryland areas 
under climate change
This chapter’s projections of the spread of drylands across Africa under a 
changing climate rely on a series of calculations that use projections of future 
climate to predict aridity across Africa at a fine geospatial scale. These projec-
tions are based on 99 climate scenarios, each of which is generated from the 
combination of a general circulation model (GCM) of global climate and a sce-
nario of future greenhouse gas emissions. 56 of these GCM-emissions combi-
nations use 22 GCMs driven by 3 Special Report Emissions Scenarios, first 
adopted in 2000 for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 
Third Assessment, and 43 of these GCM-emissions combinations use 23 GCMs 
driven by RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, medium and high emissions scenarios from the 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) adopted for the IPCC’s Fifth 
Assessment in 2013. The primary results of these 99 climate scenarios were 
then bias-corrected and spatially downscaled, incorporating quantile mapping 
to account for GCM biases in rainfall intensity distributions. In general, BCSD 
projections show strong agreement with GCM-projected changes on a large 
scale and are useful as inputs for impact modeling, particularly in hydrology 
and agriculture sector work. Each of these BCSD climate projections yielded a 
time-transient time-series of rainfall and temperature at a 0.5-by-0.5 degree 
grid across Africa for 2001-2050. 
Using these climate projections, an aridity index was calculated in a 0.5-by-
0.5 degree grid across Africa for 2001-2050. This measure of future aridity was 
then compared to aridity index values calculated for a baseline period from 
1961-1990 using observed climate data. While measures of drought are 
designed to identify dry conditions that are temporary aberrations from normal 
climatic conditions, this measure of aridity identifies regions where low precipi-
tation is the norm. Here, the aridity index is defined simply as annual precipita-
tion divided by annual potential evapotranspiration (PET), where PET is 
calculated using the modified Hargreaves approach. The Hargreaves approach 
for calculating PET, which is a function of latitude, average temperature, tem-
perature range, and precipitation, is a preferable alternative to the Penman-
Montieth calculation method because it is less data-intensive and proved less 
likely to underestimate PET in preliminary analysis. Furthermore, the Hargreaves 
approach has shown greater accuracy than comparable models in previous 
studies, and CGIAR uses the modified Hargreaves method in its global aridity 
and PET database.
These baseline and projected aridity indices were then used to predict the 
shift and expansion of drylands across Africa by 2050, as shown in Map 4.1. 
For this analysis, drylands were defined as areas with an aridity index between 
0.05 and 0.65. 
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Figure 4.5 Number of pople living in drylands in 2050 under different climate change 
scenarios (2010=100)
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The figure shows how climate change could affect the numbers of people living in drylands in 2050 
compared to the 2010 baseline. Values below 100% result from a projected contraction of drylands by 2050; 
values above 100% result from a projected expansion of drylands by 2050. The figures were estimated using 
the highest GHG concentration pathway (RCP 8.5). Within each country, the range of values reflects differ-
ences between climate models in projected temperatures and precipitation levels, which drive the aridity index.
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on vulnerability and resilience. The fact that longer-term effects of climate 
change are not explicitly incorporated in the analysis does not diminish the 
validity of the findings and recommendations, however, because the resilience 
interventions discussed in subsequent chapters can be instrumental in building 
resilience not only with the current climate but also with the (probably) much 
harsher climate of the future. The additional benefits of some of the interven-
tions in the face of climate change are explicitly assessed in Chapter 5, which 
analyzes the impacts of interventions designed to enhance the productivity and 
stability of livestock production systems under scenarios featuring more fre-
quent or more severe droughts, or both, than have been experienced to date.
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Note
1.  Estimation errors are particularly likely when poverty rates are interpolated over 
survey periods: a frequent occurrence for several countries in the PovCalnet 
database.
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Chapter 5
Livestock Production Systems: 
Seizing the Opportunities for 
Pastoralists and Agro-pastoralists
Cees de Haan, Tim Robinson, Giulia Conchedda, Polly Ericksen, 
Mohammed Said, Lance Robinson, Fiona Flintan, Alexandra Shaw, 
Shem Kifugo, Abdrahmane Wane, Ibra Touré, Alexandre Ickowicz, 
Christian Corniaux, Jill Barr, Cecile Martignac, Andrew Mude, 
Raffaello Cervigni, Michael Morris, Anne Mottet, Pierre Gerber, 
Siwa Msangi, Matthieu Lesnoff, Frederic Ham, Erwan Filliol, Kidus 
Nigussie, Adriana Paolantonio, Federica Alfani
Current situation
Livestock-keeping is one of the most important livelihood activities practiced 
in the drylands of Africa. In the countries of East and West Africa in which 
drylands are important, the livestock sector is economically significant, with 
production of meat and milk typically comprising 5–15 percent of total GDP 
and up to 60 percent of agricultural GDP. The direct contribution of livestock 
to GDP is amplified when the indirect benefits of livestock-keeping are factored 
in, such as production of organic fertilizer and provision of animal traction 
services. In addition, the livestock sector can be an important earner of foreign 
exchange, as millions of sheep are shipped every year from the Horn of Africa 
to the Gulf States, and more than one million head of cattle are trekked or 
trucked from the Sahel to coastal countries in West Africa. Significantly, with 
per capita incomes continuing to rise in Sub-Saharan Africa and with wealthier 
consumers turning increasingly to animal-source foods, regional demand for 
meat and milk is expected to double by 2030.
Livestock-keeping is the principal livelihood source for 40 million people in 
the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, and it provides a significant share of income 
for an additional 40 million people in the two regions. The way in which 
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livestock-keeping contributes to the livelihoods of individual households varies 
depending on the production system. Two main livestock production systems 
can be distinguished: 
1. Pastoral systems: Found mainly in more arid zones (Aridity Index 0.05–0.20), 
pastoral systems are systems in which livestock-keepers derive the majority of 
their income from animals that graze natural vegetation, the nutritional value 
and spatio-temporal distribution of which depend on the variability and inten-
sity of annual precipitation. In pastoral zones, where the potential for crop 
growth is limited by moisture availability, raising livestock is often the only 
viable form of agriculture. In pastoral systems, cattle, camels, sheep, and goats 
are moved around to take advantage of patchy seasonal vegetation. The pasto-
ral system represents a complex form of natural resource management and 
embodies a finely honed symbiotic relationship between local ecology, domes-
ticated livestock, and people in resource-scarce, climatically marginal, and 
often highly variable conditions. As explained by Pratt, Le Gall, and de Haan 
(1997), pastoral systems involve interactions between three different systems 
in which pastoral people operate, namely the natural resource system, the 
resource users system, and the larger geopolitical system.
2. Agro-pastoral systems: Found mainly in semi-arid zones (Aridity Index 
0.2–0.5) and subhumid zones (Aridity Index 0.5–0.65), agro-pastoral sys-
tems are systems in which livestock-keepers derive one-half or more of their 
agricultural income from crop farming and in which crop residues make up 
an important share of livestock rations (usually 10 percent or more). In semi-
arid zones, cattle typically perform multiple roles; in addition to producing 
meat and milk, they contribute to increased crop productivity by providing 
draft power and manure, while at the same time converting organic material 
not suitable for human consumption into high-value food and nonfood 
products. Agro-pastoral systems also represent a complex form of natural 
resource management that allows efficient exploitation of a limited and 
highly variable natural resource base.
The distinction between pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, once quite clear, 
is becoming increasingly blurred, as pastoralists are increasingly engaging in 
opportunistic planting of small plots in wetter areas or years as a diversification 
strategy to complement their livestock production activities. 
Over the past four decades, livestock numbers have increased rapidly in the 
drylands (Figure 5.1). Between 1980 and 2010 the livestock population in dry-
lands (expressed in Tropical Livestock Units, TLU)1 grew at an annual rate of 
about 3.5 percent per year, faster than the human population in these areas, 
which grew by about 2 percent per year during the same period. Thus on aver-
age the herd/flock size per household and per pastoralist have gone up. 
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Livestock ownership in the drylands is highly skewed. Based on World Bank 
Harmonized Household Surveys (SHIP) data and rural Gini coefficients, it is esti-
mated that the wealthiest 1 percent of livestock-keepers own between 9 percent and 
28 percent of all animals. The regional averages mask important differences between 
regions and among species, however, and they do not reflect changes taking place 
in the composition of the livestock population. For example, Desta and Coppock 
(2004) also mentioned in a report by Headey et al. (2014), report that in many areas 
in Ethiopia and Kenya covered by the USAID-funded Pastoral Risk Management 
(Parima) project, the cattle herd has declined, probably as the result of a series of 
droughts that reduced herd sizes below the minimum level needed to recuperate.
The vast majority of livestock-keepers in dryland regions of Africa are poor. 
Estimates reported in the literature, supported by modeling carried out as part 
of this study, suggest that about 3.5 TLU/capita are needed to meet the basic 
needs of a typical pastoralist household; the number can be half that much for 
the typical agro-pastoralist household that is able to supplement income from 
animals with income from cropping activities. In Sub-Saharan Africa, most 
households that keep livestock do not have anywhere near that many animals. 
The estimated 40 million pastoralist livestock-keepers in Africa hold about 
51million TLU (equivalent to 1.3 TLU/capita), and the estimated 80 million 
agro-pastoral livestock-keepers hold an estimated 76 million TLU (equivalent 
to less than 1 TLU/capita). Based on these regional aggregates, in the drylands 
of Africa the “average” pastoral household of six people owns about 6 cattle, 15 
sheep, and 15 goats, from which they harvest about 300 liters of milk per year 
(mostly destined for home consumption), while selling one cow every two years 
and 10 small ruminants per year. These activities generate about US$700 per 
Figure 5.1 Growth in livestock numbers and rural human population, 1960–2010
Source: FAOSTAT 2015
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year in household income (milk included), or just over US$100 per year per 
household member. As these numbers show, the “average” livestock-keeper in 
the drylands of Africa lives below the poverty line.
Livestock-keepers in the drylands of Africa are not only poor, they also face 
a highly variable environment that exposes them to a variety of shocks from 
which they may have difficulty recovering. 
The most frequent shocks affecting livestock systems in the drylands are 
undoubtedly extreme weather events, especially periods of severe and pro-
longed drought. In the Sahel region, the two major droughts that occurred in 
the 1970s and 1980s led to the deaths of about one-third of all cattle, sheep, and 
goats (Derrick 1977, Lesnoff, Corniaux, and Hiernaux 2012). Also in the Sahel 
region the relatively mild drought that lasted from 2010 to 2012 caused about 
12 million people to be food insecure (Oxfam 2012). In the Horn of Africa the 
livestock sector experienced five major droughts between 1998 and 2011, which 
killed more than one-half of the cattle in the most heavily affected areas and 
decimated the livelihoods of 3–12 million people (depending on the year). 
In addition to being exposed to weather-related shocks, livestock-keepers in 
many dryland regions of Africa are vulnerable to the effects of conflict. During 
the past decade alone, episodes of social unrest and civil conflict have broken 
out in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Central African Republic, 
Niger, Mali, and Nigeria, among other countries, leading to the displacement of 
millions of people and extensive losses of property, including livestock. 
Finally, dryland regions in Africa are particularly susceptible to the increas-
ing criminality that has been linked to the drug and weapons trades, ransom 
seeking, and the rise of religious extremism. Criminality has destabilized large 
parts of the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, displacing many dryland pop-
ulations, destroying social infrastructure, disrupting traditional livelihood 
activities, and discouraging tourism (de Haan et al. 2014). 
Opportunities
In considering the prospects for livestock production systems in dryland 
regions of Africa, it is important not to lose sight of the potential of the sector. 
Livestock systems in many dryland countries have come under pressure in 
recent years, resulting in uneven performance, but there is scope for increasing 
productivity and production. Policy reforms and supporting investments could 
stimulate changes in production technologies and management practices that 
could halve the regional deficit in livestock-sourced products that is projected 
to develop by 2030, should current supply and demand trends continue. At the 
same time, it is important to recognize that even with these interventions, there 
will not be enough water, grazing resources, and animals to provide all live-
stock-keepers in the drylands with an income above the poverty line. 
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With respect to pastoralism, studies have consistently confirmed the produc-
tive efficiency of well-managed pastoral systems in the drylands of Africa, com-
pared, for example, to ranching systems in similarly dry regions in developed 
countries, including Australia and the United States (see Breman and de Wit 
1983).The main opportunities in African pastoral systems, therefore, lie not so 
much in further increasing productive efficiency, but rather to putting in place 
systems that will enable buffers and rapid adjustments to the “boom and bust” 
cycles that characterize the system. This could be achieved by maintaining the 
mobility of herds to allow them to avoid climate shocks, improving animal 
health services to reduce losses from disease outbreaks and climate shocks, 
facilitating early destocking when drought is imminent and restocking when 
rains resume, fostering better market integration, in particular by exploiting 
complementarities between drylands as the breeding areas and higher rainfall 
areas for fattening younger stock from the drier areas, and consolidating small 
holdings of livestock into larger, more resilient, and more viable units.
With respect to agro-pastoralism, the main opportunities lie in the intensifica-
tion of production systems so as to increase the volume and value of commercial 
sales. This could be achieved by improving animal genetics to accelerate growth 
and increase offtake rates, improving animal health services to reduce losses from 
disease outbreaks and climate shocks, exploiting complementarities between crop 
and livestock production systems to improve the quantity and quality of available 
feed resources, and strengthening livestock value chains to increase marketing 
opportunities. As in the case of pastoralism, consolidation of small herds into 
larger holdings is needed to ensure that livestock-dependent households have at 
least the minimum number of animals needed to remain resilient.2
To what extent could currently available technologies improve the resilience 
of livestock-dependent populations living in dryland regions of Africa? To 
answer this question, it would be important first to understand what would 
likely happen in the absence of any interventions. The umbrella model 
(described in Chapter 4) was used to project the numbers of livestock-depen-
dent households likely to be living in the dryland regions of Africa by 2030. 
Under the “Business as Usual” (BAU) scenario, 77 percent of pastoralist house-
holds and 58 percent of agro-pastoralist households are projected to own fewer 
than 5 TLUs (Figure 5.2). Expressed as a share of livestock-dependent house-
holds, the number of poor/vulnerable households is especially high in Niger. 
With the BAU baseline established, the potential impacts of four interven-
tions were modeled: (1) improving animal health services, (2) improving access 
to feed resources, (3) promoting off-take of young male animals from the dry-
lands for fattening in higher rainfall areas, and (4) introducing progressive taxa-
tion policies to bring about a more equitable distribution of livestock ownership 
(Box 5.1). 
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BOX 5 .1
Modeling livestock systems in the drylands
An important original contribution of the study whose results are reported in 
this book has been to break new methodological ground in the modeling of 
livestock systems in the drylands. Five simulation models were used in combi-
nation to estimate the impacts of the resilience-enhancing interventions on 
feed balances, livestock production, and household income resilience, under a 
range of climate scenarios.
1. The BIOGENERATOR model developed by Action Contre la Faim (ACF) uses 
NDVI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index) and DMP (Dry Matter 
Productivity) data collected since 1998  by the Satellite pour l’Observation de 
la Tierre (SPOT) satellite imaging system (Ham and Flliol 2011). The model 
was used to estimate spatially referenced usable biomass in the drylands 
(e.g., biomass that is edible by livestock).
Figure 5.2 Livestock-keeping households likely to be forced to seek alternative livelihood 
strategies under a BAU scenario, selected countries, 2030 (%)
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
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2. The Global Livestock Environmental Assessment Model (GLEAM) developed 
by Gerber et al. (2013) calculates at pixel and aggregate level: (1) crop by-
products and usable crop residues; (2) livestock rations for different species 
of animals and production systems, assuming animal requirements are first 
met by high-value feed components (crop byproducts if given, and crop resi-
dues), and then by natural vegetation; (3) feed balances at pixel and aggre-
gate level, assuming no mobility at pixel level and full mobility at grazing 
shed level; and (4) GHG emission intensity.
3. The IMPACT model developed by IFPRI is a partial equilibrium global agricul-
ture sector model that can be used to generate baseline projections of agri-
cultural commodity supply, demand, trade, prices, and malnutrition 
outcomes. On the basis of the feed rations provided by GLEAM, the IMPACT 
model was used to calculate the production in drylands of meat and milk 
and to estimate how production will affect overall supply of and demand for 
these products in the region. 
4. The CIRAD/MMAGE model consists of a set of functions for simulating 
dynamics and production of animal or human populations, categorized by 
sex and age class. It was used to calculate the sex and age distribution of the 
four main ruminant species (cattle, camels, sheep, and goats), the feed 
requirements in dry matter, and milk and meat production.
5. The ECO-RUM model developed by CIRAD under the umbrella of the African 
Livestock Platform (ALive) is an Excel-supported herd dynamics model based 
on the earlier ILRI/CIRAD DYNMOD. The model was used to estimate the 
socioeconomic effects of changes in the technical parameters of the flock or 
herd (e.g., return on investments, income, and contribution to food 
security).
The modeling exercise benefitted from livestock distribution data contained 
in the Gridded Livestock of the World (GLW) database (Wint and Robinson 2007) 
and its most recent update GLW 2.0 (Robinson et al. 2014). It was also informed 
by information and analysis produced by the FAO livestock supply/demand model 
(Robinson and Pozzi 2011). For details, see de Haan et al. (2015).
The results of the above models were used as inputs for the final step of the 
analysis, namely the assessment of the number of households resilient, vulnerable 
to shocks, and likely to move out of livestock-based livelihoods. These groups were 
estimated as households owning livestock above or below critical TLU thresholds. 
The value of these thresholds was estimated using ECO-RUM; and the correspond-
ing population shares were calculated using a log-normal estimate of the TLU dis-
tribution, which approximates quite well actual TLU distributions emerging from 
survey data (SHIP database). The interrelationships between model components as 
determined by the final analysis are shown in Figure B5.1.1.
(continued next page)
Box 5.1 (continued)
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The relevance and likely effectiveness of these interventions differs according 
to the situation, because they address different determinants of vulnerability 
and resilience.
Reducing exposure to shocks
Livestock-keepers living in drylands can avoid being affected by shocks, particularly 
weather shocks, if they can move out of harm’s way before the shocks appear. In 
dryland regions of Africa, and particularly in more arid zones within the drylands, 
mobile pastoralist livestock systems are generally more productive than sedentary 
livestock systems precisely for this reason (Niamir-Fuller 1999; Catley, Lind, and 
Scoones 2012). Drawing on inherited knowledge that has been accumulated over 
many generations, plus their own personal experience, pastoralists are extremely 
skilled at moving their animals to take advantage of seasonal feed and water 
resources while avoiding locations during periods when weather-related shocks are 
likely to occur. Map 5.1 demonstrates, under a no-drought scenario, the areas in 
Box 5.1 (continued)
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Figure B5.1.1 Interrelationships between components of livestock systems model
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
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which the local feed resources will be insufficient to provide feed on a year-round 
basis and for which mobility is essential (these areas appear in orange and red, 
depending on the frequency with which feed shortfalls occur).
Because mobility is critical, especially for pastoralists, interventions that con-
tribute to improved mobility of livestock-keepers and their animals have the 
potential to significantly improve the performance of livestock systems in the 
drylands. Such interventions include: (1) development of water resources to 
allow better access to underexploited rangelands, (2) organization of feed mar-
kets to improve availability of feed in remote areas, and (3) introduction into 
land use planning of measures designed to facilitate movement of herds and 
flocks (e.g., through designation of dedicated migration corridors and dry sea-
son grazing areas). By improving access to feed, such measures designed to 
improve mobility can have a large impact on resilience. Figure 5.3 shows how 
the ratio of resilient households to vulnerable households to nonviable house-
holds changes with increasing access to feed.
Other interventions not considered in the modeling exercise can also play an 
important role in reducing exposure to shocks, including the following: 
(1) implementation of conflict resolution mechanisms in areas in which live-
stock-keeping competes with other livelihood activities, to ensure cooperative 
Map 5.1 Estimated need for movement of animals in relation to feed, Sahel and Horn of 
Africa (Baseline, no-drought scenario)
Source: Authors’ estimates
Note: WA1, WA2, WA3 and WA4 are labels used to identify the West Africa “grazing sheds.” These are 
defined as areas likely to be used for transhumance predominantly by the same population and herds/flocks 
each year. The boundaries of the grazing sheds are based on animal mobility patterns known in the literature 
(SIPSA 2012) and complemented by experts’ consultation.
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land use; (2) development of early warning and response systems to support 
early destocking when a drought shock is imminent and animals can be sold 
before they suffer a loss in value; and (3) programs that facilitate rapid restock-
ing after the shock has passed. Experience suggests that such mechanisms can 
be both effective and efficient (Feinstein International 2007).
Reducing sensitivity to shocks
Some pastoralists will be able to anticipate shocks and move their animals to 
avoid them, but others will be less fortunate and will be subjected to the full 
force of shocks when they occur. Those adversely affected by shocks are likely 
to include as well the many sedentary livestock-keepers whose reliance on farm-
ing activities keeps them anchored to particular locations. 
Livestock-keepers living in dryland regions who are unable to move out of 
harm’s way when a shock occurs will be affected only to the extent that their 
livelihood strategy is sensitive to the effects of the shock. For this reason, inter-
ventions that reduce sensitivity to shocks have the potential to significantly 
improve the performance of livestock systems in the drylands. Such interven-
tions include: (1) improving preventive and clinical animal health services to 
protect livestock against infectious diseases and parasites; (2) developing infra-
structure and funding to promote early offtake of male animals (young bulls), 
to be fattened in the higher-potential areas (highlands of East Africa and more 
humid areas of West Africa); and (3) promoting livelihood diversification 
among livestock-keeping households so that they can rely on alternative sources 
of income when the livestock enterprise fails. 
Figure 5.3 Impact of accessibility of feed on the resilience status of livestock-keeping 
households, % of households 
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
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The umbrella model was used to project the impact on the resilience of live-
stock-dependent households by 2030 of (1) improved animal health, and (2) early 
offtake of young male cattle (Figure 5.4 ). The gains from these two interventions 
are relatively small when expressed as a proportion of all livestock-dependent 
households: the proportion of pastoral households owning enough TLU to be 
resilient would increase from 12 to 16 percent, and the number of agro-pastoral 
households having enough TLU to be resilient would increase from 20 to 32 per-
cent. Still, the gains are significant when expressed in absolute terms: about 
200,000 pastoral households and more than 3 million agro-pastoral households 
would become resilient by 2030, relative to the baseline. Similar numbers of 
households would emerge from the “non-viable” category, meaning they would 
no longer feel pressure to give up livestock-keeping. Interestingly, the projected 
benefits of these two interventions stand up under a range of weather scenarios. 
An interesting—and unexpected—finding of the umbrella modeling exercise 
is that strengthening animal health services in the absence of complementary 
measures to increase feed supplies could lead to negative outcomes. 
Strengthening animal health services can accelerate growth rates, creating an 
opportunity to boost productivity and production, but accelerated growth rates 
in turn will increase feed requirements, putting further strain on what will 
already be a constraining factor (Figure 5.5). Therefore, improvements in the 
delivery of animal health services will have to be accompanied by measures 
designed to make additional feed resources available, such as opening up under-
exploited grazing areas or strengthening feed supply systems (Figure 5.5).
Figure 5.4 Impact of improved animal health and early offtake of young bulls 
on the resilience status of livestock-dependent households in 2030 
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
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Figure 5.6 shows the projected impact by 2030 of improved animal health 
and early offtake of young male cattle on productivity and production. If imple-
mented systematically throughout the drylands, these two practices would 
increase offtake by about 25 percent and production of red meat by about 20 
Figure 5.5 Effect of weather on the effectiveness of improved animal health and early 
offtake of young bulls in improving the resilience of livestock dependent households in 2030
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
Figure 5.6 Average annual inputs and outputs for the different intervention scenarios 
compared to the baseline
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
Note: The figures in the chart refer to the deviations from a reference scenario in which herd dynamics are 
driven by the same weather patterns observed in the period 1998-2011 and no policy intervention is in place.
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percent, resulting in an additional 750,000 MT (metric tons) of red meat pro-
duced annually by 2030. Feed requirements in the drylands would be reduced, 
although they would increase significantly in the more humid areas where 
increased fattening of cattle would occur. 
Finally, early offtake of young male cattle would have a measurable impact 
on greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 5.7). 
Improving coping capacity
Livestock-keeping households in dryland regions—unable to move out of harm’s 
way when shocks occur and having livelihoods that are sensitive to shocks—suffer 
frequent income losses. For these households the ability to survive will depend 
mainly on their coping capacity, that is, on their ability to draw on their own 
accumulated resources or resources provided by others to meet their needs during 
a critical period until their livelihood strategies can be reestablished. 
Experience suggests that many livestock-keeping households, when hit by a 
shock, soon exhaust their limited accumulated resources, leaving them critically 
dependent on public programs. Public policy thus plays an important role in 
supporting the recovery process, particularly for non-resilient households. In 
considering the instruments available to the government, it is useful to distin-
guish between interventions that can be implemented relatively quickly versus 
interventions that require time to produce results.
Public interventions that can be implemented in the short run to strengthen 
the coping capacity of livestock dependent populations include (1) introducing 
Figure 5.7 GHG emissions for different interventions and climate scenarios in the two 
dryland study regions
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
Note: Average cattle emission intensities (kg CO2-e/kg protein), including males fattened in humid zones.
700
600
Em
is
si
on
 in
te
ns
iti
es
 (k
g 
CO
2-
e/
kg
 p
ro
te
in
)
500
400
300
200
100
0
Baseline Drought Drought health
East Africa West Africa
Drought male Drought health male
Em
is
si
on
 in
te
ns
it
ie
s 
(k
g 
CO
2-
e/
kg
 p
ro
te
in
)
60  CONFRONTING DROUGHT IN AFRICA’S DRYLANDS 
insurance to provide compensation for lost animals and (2) establishing scalable 
safety nets to provide alternative sources of income until the livestock enterprise 
can be fully restored. (Scalable safety nets are discussed in detail in Chapter 9.) 
Over the longer term, the objective of public policy should be to make the 
livestock-keeping population independent of outside support as much as pos-
sible. Given finite feed resources, the only way to increase significantly the num-
ber of resilient livestock-keeping households will be to address the current 
highly inequitable distribution of livestock assets. 
The umbrella model was used to assess the likely impact of maintaining con-
stant at current (2010) levels the grazing area available to households that are 
already resilient and allocating the remaining grazing area to vulnerable house-
holds, but in a consolidated manner that ensures that every vulnerable house-
hold gains access to a grazing area that is large enough to support enough TLU 
to ensure that the household is resilient (Figure 5.8).
Directly allocating land and water access rights to vulnerable households 
while excluding resilient households, many of which own large herds, would 
obviously be challenging. It would not only come up against established distri-
butions of political and economic power, but it would also run counter to the 
open access user rights systems that still prevail throughout most of the dry-
lands. Still, it is possible to conceive of policies that could promote consolida-
tion of grazing resources and lead to a more equitable redistribution, described 
as follows:
Figure 5.8 Impact of consolidation of grazing area on the resilience status of livestock-
keeping households, 2030
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
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• Policies that limit land ownership (to prevent land grabbing by owners of 
large herds);
• Policies that enhance mobility of animals (to allow vulnerable households 
easier access to underutilized grazing resources); and
• Policies that allocate exclusive water use and grazing rights for the wet and 
dry seasons to groups of smallholder livestock-keepers (to prevent denial of 
access by owners of large herds).
The second intervention—redistributing assets to allow less wealthy house-
holds to accumulate larger numbers of livestock—was modeled by estimating 
the impact of a change in the Gini coefficient (used as a proxy for the distribu-
tion of assets). A 50 percent increase in the Gini coefficient relative to the 2010 
level would cut by one-half the number of vulnerable households likely to face 
pressure to exit from the sector (Figure 5.9). Redistribution of assets, while 
always politically challenging, could in theory be achieved through the intro-
duction of variable user fees or progressive tax policies, or both. At the practical 
level, a greater focus on the improvement of small ruminant production would 
also improve the distribution of livestock assets, as small ruminants are the 
main source of income for the poor.
None of interventions described above, if introduced individually, would be 
expected to have a transformational impact on the numbers of vulnerable 
Figure 5.9 Impact of redistribution of assets on the resilience status of livestock-keeping 
households, 2030
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
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households. For this reason, the umbrella model was used to explore the com-
bined impact of all the interventions. Combined, the interventions could make 
a difference: by 2030, the number of vulnerable households could be reduced to 
16 percent, and the proportion of livestock-keeping households having so few 
animals that they would feel pressure to exit from the sector would be reduced 
to only 7 percent (Figure 5.10).
Challenges
What are the obstacles to implementing these best-bet interventions designed 
to improve resilience among livestock-keeping populations in the drylands?
Cost of increasing resilience
The first and perhaps most obvious challenge to overcome is cost. Analysis car-
ried out for this book suggests that the unit cost of increasing resilience using 
the least-cost combination of interventions (i.e., the unit cost of making one 
person or one household resilient) is relatively low, ranging from US$12/per-
son/year to $386/person/year, with an average $27/person/year for all countries 
and systems (Figure 5.11). Not surprisingly, the unit cost of providing resilience 
varies by country, by aridity zone, and by livestock system, and is significantly 
higher for pastoralists than for agro-pastoralists. 
Using conservative assumptions, it is estimated that delivering improved 
animal health services and facilitating the early offtake of young male cattle 
would cost about US$0.5 billion per year for all the drylands of East and 
Figure 5.10 Impact of a combination of interventions on the resilience status of livestock-
keeping households, 2030
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
Note: Each intervention includes the effects of the ones preceding it; so, for example, intervention B includes 
the effects of intervention A; intervention C includes the effects of A and B; and so forth.
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West Africa. While this amount is not insignificant, it is certainly smaller than 
the average value of the economic losses caused every year by droughts, dis-
ease outbreaks, civil conflict, and other shocks. It is also well below the cost of 
food aid, which currently averages US$4 billion/year in the Sahel and the 
Horn of Africa. Compared to the cost of providing humanitarian assistance 
when a shock has occurred, these interventions seem like an attractive option. 
While certainly not insignificant, an investment of about US$0.5 billion/year 
would likely yield a reduction of up to US$2 billion/year in humanitarian aid.
Mobilizing the necessary funding to support these interventions will be 
politically challenging, of course. The interventions require recurrent funding, 
which may prove difficult for many governments to mobilize. Perhaps develop-
ment partners could be persuaded to help ensure that the necessary financial 
support can be sustained over the longer term (even permanently) by recogniz-
ing the savings that will be achieved in terms of reduced need for emergency 
assistance. 
Aside from the overall cost, successful implementation of each intervention 
is associated with specific challenges—technical, economic, and institutional, 
including those associated with the management of common property resources 
(Box 5.2).
Figure 5.11 Cost effectiveness of health improvements and early offtake measures in 
improving the resilience status of households
Source: de Haan et al. 2015
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BOX 5 .2
The challenge of managing common-pool resources in 
drylands
Most of the pastoralists in the drylands of East and West Africa share a strong 
ethos of open access to common-pool grazing resources. They believe that 
every pastoralist has the same rights to use grazing lands, regardless of ethnic-
ity, nationality, seniority, or socioeconomic status. They emphatically argue that 
access is free and open for everyone; it does not matter where pastoralists 
come from, whether they are newcomers or old-timers or what is their ethnic-
ity or nationality. For pastoralists, keeping cattle is not only a way of making a 
living, but also what makes life as pastoralists possible. In this sense, to deny 
cattle access to grazing resources is to deny pastoralists life (Moritz et al. 2013).
A large proportion of the rangelands that dominate Africa’s drylands are 
open access. Historically there have been relatively few conflicts among African 
pastoralists over rights to common-pool grazing resources. Pastoralists do not 
live in a world made up only of pastoralists, however. They co-exist with other 
user groups, including farmers and fishermen, who do not share their ethos 
and practice of open access. Many farmers view grazing lands as lands that 
have not yet been made productive, and because often they do not recognize 
common property regimes and feel parcels can be appropriated for exclusive 
use by individuals, this constitutes a threat to common-pool grazing resources 
(Sayre et al. 2013). The result is agricultural expansion onto seasonal grazing 
lands and the transhumance corridors connecting them (Galvin 2009; Moritz 
2006). 
Many governments in East and West Africa have tried to protect pastoral 
resources and the rights of pastoralists to use these resources from agricultural 
expansion by designating agricultural and pastoral zones and delimiting trans-
humance corridors. These solutions have been implemented at local as well as 
national levels in the forms of rural or pastoral codes (Hesse and Trench 2000). 
While much attention has been focused on problems of implementation 
and governance of rural codes (Flintan 2012; Hesse and Trench 2000; Tielkes 
and Schlecht 2001), there has been less discussion of the conflict between the 
flexibility and openness of the pastoral system and the fixing and delimitation 
of resources and resource use through the delimitation of pastoral zones and 
transhumance corridors. Turner (1999) has warned that there is a risk in for-
malizing pastoral tenure institutions into rural codes where flexibility is more 
appropriate for managing access to common-pool grazing resources, especially 
where there is considerable variation in the distribution of these resources 
through time and space. If tenure institutions become more formal and rigid, 
this can limit mobility, with potentially negative consequences for resilience.
(continued next page)
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Improving animal health services
In the absence of private service providers, governments supported by develop-
ment partners have often financed public provision of animal health services. 
Such efforts can be beneficial in the short run, but they usually prove counter-
productive in the long run, as they undermine the incentives for private service 
providers to enter into the market once effective demand emerges. The chal-
lenge for policy makers is to create an incentive framework that can attract 
Governments in East and West Africa have not always supported mobile 
pastoralists’ use of common-pool grazing resources, for several reasons. First, 
while pastoralists are integrated into regional, national, and international live-
stock markets that reach millions of consumers, most of the trade is informal 
and invisible (Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2012; McPeak, Little, and Doss 2012). 
Governments therefore naturally favor the interests of agriculturalists whose 
production is more visible and more easily taxed (Behnke and Kerven 2013). 
Second, national laws are generally better at protecting the user rights of sed-
entary farmers over the grazing rights of mobile pastoralists, in part because 
mobile pastoralists do not remain in one location throughout the year, but also 
because pastoralists are not seen as making investments in the land, which is 
often a condition for obtaining tenure rights. Third, the processes of decentral-
ization across Africa have resulted in more local control over natural resources, 
mostly at the level of municipalities. While decentralization works well for 
farmers who stay within a particular municipality throughout the year, that is 
not the case for mobile pastoralists who move through and use common-pool 
grazing resources in multiple municipalities over the course of a year. This 
means that decentralization and local control over natural resources are not 
accommodating mobile pastoral systems and are not appropriate for the gov-
ernance of common-pool grazing resources in these systems (Turner 1999).
One of the key lessons of the “paradox of pastoral land tenure” is the need 
of pastoralists to secure access to pasture and water, but also to retain flexibility 
in resource use (Fernández-Giménez 2002). The critical lesson here is that gov-
ernance needs to focus on supporting the flexibility of pastoral mobility in an 
open system, and this is not achieved by mapping, fixing, and delimiting the 
corridors, which may even have the opposite effect. The interests in support of 
pastoral mobility at the national and regional level are often not aligned with 
those at the local level, where government officials and traditional authorities 
tend to have primarily agricultural constituencies. At the national level, authori-
ties benefit from the free movement of cattle because of taxes and other levies 
on pastoralists and livestock traders, whereas at the local level, authorities 
derive most of their income from agricultural populations.
Source: Adapted from Kerven and Behnke 2014.
Box 5.2 (continued)
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private service providers to enter into the market as public service providers are 
gradually phased out.
Improving access to feed resources
Despite recent advances in legislation dealing with the pastoral economy, espe-
cially in the Sahelian countries, pastoral mobility is increasingly being ham-
pered by the expansion of cultivated cropland. Land use rights in pastoral zones 
remain generally precarious, as often they are not recognized by institutions, 
especially in the strategic areas of lowlands, riverbanks, wet valleys, forestry and 
pastoral reserves (Ickowicz et al. 2012). Policy reforms designed to formalize 
access by pastoralists to rangelands, coupled with investments in water resource 
development (to open up underutilized zones) and protection of corridors (to 
facilitate movement of animals to underutilized feed resources), could allow 
more complete use of available feed resources.
Consolidating herd size and feed resources
Because of the highly inequitable distribution of livestock assets and the limita-
tions on animal and feed resources, large numbers of households will not be 
able to accumulate the numbers of animals needed to generate enough income 
for them to remain above the poverty line. One way to overcome this problem 
would be to provide poor livestock-keepers with alternative sources of income, 
which would enable many of them to exit from the sector, freeing up resources 
for access by others. Facilitating exit from the sector—which is already occur-
ring and will have to accelerate in future—is likely to be challenging from a 
policy perspective, but it represents an opportunity for poor households to tran-
sition into more productive and more sustainable livelihoods. 
Achieving more equitable distribution of livestock resources
Evidence is accumulating that livestock ownership both in the Horn of Africa 
and in the Sahel is becoming increasingly concentrated. Ever greater numbers 
of animals are ending up in the hands of wealthy traders and government offi-
cials, who tend to manage their herds using hired labor, which crowds out many 
of the small-scale herders who make up by far the largest share of the livestock-
keeping population. If this trend could be reversed, the households able to accu-
mulate the numbers of animals needed to stay above the poverty line could 
increase significantly. Progressive taxation of livestock assets and imposition of 
user fees in public rangelands could discourage accumulation of large herds, but 
such policies are likely to engender significant resistance from politically and 
economically influential livestock owners.
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Key messages
The analysis summarized here makes clear that there is scope for expanding 
livestock production in drylands and increasing the contribution of drylands 
producers to the rising demand in Sub-Saharan Africa for animal-source prod-
ucts. Policy changes and supporting investments such as those described here 
could halve the regional deficit projected to emerge by 2030. 
The results of the modeling exercise suggest that feed and animal resources 
will be insufficient to provide secure and adequate livelihoods for all of the 
people in the drylands who depend on livestock as their principal livelihood 
source. Under the BAU scenario, by 2030 about 77 percent of pastoralist house-
holds and 58 percent of agro-pastoralist households will not be able to accumu-
late the numbers of animals needed to generate enough income for them to 
subsist even at 50 percent of the poverty line. The current inequitable distribu-
tion of livestock assets, which is projected to become worse as a result of the 
ongoing transformation of the dryland economy, is likely to put further pressure 
on poor pastoralists. 
Fortunately, these gloomy scenarios can be avoided. Investments in improv-
ing animal health services and increasing market integration, combined with 
measures to improve access to the available feed resources, could increase the 
share of livestock-keeping households able to accumulate enough animals to 
remain resilient. Adoption of the full package of best-bet interventions could 
reduce the share of livestock-keeping households who feel pressure to exit from 
the sector to as little as 7 percent.
The development of alternative sources of income, inside or outside the dry-
lands, needs to be an integral and major component of any dryland develop-
ment strategy. Going forward, the traditional narrow focus on increasing 
production of milk and meat will have to change so as to embrace a wider range 
of diversified income generating activities. There is need as well to strengthen 
the incentives for livestock-keepers to serve as responsible stewards of the 
environment. 
Government policies designed to sedentarize pastoralists, particularly in the 
more arid zones, are unlikely to succeed. Herds and flocks must be mobile if 
they are to use temporally and geographically distributed feed resources, so 
measures that restrict their mobility will reduce productivity and exacerbate 
poverty.
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Notes
1.  The Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) is an artificial construct that can be used to aggre-
gate different livestock species. For Sub-Saharan Africa, the conversion factors are: 
1 camel = 0.7 TLU, I cow = 0.6 TLU, and 1 sheep or goat = 0.1 TLU.
2.  Resilient households are defined as households owning at least the minimum num-
ber of TLU needed to stay above the poverty line, assuming that 70% of the income 
of pastoralists is derived from livestock, and 35% of the income of agro-pastoralists.
Three categories are distinguished: (a) resilient households = households owning 
more than 15 TLU, (b) vulnerable households = households owning 7.5 to 15 TLU, 
and (c) non-viable households = households owning less than 7.5 TLU and likely to 
be forced to seek an alternative livelihood strategy. These levels increase with 
drought and decrease with the introduction of productivity-enhancing innovations. 
For details, see De Haan et al. 2015.
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Chapter 6
Tree-based Systems: Multiple 
Pathways to Boosting Resilience
Frank Place, Dennis Garrity
Current situation
Tree-based production systems have enormous potential to reduce vulnerability 
and increase the resilience of households in dryland regions of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Trees are key providers of biomass, which is critical for many livelihood 
needs. Wood from trees is the leading source of energy in many dryland coun-
tries and is an important construction material. Foliage and pods from trees and 
shrubs are the most important source of feed for camels and goats, the domi-
nant livestock species in more arid parts of the drylands. Trees and shrubs offer 
enhanced sources of the organic matter needed to improve the structure and 
raise the fertility of soils used for agriculture. In addition, many parts of trees 
provide different medicinal products for people. And fruits and vegetable foli-
age harvested from trees are important seasonal food sources for people living 
in drylands and for sale.
The benefits from trees take on added value when it is considered that tree-
based production systems are relatively impervious to many of the shocks that 
affect other production systems, especially livestock-keeping and agriculture. 
With their deep roots, trees, maintain their standing value and offer some pro-
duction even in drought years. Therefore they are a good buffer against climatic 
risk and a critical element in a diversification strategy designed to maintain 
levels of consumption and income in good times and bad. In addition, their 
value can be tapped when it is most needed: wood from trees can be harvested 
throughout the year, and many annual tree products are harvested at times dif-
ferent from the times when annual crops are harvested.
The term “tree-based systems” as used in this book refers to agricultural 
systems, forest/woodland/bushland systems, or pastoral (rangeland) systems in 
which trees play a significant role. Within each of these three main classes of 
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land use, many different tree species can be economically and ecologically 
important. 
Management strategies for tree-based systems
Not surprisingly considering their variability, tree-based systems encompass a 
wide range of management practices. It is important to distinguish between 
tree-based systems that involve the managed regeneration of trees (often indig-
enous species) and tree-based systems that involve purposeful planting and/or 
management of trees (often introduced species). 
Natural regeneration
Managed regeneration of indigenous tree species can lead to the emergence of 
diversified tree-based systems capable of generating multiple products and ser-
vices. In the drier areas of Sub-Saharan Africa regeneration accounts for a large 
majority of the trees being managed by farmers. Regenerative practices include 
farmer-managed natural regeneration (FMNR) of trees found in croplands, as 
well as assisted natural regeneration (ANR) involving the use of enclosures to 
rehabilitate rangelands or woodlands. Systems based on natural regeneration 
typically include a diverse set of tree species that are well-adapted to local condi-
tions and that entail relatively low establishment costs. Regenerative systems are 
currently being expanded in large areas throughout the arid and semi-arid dry-
lands. Regeneration of trees on farms occurs throughout the farm, including on 
crop fields. The result is a mosaic of trees integrated into other land uses such as 
cropping, pastures, and fallows.
FMNR on agricultural lands ANR on community lands represent cost-effec-
tive ways of achieving widespread increases in the numbers of valuable, adapted, 
and diverse trees. What these practices have in common is that in both cases, 
people (individual farmers or entire communities) actively influence natural 
biological regeneration processes to achieve patterns that better suit their needs. 
On agricultural lands, farmers identify naturally regenerating tree seedlings in 
their fields and manage them to provide various benefits (for direct products 
and for crops or livestock). On community lands, community groups may adopt 
the same practices, and they may also introduce grazing management systems 
at the community level designed to allow successful tree regeneration in tar-
geted areas. Under both systems, protecting and weeding around young trees 
may be necessary to help them survive. 
In recent years FMNR has gained in popularity in many dryland areas 
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Because FMNR requires minimal cash invest-
ment, it can expand rapidly through farmer-to-farmer and village-to-village 
diffusion. The more than 5 million hectares of medium- to high-density tree 
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cover newly regenerated on croplands in Niger provide a dramatic example of 
how quickly and how extensively the practice can spread (Reij, Tappan, and 
Smale 2009). And Niger may be just the tip of the iceberg. A recent study carried 
out in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Senegal found that almost all farmers are 
actively regenerating trees (Place and Binam 2013). 
The benefits derived from FMNR vary from location to location, depending 
on which tree species are present in the area and what products and services are 
valued locally. Throughout the Sahel more than 100 woody species are being 
managed by farmers through natural regeneration. These trees are of high value: 
they contribute products for human consumption (more than US$200 per 
household per year) and feed for livestock during the late dry season, and they 
have positive effects on crop yields (accounting for roughly 20–25 percent of 
variation in millet and sorghum yields). 
Purposeful planting
Purposeful planting and/or management of certain types of tree species that can 
produce economically valuable products and services are also important in the 
drylands, particularly in dry subhumid zones where rainfall is more plentiful. 
Where the water supply is more assured, the costs of planting trees are lower, 
the risk of losing trees to drought is less pronounced, and the productivity of 
trees is higher. 
Benefits of tree-based systems
Whether based on managed regeneration or purposeful planting, tree-based 
systems in drylands are capable of generating many economically valuable 
products and services.
Improved soil fertility
Trees of all types have properties that are beneficial for soil fertility. These include 
root systems that hold soils in place, litter that falls as mulch, and organic matter 
that the roots and litter provide to micro and macro fauna in the soil. Many farm-
ers have known and appreciated these properties for generations. At the same 
time, trees can compete with crops for nutrients, water, and light, so farmers must 
weigh the costs and benefits before associating trees with crops. The presence of 
trees in crop fields may also complicate plowing, which is why extension agents 
often convey messages about cultivating “clean” fields (Smith 2010).
Quite a number of tree species have been found to offer significant soil fertil-
ity benefits in dryland regions of Africa. Unquestionably the most important of 
these is Faidherbia albida (formerly Acacia albida), which fixes nitrogen from 
the atmosphere, develops a deep rooting system that allows it to access 
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underground moisture during times of drought, produces a light canopy that 
does not compete much with underlying crops, and drops its nitrogen rich 
leaves in advance of the rainy season. Many other species similarly contribute 
to improved soil fertility, for example, many of the acacia species.  
In drier zones characterized by less than 600 mm of annual rainfall, virtually 
all fertilizer trees are established through FMNR. In more humid reaches of the 
drylands, where population densities are generally higher and the incentives 
and capacities for intensification are higher, hundreds of thousands of farmers 
have been induced to establish fertilizer trees through purposeful planting 
(Garrity et al. 2010). 
A meta-analysis of studies on the effects of fertilizer trees on maize yields 
found that such trees often have significant positive effects; even doubling of 
yields is not uncommon (Sileshi et al. 2008). The effects can be quite variable, 
however, with species choice, management practices, and environmental condi-
tions all playing critical roles. Two recent studies examined the yield and profit 
effects from FMNR of faidherbia-based systems in Malawi (Glenn 2012) and the 
Sahel (Place and Binam 2013). Both studies found that the trees had positive 
effects on yields and profits. In multiple locations in Mali, Burkina Faso, and 
Niger, faidherbia and other species established through FMNR boosted yields 
of millet and sorghum from 16-30 percent, controlling for other inputs (Place 
and Binam 2013). In multiple locations in Malawi, faidherbia trees boosted 
maize yields by 12-16 percent, also controlling for other inputs (Glenn 2012). 
In addition to helping increase yields during times of normal rainfall, fertilizer 
trees provide some protection against drought. The available evidence, while 
limited, suggests that yield decreases are generally less pronounced during 
droughts when fertilizer trees are present in the field (Akinnifesi et al. 2010). 
In the more humid parts of the drylands the benefits of fertilizer trees can be 
realized rapidly, especially in planted systems, because planted trees quickly 
produce large quantities of biomass containing significant amounts of nitrogen 
(more than 100 kg N/ha). In the drier parts of the drylands the benefits of fertil-
izer trees take longer to appear because the trees that make up the mainly regen-
erative systems that dominate in the drier zones take longer to become 
established. In addition to contributing to improved soil fertility through the 
production of leaf biomass, trees can help to build up soil biological and physi-
cal health through the continual deposition of organic matter. Organic matter 
improves the resilience of the soil resource, so that it is more productive for a 
wider range of crops and other plants. The positive effects of trees on soil carbon 
(e.g., Beedy et al. 2014; Nair 2009), soil water retention capacity (Mafongoya et 
al. 2006), and soil fauna (Mafongoya and Sileshi 2006) are supported by a large 
body of evidence. 
Case studies have shown that both regenerative and planted tree systems can 
be profitable (for examples see Ajayi et al. 2007; Ajayi et al. 2011; Place and 
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Binam 2013). Planted systems require more labor, not only for establishment of 
trees but also for management of potential competition with crops, especially 
when exotic fast-growing tree species are used. The added labor costs are more 
than compensated, however, through higher crop yields. Ajayi et al. (2007) 
found that the net present value from a five-year improved fallow rotation (two 
years fallow followed by three years of maize) ranged from US$270–310/ha, 
compared to US$130/ha for the conventional system with no fertilizer. Although 
systems based on the use of fertilizer outperform tree-based systems in terms of 
crop yield and net present value, the two systems are comparable in terms of 
benefit-cost ratio and returns to labor.
Livestock fodder and feed
Trees and shrubs produce feed for livestock, particularly during the dry season 
when natural pasture is scarce. For this reason, farmers use many dryland trees 
and shrubs to nourish their livestock. In West Africa, two of the most common 
are Pterocarpus spp and Piliostigma spp. 
The limited available evidence on the effects of trees and shrubs on livestock 
growth in drylands comes mainly from researcher-managed feeding trials. For 
example, supplementation of pasture in Zimbabwe with 75 g of Acacia angustis-
sima fed to a group of goats each day was found to result in an incremental 
increase of 36 g per goat per day (Mukandiwa et al. 2010). 
Relatively little research has been done at the farm level to assess the profit-
ability of tree investments in the livestock sector. Such assessments are compli-
cated by the large number of tree species used for feed, the high level of 
variability in the duration and frequency of feeding, and the shifting composi-
tion of feed resources, among other factors. Place and Binam (2013) found posi-
tive correlations between the number of goats and sheep and the number of 
fodder shrubs on farms in Burkina Faso, but no such correlation was detected 
in neighboring countries. The same authors also found positive correlations 
between the value of goat and sheep production and the production value-to-
stock ratio on the one hand and the number of trees on the other. This suggests 
that at least in the case of small ruminants, private investment in fodder trees 
and shrubs is associated with higher animal stocks and production. 
Fuel wood and timber
Trees are the leading source of energy in almost all rural areas of Africa, includ-
ing the drylands. Firewood and charcoal are widely used for cooking, bathing, 
laundering, and heating. In many countries, the drylands are a major supplier 
of firewood and charcoal for urban areas. The value of traded charcoal is cur-
rently estimated to be in the billions of dollars, making charcoal one of the most 
valuable commodities traded in the region. Current fuel wood production 
comes mainly from off-farm sources, and harvesting methods are frequently 
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destructive to the environment. Governance of fuel wood production and mar-
keting is generally weak, which creates uncertainty throughout the value chain, 
gives rise to extra-legal transactions costs, and also undermines incentives for 
long-term investment. Reforms to policy and regulatory frameworks could sig-
nificantly improve the management of fuel wood harvested from woodlands, as 
well as strengthen the incentives to source fuel wood from farms.
Tree products (especially timber and poles) are important construction 
materials in many dryland regions of Africa. Timber and pole production 
almost always involves the purposeful planting of seedlings, because the profit-
ability depends critically on the use of quality germplasm and adoption of care-
ful management practices. Timber and pole production therefore are best suited 
to areas in which rainfall is more abundant and more reliable, especially the dry 
subhumid zone. Timber and pole production schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have for the most part relied on exotic species, such as Eucalyptus camuldulensis 
or Acacia mearnsii. In addition, many indigenous trees with high value have the 
potential to perform well, as long as sufficient attention is paid to germplasm 
selection and management. For example, Melia volkensii already supports a 
thriving high-quality furniture wood production industry in Kenya. 
Non-wood tree products
Trees and shrubs in the drylands produce many non-wood products that are 
extensively harvested for home consumption as well as for sale. These non-wood 
products include foods (fruits, nuts, and leaves); medicines; gums and resins; oils 
and fragrances; and fodder for livestock. The value of non-wood products varies 
considerably by region. Baobab contributes significantly to incomes in Senegal; 
shea in Burkina Faso, Mali, and northern Ghana; gum arabic in Sudan; and 
marula in southern Africa. Cashew is another important commodity, prominent 
in the semi-arid and subhumid zones. Over 1.5 million farmers grow cashews in 
Africa, and production doubled between 2003 and 2011. Fruit production, while 
still relatively limited, has tremendous potential, as fruit consumption is growing 
rapidly throughout the region as a result of urbanization and improved nutrition 
awareness. Production of many of these non-wood tree products can be expanded 
to meet growing export demand. In some cases the opportunities lie more with 
value addition, rather than with production. For example, the fruits of hundreds 
of millions of shea trees are processed locally using traditional methods to meet 
domestic demand or are exported unprocessed. Investments in industrial pro-
cessing machinery could significantly increase the quantity and the quality of shea 
nut products, generating increased profits for producers, processers, and export-
ers, and boosting foreign exchange earnings for exporting countries. A similar 
situation prevails in the case of cashew.
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Environmental services
Trees provide many environmental services, including carbon sequestration, 
watershed protection, and soil health enrichment. All trees sequester carbon at 
a relatively stable proportion of 0.5 of the woody biomass dry weight. Tree 
growth is slower as aridity increases, and the annual aboveground carbon 
sequestration from a typical regenerated field may be around 1 ton/ha in the 
semi-arid regions with an additional third of that below ground. 
The value of trees and tree products can be significant, both in terms of the 
contribution to total household income, as well as in terms of cash income from 
sales (Figure 6.1).
Opportunities
How might the benefits produced through tree-based systems contribute to the 
resilience of households living in drylands? To answer that question, it is useful 
to consider the potential impacts of trees on the three determinants of 
resilience.
Reducing exposure
There is some evidence that wide-scale adoption of tree-based systems can actually 
affect weather patterns in the drylands, for example by tempering the frequency and 
the strength of storms. These effects are at best very minor, however, and almost 
certainly below the level needed to significantly reduce exposure to shocks. 
Figure 6.1 Revenue from sales of tree products, selected countries, West Africa
Source: Place and Garrity, forthcoming 2016
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Reducing sensitivity
While trees may not reduce exposure to shocks, they can play an important role 
in reducing household sensitivity to shocks. Trees are not completely impervi-
ous to climate change, but their deep rooting systems allow them to take advan-
tage of moisture stored in the soil, which makes them less vulnerable to seasonal 
rainfall reductions. This robustness allows trees to play a particularly important 
role in reducing sensitivity to at least two types of shocks experienced in the 
drylands: weather-related shocks and health-related shocks. 
Reduced sensitivity to weather-related shocks. The dominant weather-
related shock in the drylands is droughts that are severe, frequent, or prolonged. 
Trees growing in crop fields attenuate the severity of drought effects on crop 
performance by modifying the microclimate. Crops growing in the vicinity of 
trees experience a more favorable microclimate, with significantly higher 
humidity in the crop canopy causing a lower vapor pressure deficit. Trees can 
also lower solar radiation stress experienced by crops, and they can increase the 
infiltration and storage of rainfall in the soil by reducing surface runoff. The 
additional biomass that trees provide increases soil organic matter, which 
enhances soil moisture storage and improves nutrient availability to crops. 
Moreover, there are circumstances under which some trees effectively transfer 
water from deeper depths up to near the soil surface through their root systems 
and make such water available to nearby crops, a phenomenon known as 
“hydraulic lift” (Bayala et al. 2014). These various features of trees combine to 
reduce the rate of onset of crop water stress, enabling crops to more successfully 
withstand periods of drought during the growing season. 
A second weather-related shock in the drylands is heat. All crops experience 
a reduction in yield whenever temperatures exceed a certain threshold level. 
High temperatures depress yields through two processes. First, plants respond 
to high temperatures by increasing their respiration rate, which causes them to 
burn up more energy, leaving less available for grain filling. Second, high tem-
peratures shorten the crop maturity period, which reduces the size and weight 
of the grain. Trees growing in crop fields can significantly reduce temperatures 
in the crop canopy and soil, particularly during the middle part of the day. 
Across the growing season, avoiding daily temperature shocks can allow plants 
to photosynthesize longer, leading to increased grain filling and higher yield. 
These effects can be observed in the more stable crop yields recorded during 
drought years in fields containing trees than in fields without trees (for example, 
see evidence from Niger cited in Reij, Tappan, and Smale 2009). Survey data are 
consistent with testimony by many farmers that higher tree populations reduce 
drought effects. 
Reduced sensitivity to health-related shocks. Trees can also help reduce 
sensitivity to health-related shocks. Fruits and vegetable foods harvested from 
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trees comprise part of the regular diet in the drylands, and in many cases they 
are critical for good nutrition because they contain vitamins and micronutrients 
that are unavailable from other sources. For example, the fruits and leaves of 
baobab are highly nutritious in vitamins A and C, which are lacking in staple 
foods (Orwa et al. 2009). Tree-based foods take on special significance during 
periods of seasonal or prolonged drought-induced hunger when crops and 
animal-source foods become unavailable (Place and Binam 2013). 
Crop modeling carried out for this study and further discussed in Chapter 12 
helped provide orders of magnitude of the benefits of FMNR in terms of reduc-
tion of drought impacts. When FMNR of native species is added to the other 
productivity-enhancing technologies discussed in this report, the effects are 
impressive. In a group of 10 countries in East and West Africa, the projected 
number of poor, drought-affected people living in drylands in 2030 falls—com-
pared to the BAU no intervention scenario—by 13 percent with low-density tree 
systems and by more than 50 percent with high-density tree systems (Figure 6.2).
Improving coping capacity
In addition to reducing sensitivity to shocks, trees can enhance the capacity of 
households in drylands to cope with the effects of shocks after the shocks have 
occurred. Trees are assets that can be cut and sold for cash or exchanged for 
Figure 6.2 Estimated reduction in the average number of drought-affected people through 
use of FMNR and other technologies by year 2030
Source: Authors’ estimates
Note: FMNR = Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration. The data in the chart refer to the number of households 
that by 2030 could become resilient to droughts, on an annual average, by adopting different packages of 
resilience interventions. The figure presents aggregated results for Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, Nigeria, 
Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
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goods in times of need. In the Maradi and Zinder Regions of Niger, where 1.2 
million households now sustain medium to high densities of tree populations 
on their farms, farmers cut tree branches on a continuous cycle for household 
fuel wood supplies and for sale, and some mature trees are cut down and sold 
in local wood markets for poles and construction materials. Export markets are 
active in shipping wood south to Nigeria. During prolonged drought periods 
these tree assets may be gradually liquidated to supply the household with cash 
for food purchases. This process was observed to be an important source of 
coping capacity for households during recent droughts (Reij, Tappan, and Smale 
2009). 
Returns to investment 
The rapid expansion of FMNR throughout large areas of West and East Africa 
suggests that farmers in the drylands value the benefits of the technology. But 
just how profitable is the technology, especially in comparison to other tech-
nologies that farmers could choose to adopt? Researchers have been homing in 
on this question, although definitive answers remain elusive due to the difficulty 
of measuring all of the multiple benefits and the long periods over which they 
are realized. 
Place and Garrity (2016 forthcoming) explored the returns to investment in 
FMNR using a model constructed to analyze costs and benefit streams over a 
20-year period. The model can be calibrated to represent the situation prevailing 
in different aridity zones and in different countries; in this case, the focus is on 
parkland systems in Mali and Niger in which millet is the dominant crop. The 
investment considered is FMNR, starting from a base of no trees and allowing 
the tree density to build up to the average density observed in the two countries. 
Two benefit streams are captured: the value of direct tree products (wood and 
non-wood), and the value of improved crop yields. Three cost categories are 
considered: (1) establishment of the system, (2) annual costs (upkeep and har-
vesting) related to tree products, and (3) annual costs related to crop produc-
tion. Discount rates of 10, 15, and 20 percent are used over 20- and 30-year time 
frames. 
Table 6.1 shows the net present value (NPV) and benefit-cost ratio (BCR) for 
six combinations of discount rates and time periods (all other variables are 
fixed). The estimated returns range from a low of NPV = US$29.9/ha and BCR 
= 1.5 (for the 20-year period assuming a 20 percent discount rate) to a high of 
NPV = US$178.11/ha and BCR = 2.66 (for a 30-year period assuming a 10 
percent discount rate). The IRR (internal rate of return) does not vary much for 
the different assumptions. The IRR is 34% in a 20-year time frame and 36% in 
a 30-year time frame. The break-even year similarly does not vary much, falling 
in year 11 in the case of a 20 percent discount rate and in years 10 and 9 in the 
case of discount rates of 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively. The benefit 
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streams per hectare from crops and tree products are virtually the same in the 
case of Mali. In contrast, all the economic variables are more favorable for 
FMNR in Niger, due to larger benefit streams from both harvested tree products 
and crop yields. 
Challenges
Tree-based systems have spread rapidly in some dryland zones, but in other 
zones, adoption continues to lag. Efforts to promote the technology more widely 
face five major challenges: (1) technical, (2) institutional, (3) legal, (4) eco-
nomic, and (5) cultural.
Technical. The main technical challenge slowing the dissemination of tree-
based systems in the drylands is lack of water. Water is needed in all humidity 
zones during the dry season to maintain tree nurseries, and it is needed 
throughout the year in the more arid zones to allow watering of recently planted 
saplings. 
Institutional. During their early stages of growth, young trees are vulnerable 
to heavy browsing and to fire. Dissemination of tree-based systems has lagged in 
areas in which local customs and laws fail to ensure the protection of young trees. 
Legal. In many dryland countries, forest regulations—even though well 
intended— discourage farmers from effectively managing indigenous species on 
their farms. For example, farmers are often required to pay for licenses to cut trees 
on their own land. Where these policies and regulations have been revised, in most 
cases farmers have responded with an explosion of tree regeneration on their lands.
Economic. The incentives to invest in tree-based systems in the drylands are 
not often obvious to farmers. Because trees grow slowly in the drylands, the 
benefits from an investment in trees often take years to materialize. This can be 
Table 6.1 Private economic returns from FMNR (US$/ha)
Mali Niger
20-year period 30-year period 20-year period 30-year period
Net Present Value (NPV)
10% discount rate 133.57 178.11 442.80 568.99
15% discount rate 66.82 82.46 253.94 298.24
20% discount rate 29.89 35.71 149.18 165.66
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR)
10% discount rate 2.43 2.66 6.78 7.47
15% discount rate 1.94 2.09 5.40 5.83
20% discount rate 1.52 1.60 4.19 4.43
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problematic. The long time lag to realize investment returns reduces the attrac-
tiveness of tree-based systems, where resource-constrained farmers generally 
must focus on meeting their families’ immediate consumption needs. In the 
case of trees grown for commercial purposes, a major challenge is the fact that 
markets for many tree products are as yet poorly developed. 
Cultural. Despite the accumulating body of evidence demonstrating the 
benefits of associating trees and crops in dryland zones, and despite the fact that 
farmers in the drylands have been using tree-based systems for generations, 
extension messages in many countries continue to encourage farmers to main-
tain “clean” fields. 
Key messages
Trees can improve the productivity and stability of crop and livestock produc-
tion systems in the drylands by providing multiple benefits that tend to stand 
up well in the face of climate shocks. 
The importance of tree-based systems and their role will vary depending on 
the microenvironment. 
In arid zones, low and uncertain rainfall makes investment in purposefully 
planted tree-based systems risky. In these zones, FMNR can make sense as a 
strategy to improve the productivity of pastoral livestock systems. Tree-based 
systems also have the potential in arid zones to sequester carbon, a function that 
currently generates little or no revenue for landholders but that could become 
increasingly important in future with the development of payment for environ-
mental services schemes.
In semi-arid zones, tree-based systems have considerable potential to con-
tribute to the productivity, profitability, and sustainability of agro-pastoral sys-
tems. Drought remains a threat, however, making some management practices 
more attractive than others. In semi-arid zones, regenerative tree-based systems 
should be promoted widely as a foundational practice. In selected areas, par-
ticularly areas where irrigation is available, there is scope for purposefully plant-
ing trees to produce wood and non-wood products as a way of increasing 
farmer incomes and improving nutrition.
In dry subhumid zones, tree-based systems can perform extremely well, but 
they are likely to face competition from other agricultural activities and there-
fore may have difficulty gaining traction. In areas where continuous cereal crop-
ping is taking place, regenerative tree-based systems may be able to help 
maintain soil fertility. And in areas of higher population density, where markets 
are well developed, cultivation at small and medium scale of purposefully 
planted high-value trees could generate significant amounts of income while at 
the same time contributing to improved nutrition. 
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Agriculture: More Water and Better 
Farming for Improved Food Security
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Current situation
Agriculture—used here to refer to farming in general and crop cultivation in 
particular—is one of the two main livelihood strategies practiced in the dry-
lands (the other being livestock-keeping). In the countries of East and West 
Africa in which drylands are important, agriculture is economically significant, 
with crop production typically contributing 10–30 percent of GDP and up to 75 
percent of agricultural GDP. 
Dryland agriculture is diverse, with mixed cropping predominating as a way 
of protecting against risk. Most dryland farming systems are dominated by one or 
two main staples, which are grown in association with a range of other crops hav-
ing dissimilar growth cycles and different maturity dates. Generally speaking, 
cropping systems in drier areas are dominated by millet and sorghum, due to the 
superior ability of these two species to tolerate drought and heat. As rainfall levels 
increase and mean temperatures decline, millet and sorghum give way to maize, 
which is the dominant crop throughout the wet parts of the semi-arid zone and 
the subhumid zone. In the wettest part of the drylands, maize is increasingly asso-
ciated with roots and tubers, including cassava, yam, and sweet potato. 
Drylands are generally unfavorable for agriculture. The harsh agro-climatic 
conditions restrict the potential of many crops, and fields are chronically 
exposed to unpredictable shocks that can decimate production to the point of 
causing complete crop loss. The biggest challenge to dryland agriculture is 
posed by the uncertain availability of water, both in terms of quantity and 
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timing. Although the effects of uncertain and highly variable rainfall can be 
mitigated through the use of irrigation, irrigation is relatively underdeveloped 
in the drylands, as it is across the region as a whole. Sub-Saharan Africa has the 
lowest level of irrigation development in the world. Across the entire region 
(drylands and non-drylands), about 7.1 million hectares have been developed 
for irrigation, representing just 3 percent of the total cultivated area. This com-
pares to about 15 percent of cropland that is irrigated worldwide. Not only is 
irrigation much less developed in Sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere, but the 
area that is developed is underused—more than one-fifth of the area equipped 
with irrigation infrastructure is reported to be out of use. Prospects for catching 
up with the rest of the world are bleak, as the rate of expansion of new irrigation 
is slow, averaging about 1 percent per year since 1995.
With irrigation still relatively underdeveloped, crop cultivation in the dry-
lands takes place mainly in rainfed systems. Rainfed crop production in the 
drylands is highly correlated with rainfall, which is important because drought 
is a defining feature of the environment (Figure 7.1). In most years, farmers sow 
their crops into dry soil at the beginning of the rainy season, in the expectation 
that the rains will follow. When the temporal distribution of rainfall differs from 
expectations, the consequences can be severe. The late arrival of early-season 
rains may spell crop failure, and terminal drought stress at the end of the grow-
ing season can be catastrophic as well. A second major constraint affecting dry-
land agriculture is extreme temperatures, particularly heat. Although many of 
the crops grown in drylands have the ability to tolerate wide temperature 
Figure 7.1 Dryland cereal production and rainfall in Burkina Faso, 1960–2000
Source: Ward and Torquebiau 2016 forthcoming
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fluctuations, most are unable to withstand even short periods of extreme heat 
or cold, especially when these occur at critical stages of the plant growth cycle. 
Water scarcity and extreme heat are the two biggest constraints affecting 
dryland agriculture, but they are hardly the only ones. Low soil fertility and 
nutrient depletion are chronic problems, with an estimated three-quarters of 
dryland soils showing symptoms of one of more plant nutrient deficiencies. 
Eroding winds, uncontrolled burning, and attack by insects such as locusts and 
army worms can further impair productivity and increase risk in dryland crop-
ping systems.
As a result of the many constraints, productivity in dryland farming systems 
is generally low, and production tends to fluctuate considerably from year to 
year. Across all of Sub-Saharan Africa, total factor productivity in agriculture 
increased very little during the three decades 1960–1990. Not until the mid-
1980s did significant numbers of African farmers begin adopting more inten-
sive technologies, leading to a modest acceleration in productivity growth 
(Fuglie and Rada 2013). 
Opportunities
Despite the challenges they pose to farming, drylands feature a number of agro-
climatic conditions that are favorable for plant growth, such as high levels of 
solar radiation and a relative absence of pests and diseases. These advantages 
confer possibilities for crop productivity gains. Where there are profitable mar-
kets and particularly where farmers have access to reliable water supplies, tech-
nological change can occur rapidly, bringing gains in income, reductions in 
poverty, and increases in resilience.
Agricultural productivity in many parts of the drylands is far below poten-
tial, as reflected by large and persistent gaps between yields observed in farmers’ 
fields and yields recorded on experiment stations using optimal levels of inputs 
and improved management practices. The existence of these yield gaps means 
that technologies are available with demonstrated capacity to increase and sta-
bilize the productivity of dryland agriculture. These technologies are not all the 
same, however; the benefits they deliver depend on the degree to which they 
address each of the three determinants of vulnerability and resilience (exposure, 
sensitivity, coping capacity).
Reducing exposure
Different to the case of many livestock-keepers who can move their herds to 
avoid exposure to droughts and other related shocks, farmers cannot move their 
fields. For this reason, agriculture will always be exposed to weather shocks, 
especially droughts.
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Reducing sensitivity
Farmers living in dryland regions are affected by droughts only to the extent 
that their farming activities are sensitive to the effects of those droughts. For this 
reason, interventions that reduce the sensitivity of dryland agriculture to 
droughts have the potential to reduce the vulnerability and improve the resil-
ience of households that depend on farming as their principal livelihood source. 
Two broad categories of interventions are distinguished here that reduce sensi-
tivity of crop farming to droughts: (1) improved management practices for rain-
fed agriculture, and (2) irrigation development.
Improved management practices for rainfed agriculture 
Where there are profitable markets and particularly where farmers have access 
to reliable water supplies, technological change in rainfed cropping systems can 
occur rapidly, bringing gains in income, reductions in poverty, and increases in 
resilience. The modeling exercise confirmed that several opportunities for accel-
erating the pace of technological change offer particularly bright prospects, 
described as follows. 
Accelerating the rate of varietal turnover. Modern varieties (MVs) of cere-
als, such as rice, wheat, and maize, played a major role in driving the Green 
Revolutions of Asia and Latin America, but they have had much less impact in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where adoption of MVs has lagged (Walker et al. 2014). In 
2010, across sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the average rate of MV adoption 
among 20 field crops stood at around 35 percent (Figure 7.2). While this 
Figure 7.2 Adoption of modern varieties by crop in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2010
Source: Constructed from Walker et al. 2014
Note: Maize is divided into East and Southern Africa (ESA) and West and Central Africa (WCA).
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adoption rate is considerably lower than the rate achieved in other developing 
regions, the uptake of MVs in Africa has accelerated in recent years, particularly 
in the case of maize and cassava, the leading dryland cereal and root crops 
(Walker and Alwang 2015). If current adoption rates continue, two-thirds of 
dryland areas will be sown to MVs by 2030.
Increasing the availability of hybrids. Thanks to the phenomenon of het-
erosis (commonly known as “hybrid vigor”), well-adapted hybrids have two 
main advantages over well-adapted improved varieties: higher yield potential 
and greater yield stability. In addition, because these advantages of hybrids are 
assured only when farmers purchase new seed for every cropping cycle, the 
demand for hybrid seed tends to be strong, creating incentives for private com-
panies to make sure that the market is well supplied. Yet despite the superior 
performance of hybrids and the stronger incentives for seed companies, adop-
tion of hybrids remains low in many dryland regions, and hybrid seed remains 
scarce in local markets. Increasing the availability of hybrids could increase 
resilience, especially for maize, sorghum, and pearl millet in West Africa, which 
account for about 40 percent of dryland cropped area in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Improving fertility management. Because low soil fertility constitutes a 
major constraint to farming in the drylands, diffusion of improved fertility 
management practices is essential for the sustainable intensification of dryland 
agriculture. A number of practices have demonstrated their effectiveness under 
diverse dryland conditions, including mulching, green manuring, composting, 
intercropping with legumes, and judicious use of mineral fertilizer (for a sum-
mary, see Walker 2015). The impact of improved soil fertility management tech-
nologies is amplified when MVs are introduced at the same time because of the 
synergistic effects between improved germplasm and improved management 
practices. 
Improving agricultural water management. In the drylands, which are 
characterized by conditions of chronic water scarcity and climatic unpredict-
ability, soil moisture is often inadequate to achieve a decent yield, and in times 
of drought, farmers may face total crop failure. Many households in the dry-
lands that rely on farming as their primary livelihood strategy are highly sensi-
tive to soil moisture risk and to the resulting low yields or crop failure. Therefore 
increasing the availability of water and improving the efficiency with which 
available water is used can have a transformational impact in dryland rainfed 
agriculture. 
Agricultural water management in dryland environments aims to reduce 
sensitivity to drought and strengthen coping capacity by bringing moisture to 
the plant root zone in the right quantity and quality and at the right time to 
achieve higher levels of productivity, essentially by one or more of three routes: 
(1) “just-in-time” watering to bridge drought gaps and save the crop; (2) deliv-
ering quality water at optimal intervals to the plant root zone through good 
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water service to the field and in-field water management to promote optimal 
plant growth; and (3) combining water management with soil and crop manage-
ment to achieve optimal crop water productivity (Ward and Torquebiau 2016 
forthcoming). 
The most secure way to increase the availability of water to growing plants is 
through irrigation development, discussed in the next section (see Box 7.2). 
Short of irrigation development, however, many tried and tested technologies 
are available to improve water availability and management for rainfed farming 
in the drylands (Table 7.1). Investment programs in areas where full irrigation 
is not an option should focus on improved agricultural water management as 
part of a total livelihood package.
Technologies to improve crop productivity in dryland environments. A 
technology assessment carried out for this book identified five technologies 
with demonstrated capacity to improve crop productivity in dryland environ-
ments: (1) drought-tolerant improved varieties, (2) heat-tolerant improved vari-
eties, (3) fertilizer, (4) water harvesting, and (5) farmer-managed natural 
regeneration (FMNR) of indigenous trees. The ability of these five technologies 
to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience of agriculture-dependent 
Table 7.1 Water management strategies for rainfed agriculture
Aim Strategy Purpose Techniques and structural measures
Improve water 
use efficiency by 
increasing water 
available to the 
plant roots
Soil and water 
conservation
Concentrate rainfall 
through around crop roots 
Bunds, ridges, broad-beds and 
furrows, micro basins, runoff strips
Planting pits
Maximize rainwater 
infiltration
Terracing, contour cultivation, 
conservation agriculture, dead 
furrows, staggered trenches
Evaporation 
management
Reduce non-productive 
evaporation
Dry planting, mulching, conservation 
agriculture, inter-cropping, 
windbreaks, agroforestry, early plant 
vigor, vegetative bunds
Water 
harvesting
Mitigate dry spells with 
supplementary irrigation, 
protect springs, recharge 
groundwater, enable off-
season irrigation, and 
permit multiple uses of 
water
Surface micro dams, subsurface 
tanks, farm ponds, percolation dams 
and tanks, diversion and recharging 
structures
Improve water 
productivity by 
increasing 
productivity per 
unit of water 
consumed
Integrated soil, 
crop, and water 
management
Increase proportion of 
evapotranspiration flowing 
as productive transpiration 
and so obtain “more crop 
per drop”
Increase plant water uptake capacity 
through conservation agriculture, dry 
planting (early), improved crop 
varieties, optimum crop spacing, soil 
fertility management, optimum crop 
rotation, intercropping, pest control, 
and organic matter management
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households was assessed through a multi-step modeling exercise using the 
“Africa RiskView” (ARV) model developed by the African Risk Capacity (a spe-
cialized agency of the African Union) and the Decision Support System for 
Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT) crop simulation model. The ARV model 
uses drought vulnerability profiles of the population against which drought 
impacts are calculated to estimate drought-affected populations under different 
drought scenarios. The DSSAT model allows estimation of the impacts on yields 
of indicator crops—in this case millet, sorghum, and maize—of the five tech-
nologies under different drought scenarios. 
By combining the results of the two models and including screening criteria 
to restrict adoption of each technology to zones in which adoption would likely 
be profitable for the farmer, it was possible to estimate the number of house-
holds living in drylands in 2030 that would be made resilient by adopting one 
of the technologies. (A more detailed description of the modeling approach 
appears in the Appendix.) Because simultaneous adoption of two or more tech-
nologies results in interactive effects that are difficult to capture in the DSSAT 
model, the impacts of the best-bet technologies were modeled separately, and 
only the most effective technology was assumed to be adopted in each location. 
Thus the results of the modeling exercise are conservative, because they do not 
allow for simultaneous adoption of multiple technologies, which is likely to 
occur in many situations. 
The results of the simulation exercise are summarized in Figure 7.3. Overall, 
improving soil fertility through application of fertilizer was found to have the 
greatest potential for increasing resilience in the drylands. After soil fertility 
management, the technologies with the next greatest potential for increasing 
resilience were found to be drought-tolerant germplasm and farmer-managed 
natural generation of indigenous tree species. The effectiveness of the latter 
Figure 7.3 Contribution of improved cropping technologies to reducing vulnerability
Source: Authors’ calculations
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technology increases with tree density: establishing and maintaining 10 trees 
per hectare on average was found to be significantly more beneficial than estab-
lishing and maintaining 5 trees per hectare on average. Heat-tolerant germ-
plasm in and of itself was found to have limited potential. Water harvesting 
practices were found to have limited potential, due to the relatively high cost 
compared to the limited expected returns from higher yields.
In summary, adoption of improved cropping technologies could make an 
important contribution to reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience in 
the drylands, particularly in countries in which a large proportion of vulnerable 
households depend on agriculture as a major livelihood source. Figure 7.4 
shows the reduction in 2030 in the share of drought-affected households relative 
to the BAU scenario that would occur if the most effective technology were 
adopted in every location in which adoption would be profitable. Across the 
drylands as a whole, just under 20 percent of all households could be made 
resilient by adopting one or more of the improved cropping technologies. In 
some countries the share would be much higher. For example, in Ethiopia one-
half of the drought-affected households could be made resilient in the face of 
drought by adopting improved cropping technology. In Senegal and Niger more 
than one-quarter of the drought-affected households could be made resilient.
Irrigation development
The most reliable way to reduce the sensitivity of cropping systems in the dry-
lands to drought shocks and to ensure adequate water supplies at critical peri-
ods during the cropping season is through irrigation. Despite their prevailing 
aridity, many dryland areas have considerable water resources that can be used 
Figure 7.4 Percent reduction in the number off drought-affected households from 
adoption of improved cropping technologies relative to BAU scenario, 2030
Source: Authors’ calculations
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for irrigation, both surface water and groundwater. Yet much of this potential 
remains unexploited: dryland countries have developed less than one-third of 
their technical irrigation potential, and more than one-fifth of the area devel-
oped for irrigation is currently not in use (Xie et al. 2015). 
Small-scale irrigation
Because of its relative affordability and manageability, small-scale irrigation 
arguably offers the most important opportunities to improve agricultural water 
management in drylands. Modeling work carried out for this book suggests that 
using conservative assumptions about costs and returns to investment capital 
allows considerable scope for further development of small-scale irrigation in 
dryland regions of Africa—up to 3 million hectares or even more (Xie et al. 
2015).
Individual smallholder irrigation using low-cost pumps is spreading fast in 
many dryland regions, drawing water from both groundwater and surface 
sources. Because of the recurrent cash outlays needed to pay for fuel, operation 
and maintenance, and production inputs such as seed and fertilizer, small-scale 
irrigation works best when cash crops are being produced and when farmers 
have ready access to nearby markets where they can sell their production (Ward 
and Torquebiau 2016 forthcoming).
In addition to individual smallholder irrigation, community-based small-
scale irrigation also offers considerable scope for expansion in drylands. Small-
scale community-based irrigation has expanded in recent decades in response 
to new market opportunities, often with support from development programs. 
Because it is essentially farmer-managed, community-based small-scale irriga-
tion tends to be well adapted to local biophysical conditions and socioeconomic 
circumstances (Ward and Torquebiau 2015). 
Large-scale irrigation
Large-scale irrigation offers additional opportunities for increasing and stabiliz-
ing agricultural production in dryland areas. It is difficult to predict to what 
extent these opportunities will be exploited, however. Because the benefits gen-
erated by agriculture alone rarely justify the cost of constructing large dams, 
future growth in large-scale irrigation will likely depend on decisions to invest 
in dams whose primary function is to generate hydro-power. 
Some opportunities are more accessible than others. For example, there is 
scope to double production in the drylands of existing large-scale irrigation 
schemes that currently are underutilized. Technical and institutional modern-
ization on the 5 million hectares currently being irrigated in the drylands could 
greatly increase yields–even double them in some cases—at an average cost 
about US$2,700/ha, less than half the cost of developing new irrigation. In addi-
tion, there is scope for bringing back into production some of the more than 
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one million hectares in the drylands that are equipped for irrigation but not 
currently being irrigated.
With respect to developing new large-scale irrigation in the drylands, much 
will depend on future investments in the energy sector. It is beyond question 
that the technical potential to expand large-scale irrigation is significant, if tech-
nical potential is defined in terms of the availability of water and arable land. 
Taking into account the 120 large dams currently in existence or included in 
national development plans in dryland countries, and assuming conservatively 
that 30 percent of the water stored in these dams will be available for irrigation, 
up to 1.5 million ha could be developed for large-scale irrigation. Approximately 
two-thirds of these dams are already operational, meaning only conveyance and 
distribution systems and pumping equipment are needed to bring water to the 
fields.
Irrigation development potential in drylands through 2030
What might be the potential impact by 2030 on productivity and production if 
the potential for small-scale and large-scale irrigation in the drylands was fully 
developed? This question was explored using a modeling approach described in 
Xie et al. (2015). As a baseline, it was estimated that in 2000 approximately 6.43 
million ha in all of Sub-Saharan Africa was equipped for irrigation. Of this area, 
approximately 4.56 million ha (71 percent) was located in dryland regions. 
Table 7.2 shows the additional area that could potentially be developed for 
large-scale and small-scale irrigation by 2030, assuming moderate capital 
investment costs and two minimum acceptable internal rates of return (IRR). 
Restricting the analysis to the drylands as they are defined in this book (Aridity 
Zones 3–6), depending on the assumptions, by 2030 as little as 3.9 million ha or 
Table 7.2 Irrigation development potential by 2030, by aridity zone (ha)
Total 
cropland
Large-scale irrigation Small-scale irrigation
5% IRR  12% IRR 5% IRR 12% IRR
Hyper arid (Zone 1) 1,248,862 60,170 47,624 0 389
Arid (Zone 2) 567,069 0 0 2,910 5,732
Dry Semi-arid (Zone 3) 16,308,307 91,926 96,428 307,768 142,116
Wet Semi-arid (Zone 4) 25,127,335 141,132 95,102 1,238,674 897,492
Dry Subhumid (Zone 5) 29,546,353 240,395 182,831 1,716,223 1,242,597
Wet Subhumid (Zone 6) 35,610,403 450,073 373,914 1,891,591 1,620,670
Humid (Zone 7) 76,139,002 713,412 499,563 3,121,388 2,931,384
Grand Total 184,547,331 1,697,108 1,295,462 8,278,554 6,840,381
Source: You, Wood, and Wood-Sichra. 2009, Xie et al. 2015.
Note: IRR = internal rate of return
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as much as 5.2 million ha could be developed for small-scale irrigation. For 
large-scale irrigation development, which will depend on the rehabilitation and 
construction of dams, the area is much more limited, ranging from a low of 0.75 
million ha to a high of 0.92 million ha.
In dryland regions of West Africa and East Africa, prospects for irrigation 
development by 2030 vary considerably by country (Table 7.3). It is interesting to 
note, however, that even if the potential for irrigation were fully exploited, in most 
cases the irrigated area would comprise only 3–20 percent of total cropland. 
The potential for irrigation development in dryland regions of Sub-Saharan 
Africa is summarized in Map 7.1. Two clear messages emerge from the 
Table 7.3 Irrigation development potential by 2030, East and West Africa 
(moderate cost and 5% IRR)
 
Cropland 
in 2000 
(ha)
Irrigated area 
potential 
(ha)
Irrigated area 
potential 
(% of cropland)
Nigeria 24,523,253 1,617,654 7
Ghana 1,759,898 312,275 18
Senegal 2,266,221 255,901 11
Burkina Faso 5,176,476 174,513 3
Mali 4,696,988 141,362 3
Chad 3,539,511 94,080 3
Niger 12,232,511 118,795 1
Benin 2,030,091 135,989 7
Mozambique 2,601,577 76,433 3
Cote d'Ivoire 968,534 74,316 8
Mauritania 284,483 100,340 35
Togo 790,188 61,798 8
Cameroon 1,145,331 56,664 5
Guinea 214,349 22,927 11
Gambia 277,146 17,682 6
Kenya 2,629,859 335,705 13
Ethiopia 4,801,840 245,629 5
Somalia 935,603 230,028 25
Eritrea 669,799 27,865 4
Swaziland 95,822 13,488 14
Sudan 10,449,867 11,775 0.1
Djibouti 5,051 3,648 72
Source: Xie et al. 2015.
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modeling work. First, the potential for irrigation development in the drylands 
is substantial, but the likely impact on crop production pales in comparison to 
the impact on crop production that could be achieved by fully exploiting the 
available opportunities to develop rainfed agriculture. Rainfed agriculture is far 
more important than irrigated agriculture in the drylands and will remain that 
way for the foreseeable future. Second, within the irrigation sector, although 
large-scale irrigation is generally the most reliable form of irrigation, compared 
to small-scale irrigation, large-scale irrigation has a limited area potential and 
is much smaller in size. The reason is that expansion of large-scale irrigation will 
depend on investments in dams that will be rehabilitated or constructed for 
purposes other than agriculture. 
To summarize, the modeling work done for this book suggests that there is 
considerable scope for increasing the irrigated area in the drylands. Development 
of a further 6.1 million ha (in addition to the current 4.6 million ha) is techni-
cally feasible and economically justifiable (Xie et al. 2015). Overall, irrigation 
development could have a large, possibly transformational impact on farming 
systems and on resilience. Prospects are brightest for small-scale irrigation 
because of its lower costs, more decentralized management, and likely higher 
levels of farmer participation. 
There is also considerable potential for large-scale irrigation development, 
concentrated along corridors located downstream from dams that will have 
been constructed for other (non-agricultural) purposes. Investment costs for 
Map 7.1 Potential for development of small- and large-scale irrigation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: © IFPRI. Reproduced with permission, from Xie et al., 2015; further permission required for reuse. 
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large-scale irrigation are roughly three times higher than for small-scale irriga-
tion, but the value of the incremental production and the amount of employ-
ment created are three times as great. Large-scale irrigation poses technical, 
economic, and institutional challenges and risks, however, so investment in 
large irrigation schemes is likely to proceed slowly, to provide time for models 
to be worked out that ensure that such schemes can be operated profitably and 
sustainably. In some dryland countries, improving existing large-scale irrigation 
schemes may pay higher returns than building new schemes.
Small- and large-scale irrigation schemes both have the potential to contrib-
ute to increased resilience, but their contributions will be somewhat different 
(Ward and Torquebiau 2015). Small-scale irrigation in the drylands is used in a 
wide range of mixed farming systems, helping to raise and stabilize crop yields 
and thereby allowing large numbers of poor households to grow more home-
consumed food and increase their income from cash sales. In contrast, large-
scale irrigation is often associated with specialized production systems that feed 
into distinct and separate value chains, so it strengthens resilience by allowing 
households to generate cash incomes that are relatively insensitive to shocks. 
While the number of households that can be accommodated on large-scale 
schemes is usually limited, such schemes tend also to create new employment 
opportunities for wage laborers, thereby enhancing resilience for a broader seg-
ment of the rural population. 
Improving coping capacity
Agricultural households that live in dryland regions, being unable to move out 
of harm’s way when shocks occur and having livelihoods that are sensitive to 
shocks, suffer frequent income losses. For these households, the ability to sur-
vive will depend mainly on their coping capacity, that is, on their ability to draw 
on their own accumulated resources or resources provided by others to meet 
their needs during a critical period until their livelihood strategies can be 
re-established. 
Public policy interventions. Experience suggests that many agricultural 
households when hit by a shock soon exhaust their limited accumulated 
resources, leaving them critically dependent on public programs. Public pol-
icy thus plays an important role in supporting the recovery process, particu-
larly for non-resilient households. In considering the instruments available to 
the government, it is useful to distinguish between interventions that can be 
implemented relatively quickly versus interventions that require time to pro-
duce results.
Public policy interventions that can be implemented in the short run to 
strengthen the coping capacity of agriculture-dependent populations include: 
(1) introduction of crop insurance to provide compensation for production 
losses; and (2) establishing scalable safety nets to provide alternative sources of 
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income until the farming enterprise can be fully restored. (Crop insurance is 
discussed in the next section; scalable safety nets are discussed in Chapter 9.) 
Crop insurance. In theory, crop insurance addresses the problem of sys-
temic risk from yield variability in dryland agriculture (for a general discussion, 
see Hazell, Pomareda, and Valdes 1986). In addition to directly protecting farm-
ers from yield losses due to adverse weather and outbreaks of diseases or pests, 
crop insurance indirectly enhances resiliency in the production environment 
because farmers having insurance will be more willing to adopt technologies 
perceived to be profitable without having to worry as much about the vagaries 
of the weather. Increased profits attributable to the improved technologies can 
be reinvested to further limit sensitivity to risk and to improve coping mecha-
nisms and strategies. 
In practice, crop insurance that is voluntary and oriented to the individual 
producer is vulnerable to consistent and sizable losses because of moral hazard 
and adverse selection (Brown, Mobarak, and Zolanska 2014). Moral hazard 
refers to negative incentives as farmers are rewarded for exerting less effort 
when yields approach payout trigger points. Adverse selection becomes a prob-
lem when the more productive farmers with higher yields do not participate in 
crop insurance programs. Both moral hazard and adverse selection erode the 
actuarial basis for cost-effective crop insurance. 
Interest in crop insurance has waxed and waned over the years, and a number 
of pilot programs have been launched to test out different design features. Several 
advances in design have brightened the prospects for crop insurance, including 
the use of a homogeneous area approach to compensation (which eliminated the 
moral hazard problem, because individual farmers could not manipulate yield 
estimates calculated over large areas) and, instead of targeting individual farmers, 
using rainfall instead of yields as the criterion for determining payouts (much 
easier to measure, because rainfall data are more readily available than yield data, 
especially following the advent of automatic weather stations). 
Despite some isolated success stories, demand for crop insurance among 
smallholder farmers has remained weak, even when rainfall insurance has been 
partially subsidized and thoroughly explained. With sufficient targeting and 
structuring of design to highly contextual conditions, the widely acknowledged 
problem of weak demand may not be insurmountable. But at least one seasoned 
observer of insurance over the past 40 years believes that rainfall insurance is not 
a viable option for improved risk management drylands, arguing that poor farm-
ers are often cash/credit-constrained and therefore cannot advance the money 
before sowing time to buy insurance that pays out only after the harvest 
(Binswanger-Mkhize 2012). Others are more sanguine. For example, Brown, 
Mobarak, and Zelanska (2014) concede that credit constraints, limited financial 
literacy of farmers, and basis risk limit the demand for rainfall insurance, but they 
are confident that as the chain of evidence becomes longer with research and as 
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several of these obstacles are overcome, pilot applications can be scaled up to 
make a substantive contribution to risk management in dryland agriculture. 
Challenges
Opportunities exist to increase and stabilize agricultural production in dry-
lands, but they will not be easy to exploit. Multiple constraints will have to be 
overcome to enable the successful adoption of productivity-enhancing improved 
technologies.
The first and perhaps most obvious challenge is financial. Adoption of 
improved agricultural technology entails two types of cost: (1) costs incurred by 
the farmers who adopt the technology, especially the costs of purchased inputs 
such as improved seed, fertilizer, and crop chemicals, and (2) costs incurred by 
the public sector in promoting the improved technology (e.g., the cost of paying 
extension agents to provide advisory services, mount publicity campaigns, and 
train farmers in the use of new technologies). Depending on the technology, the 
first type of cost can be small (e.g., in the case of improved seed) or large (e.g., in 
the case of fertilizer). In the latter case, farmers may lack the resources to pay, in 
which case adoption is unlikely to occur without subsidies or other forms of assis-
tance. The second type of cost is generally quite modest compared to other types 
of public interventions, as large numbers of farmers can often be reached through 
relatively low-cost promotional campaigns. Estimates made for this book suggest 
that five cropping technologies—drought-tolerant varieties, heat-tolerant variet-
ies, chemical fertilizer, water harvesting and tree-based systems—could be pro-
moted throughout the dryland countries in East and West Africa for US$126–426 
million, depending on how effectively promotional efforts are targeted (for details, 
see Walker 2015). It is important to note, however, that just because an improved 
technology has been promoted does not mean it will be adopted, as farmers 
reached by the extension campaign will have to weigh numerous factors before 
deciding whether or not a promoted technology is right for them.
Aside from cost, several other types of challenges will have to be overcome 
to ensure successful uptake of improved agricultural production technologies. 
Harsh agro-climatic conditions. Improved crop production technologies 
can deliver significant benefits during years of normal weather, but even the best 
technologies are likely to fail in the face of prolonged drought or extreme heat 
(see Box 7.1). In dryland areas where extreme weather events are common, 
investing in improved technologies carries risk, which some farmers—particu-
larly the poorest farmers—may be unwilling to take on.
Infrastructure constraints. Farmers will be willing to invest in improved 
technologies only when they are confident that they will be able to produce a 
decent crop and sell surplus production for remunerative prices. In the drylands 
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BOX 7 .1
How will climate change affect dryland agriculture?
The effects on dryland agriculture of droughts and other extreme weather 
events are readily apparent. In contrast, the effects of climate change resulting 
from global warming are much less visible, since they occur gradually and man-
ifest themselves differentially through space and time. 
Lobell and Field (2007) carried out a comprehensive review of crop model-
ing exercises and climatic analyses on the impacts of global warming on crop 
productivity. Maize was identified as the crop most requiring attention in Sub-
Saharan Africa, due to its economic and nutritional importance. Because maize 
germplasm is sensitive to temperature changes, Lobell and Field concluded that 
the relevant question is not whether climate change will have deleterious 
impacts on maize yields, but rather how much productivity will be lost from 
rising temperatures. 
Fischer, Byerlee, and Edmeades (2014) recently addressed this issue in a sur-
vey of the burgeoning literature on the agricultural consequences of global 
warming. Among their conclusions: 
• CO2 is expected to increase by 26 percent to 480 ppm by 2050; with rising 
CO2 levels, average global temperatures are forecast to increase by 2°C by 
2050. 
• Chronic warming, especially hot spells above 30°C, depresses yields by 
speeding up crop development and by reducing grain numbers and size. 
• Predicted changes in precipitation attributed to global warming are not that 
sizable and are too uncertain to warrant rigorous impact assessment at this 
time. 
• Estimates from regression studies and simulation modeling suggest that 
average yields of maize, rice, and wheat will fall by 5 percent for each 1°C 
increase in temperature. In the absence of adaptation, global warming of 
2°C by 2050 would lead to a 10 percent decrease in cereal yields. 
• These pure temperature effects will be offset by gains from increasing CO2 
concentration especially in crops that use the C3 carbon fixation metabolic 
pathway (wheat, rice, and soybean), where the utilization of CO2 in photo-
synthesis is not as efficient as in coarse cereals. Hence, the total yield effect 
is negligible in rice and wheat and is equivalent to an 8 percent loss of pro-
ductivity in maize. 
Fischer, Byerlee, and Edmeades (2014) express optimism that plant breeding 
and crop agronomy can be deployed to dampen declines in yield from global 
warming by 2050. Many agricultural research centers have committed 
(continued next page)
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producing a decent crop and selling surplus production at remunerative prices 
are often threatened by underdeveloped irrigation infrastructure, inadequate 
and unreliable power supplies, and weak transport systems.
Institutional weaknesses. The development of improved agricultural tech-
nologies and the transfer of these technologies to farmers are joint-impact, high 
exclusion-cost activities, which is why they are usually considered public goods 
and provided through public institutions. Yet in most dryland countries, the 
public institutions that provide research and extension services are weak and 
ineffective. Provision of production inputs (e.g., seed, fertilizer, crop chemicals) 
and financial services are activities that lend themselves more readily to private 
provision, but the riskiness and low profitability of dryland agriculture has dis-
couraged investment by private firms, so distribution networks for inputs 
remain underdeveloped, and financial institutions lending to the agricultural 
sector are few and far between.
Economic constraints and trade-offs. The low productivity of dryland agri-
culture is compounded by the lack of economic incentives to invest in the sec-
tor. With production dispersed across vast areas, value chains poorly articulated 
and inefficient, and agricultural policies fragmented and often acting at cross 
purposes, dryland agriculture faces a number of daunting economic constraints 
and trade-offs (Box 7.2). 
resources to screening materials for and finding sources of tolerance to heat 
stress. In the past, sustained breeding efforts for resistance or tolerance to heat 
stress have not paid dividends for maize at CIMMYT (International Maize and 
Wheat Improvement Center) and for potato at CIP (International Potato 
Center). However, several physiological aspects remain to be explored, which 
could provide the basis for effective heat tolerance in these and other crops. 
Pearl millet, a hybrid prized for its heat tolerance, is one of the leading cultivars 
in India in the State of Rajasthan, an environment very similar to the Southern 
Sahelian Zone (Asare-Marfo et al. 2013). 
Fischer, Byerlee and Edmeades (2014) also highlight tactical crop man-
agement as a source of innovations designed to combat the adverse effects 
of climate change. The opportunities are largely location-specific and rely 
on knowledge about timeliness in the use of inputs. Many of the advances 
in this area will likely be made in the course of “normal” crop improvement, 
as the additionality of global warming to the other problems being 
addressed by agronomic researchers is difficult to envisage in highly specific 
terms.
Box 7.1 (continued)
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BOX 7 .2
Rainfed or irrigated agriculture: A fundamental choice
In seeking to improve the productivity, stability, and sustainability of dryland 
agriculture, policy makers face a fundamental question: Should attention be 
focused on improving rainfed production systems, expanding irrigated produc-
tion systems, or both? 
Currently, more than 90 percent of the staples produced and consumed in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is produced in rainfed systems, and only 5 percent is pro-
duced under irrigation. Using realistic assumptions about future area expansion 
and yield growth, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) projects 
that rainfed agriculture can continue to meet 90 percent of incremental 
demand for decades to come. Noting that investment in irrigation is economi-
cally justifiable only when irrigation facilities can be used to produce high-value 
cash crops, FAO projects that as soon as 2050, irrigated production is unlikely 
to contribute more than 10 percent of staples production.
The FAO vision, which is shared by many analysts, suggests that African 
policy makers and development partners should follow a strategy of promoting 
production of cereals and grain legumes in drylands, and rice and horticultural 
crops in irrigated zones. Investments should be tailored accordingly. In zones 
deemed unfavorable for irrigation, efforts should focus on promoting adoption 
of improved technologies that can improve productivity and stabilize produc-
tion of rainfed agriculture, with an emphasis on reducing risk and increasing 
resilience among vulnerable households. In zones deemed favorable for irriga-
tion, efforts should focus on developing irrigation and promoting production 
of high-value crops, with emphases on increasing revenues, improving food 
security, and reducing poverty.
Deciding an appropriate balance between these two complementary objec-
tives will not be easy. From a public policy perspective, given a fixed amount of 
resources, there is a clear trade-off between investing in small improvements 
for the large number of households in the drylands that engage in rainfed pro-
duction, and investing in large improvements for the relatively small number of 
households that could take advantage of irrigation technology. Investments 
that target rainfed production systems will not promote highly visible results, 
but because they can benefit so many households, they have the potential to 
improve the livelihoods and increase the resilience of the large majority of the 
population. The policy choice thus pits small reductions in poverty for the many 
against large reductions in poverty for the few. And given the vast discrepancy 
in the numbers of households falling into each category, as well as the high 
cost of irrigation development, targeting dryland agriculture is likely to be the 
better choice.
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Key messages
More than 200 million people living in dryland regions of Sub-Saharan Africa 
make their living from agriculture. Most of these people are exposed to weather 
shocks, especially drought, that can decimate their incomes, destroy their assets, 
and plunge them into a poverty trap from which it is difficult to emerge. Their 
lack of resilience in the face of these shocks can be attributed in large part to the 
poor performance of agriculture on which their livelihood depends.
Opportunities exist to improve the fortunes of these households. Improved 
farming technologies are available that can increase and stabilize the production 
of millet, sorghum, maize, and other leading staples. Yet most of these technolo-
gies have not been adopted on a large scale, for reasons that include lack of 
farmer knowledge, non-availability of inputs, unfavorable price incentives, and 
high levels of production risk. 
Irrigation is technically and economically feasible in some areas and offers 
additional opportunities to increase and stabilize food production, especially in 
the case of small-scale irrigation systems, which tend to be more affordable and 
easier to manage. Large-scale, dam-based irrigation systems make sense in cer-
tain situations, but their potential is more difficult to exploit because of high 
investment costs and daunting institutional and governance challenges. While 
irrigation represents an excellent option in some areas, it is important to keep 
in mind that prospects for irrigation development are limited in the drylands, 
so for the foreseeable future, rainfed agriculture will continue to be far more 
important.
Future production growth in the drylands is expected to come mainly from 
raising yields and increasing the number of crop rotations on land that is already 
being cultivated (intensification), rather than from bringing new land into cul-
tivation (extensification). Controlling for rainfall, average yields in rainfed crop-
ping systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are still much lower than yields in rainfed 
cropping systems in other regions, suggesting that there is considerable scope 
to intensify production in these systems. Furthermore, unlike in other regions, 
production of low-value cereals under irrigation is not generally economic in 
Sub-Saharan Africa unless the cereals can be grown in rotation with one or 
more high-value cash crops. The long-run strategy for dryland agriculture 
therefore must be to promote production of staples in rainfed systems and pro-
duction of high-value cereals (e.g., rice), horticultural cops, and industrial crops 
in irrigated systems.
Considerable potential exists in the drylands to improve the productivity of 
rainfed agriculture and to expand irrigation. Exploiting the available opportuni-
ties will require policy reforms and institutional changes backed by supporting 
investment. Attention must focus on:
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• Strengthening innovation systems at the national and regional level, for 
example, by supporting the emergence of multi-actor networks that can 
leverage the strengths of public institutions, private firms, and civil society 
organizations.
• Promoting improvements in rainfed agriculture to increase and stabilize 
production of food staples and strengthen resilience of vulnerable 
households.
• Promoting investments in irrigated agriculture, both small-scale and large 
scale, to increase production of high-value cash crops and raise incomes and 
reduce poverty of commercially oriented farmers.
Improving the productivity and stability of agriculture in the drylands has 
the potential to make a significant contribution to reducing vulnerability and 
increasing resilience. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that in 
an environment characterized by limited agro-climatic potential and subject to 
repeated shocks, farming on small land holdings may not generate sufficient 
income to bring people out of poverty.
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Chapter 8
Healthy Ecosystems: Integrated 
Approaches for Well-balanced 
Landscapes
Erin Gray, Norbert Henninger, Robert Winterbottom, Chris Reij, 
Paola Agostini
Current situation
In Sub-Saharan Africa as in other parts of the world, dryland communities, 
along with their production systems and human livelihood strategies, have 
evolved over hundreds of years in response to an unfavorable climate, enabling 
both ecosystems and human well-being to recover following droughts, floods, 
and fires. Over the past decades, however, high human population growth rates, 
increasing land use pressures and associated land degradation, changes in rain-
fall patterns, greater frequencies and intensities of droughts, intensifying con-
flicts over natural resources, and other natural and anthropogenic drivers have 
begun to undermine the resilience of many dryland communities in Africa and 
have contributed to depleted soil fertility and water stress. An increasing num-
ber of these communities are facing a reduced capacity of the land to support 
them, lowering their resilience to recover from natural shocks.
Although efforts to address these challenges in the drylands of Sub-Saharan 
Africa have yielded some positive outcomes, all too often they have failed to achieve 
significant and lasting improvements at scale. In an environment in which water is 
frequently the most limiting resource, few interventions have taken adequate 
account of linkages between upstream and downstream water users. In many cases, 
well-intentioned interventions have disrupted traditional management systems for 
common pool resources, such as wetlands, grazing reserves, and forests.
Single-objective and sectoral development approaches in particular are 
increasingly seen as inadequate because they may not fully address trade-offs 
associated with competing land uses and actors, or they fall short in incorporating 
the perspectives of all stakeholders in local communities and in appropriately 
addressing sources of resource conflict. They may also fail to take into account 
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biophysical connections and leverage interactions among production systems that 
are critically important in dryland systems and necessary to generate and sustain 
both farm-level and landscape-level benefits. For example, trees in agricultural 
landscapes can play a critical role in renewing soil fertility, providing fodder for 
livestock, and generating fuelwood for households, while simultaneously contrib-
uting to the diversification and enhanced resilience of farming systems; yet many 
agricultural and livestock development programs have not taken fully into 
account the key roles of trees in agricultural landscapes. 
Many development actors across Sub-Saharan Africa are starting to adjust 
dryland development programs so as to consider multiple objectives and mul-
tiple actors across two or more sectors. Evidence is emerging that a carefully 
sequenced landscape approach can increase the effectiveness of development 
programs and capitalize on opportunities to restore resilience in drylands.
Opportunities
Water scarcity and land degradation are the major biophysical constraints fac-
ing drylands and are key threats to economic development and human welfare. 
Sustainable land management interventions that can conserve soil and water, 
build natural and social capital, and maximize efficiency of water and soil 
resource use can be critical for stabilizing rural production systems. They can 
also help rebuild household resilience. In many locations these interventions 
can be considered foundational for sustainable agricultural intensification. A 
number of practices have been identified as especially promising for drylands, 
where the need for the widespread adoption of improved land and water man-
agement practices to boost productivity is especially acute. These practices 
include agroforestry, farmer-led soil and water conservation techniques, rain-
water harvesting, conservation agriculture, and integrated soil fertility manage-
ment. These measures can be extremely effective in reversing land degradation 
and contributing to the sustainable intensification of agriculture and forestry. 
Rural economies can benefit from these practices through higher crop yields; 
increased supplies of fodder, firewood, and other valuable goods; greater income 
and employment opportunities; a restoration of biodiversity and ecosystem ser-
vices; and enhanced resilience in the face of climate change. Promoting the 
widespread adoption of these improved land management practices can be a 
core element of integrated landscape management designed to enhance and 
diversify production systems and increase household resilience.
Integrated landscape management
Integrated landscape management represents an opportunity to restore dryland 
areas in Sub-Saharan Africa. The definition of integrated landscape 
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management adopted here is based on the definition used by members of the 
initiative on Landscapes for People, Food and Nature, a collaborative partner-
ship of environmental and agricultural NGOs, UN agencies, and 
governments:
[Integrated landscape management is characterized by] long-term collaboration 
among different groups of land managers and stakeholders to achieve the mul-
tiple objectives required from the landscape. These typically include agricultural 
production, provision of ecosystem services (such as water flow regulation and 
quality, pollination, climate change mitigation and adaptation, cultural values); 
protection of biodiversity, landscape beauty, identity and recreation value; and 
local livelihoods, human health and well-being. Stakeholders seek to solve shared 
problems or capitalize on new opportunities that reduce trade-offs and 
strengthen synergies among different landscape objectives. Because landscapes 
are coupled socio-ecological systems, complexity and change are inherent prop-
erties that require management. (Scherr, Shames, and Friedman 2013)
Integrated landscape management provides a framework for scaling and 
leveraging land and water management interventions in such a way that the 
whole becomes greater than the sum of individual interventions in terms of 
ecological and economic gains. Scherr, Shames, and Friedman (2013) identified 
five key actions for operationalizing integrated landscape management to pro-
mote successful dryland restoration and community resilience: (1) Interventions 
are designed to promote multiple goals and objectives; (2) Ecological, social, 
and economic interactions are managed to reduce negative trade-offs and opti-
mize synergies; (3) Roles of local communities are acknowledged; (4) Planning 
and management of interventions is adaptive; and (5) Collaborative action and 
comprehensive stakeholder engagement are encouraged and institutionalized. 
Following the EcoAgriculture Partners (2013) report and taking into account 
the findings of an extensive literature review, this chapter categorizes the five 
key actions into three broad core components for operationalization, and pro-
vides 10 key principles that can be viewed as a checklist for implementation and 
operationalization of integrated landscape management (see Figure 8.1). The 
three core components are as follows.
Core Component 1: Landscape Goal(s) Encompassing Multiple 
Objectives at Different Scales. In drylands with mixed land uses and multiple 
stakeholders, it is important to establish a shared perception of dryland land-
scapes by identifying and fostering multiple objectives and goals. This promotes 
common entry points among stakeholders for collaboration around actions that 
are critical to enhancing resilience. In the drylands of Sub-Saharan Africa, goals 
and objectives generally relate to improving food security and livelihood diver-
sification. In some higher-producing regions, goals often include also sustain-
able intensification of production systems. Integrated landscape management 
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must consider multiple scales upon which to implement interventions (e.g., 
farm level and landscape level), as well as temporal and biophysical dimen-
sions–which are especially important in environments with highly variable and 
unevenly distributed rainfall.
Integrated landscape management must generate short-term economic 
returns to incentivize farmer and herder participation, but it must also promote 
thinking holistically about maximizing ecological gains, for example, by 
improving biophysical connectivity to restore groundwater levels, by providing 
critical corridors for livestock movement, or by preserving wildlife habitat. 
Integrated landscape management must also consider the multi-functionality 
of landscapes and provide a mechanism that enables local stakeholders to 
reduce conflicts among different types of specialized resource users who differ 
in their dependencies on a range of ecosystem services (e.g., herders, farmers, 
or fishers).
Core Component 2: Adaptive Planning and Management. Integrated land-
scape management must seek to understand how land users interact with their 
environment and take advantage of key sources of income that can improve wel-
fare. The planning of land use, grazing, and natural resource use under integrated 
landscape management must recognize ecological, social, and economic interac-
tions among different parts of a landscape, which then can be managed to opti-
mize synergies and reduce negative trade-offs. Integrated landscape management 
should promote continual learning from outcomes and create opportunities to 
scale up successes and address failures. Adaptive management is also important 
for understanding the resilience of a landscape—for example, how it responds to 
shocks such as changes in rainfall or temperature. As climatic and economic risks 
create uncertainty, adaptive planning and management—whereby stakeholders 
review at recurring intervals the successes and challenges of current land use 
choices—allows all involved to quickly address risks. As such, integrated land-
scape management requires effective user-friendly participatory monitoring and 
evaluation systems and feedback mechanisms.
Core Component 3: Collaborative Action and Comprehensive 
Stakeholder Involvement. Integrated landscape management must recognize 
the critical importance of identifying and acknowledging the roles of local com-
munities and households in resource management. Integrated landscape man-
agement must promote community-wide participation and planning in dryland 
restoration and other land use interventions, collective action for implementing 
these interventions, and coordination among key stakeholders across scales and 
sectors. For example, on steep slopes, actions taken by farmers to minimize till-
age operations combined with actions taken by herders to reduce grazing pres-
sure in critical locations will have greater impact on erosion and sedimentation 
rates and restoration of the vegetative cover than fragmented or individual 
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efforts alone. Local communities must be incentivized to invest in improved 
land and water management and to share local knowledge and experience. 
Based on the three core components, 10 key principles are identified for 
integrated landscape management (Figure 8.1), The 10 key principles are useful 
for design processes that can motivate multiple stakeholders to pursue a set of 
common goals within a landscape, explicitly recognize synergies and trade-offs 
between different objectives, and establish agreed mechanisms to resolve 
differences.
Skeptics of integrated landscape management may characterize the quest for 
enhanced integration across multiple sectors and stakeholders, along with 
greater emphasis on geographic targeting, as nothing new. Conceptually, how-
ever, the way integrated landscape management is being proposed here is novel 
in that it incorporates lessons learned from previous land management 
approaches and places much greater emphasis on building resilience to drivers 
such as climate change and changing market forces. Integrated landscape man-
agement provides added value in that it:
• Does not promote a “one-size-fits-all” approach but rather asks stakehold-
ers to consider the local context and take sectors, stakeholders, and social, 
cultural, and other conditions into account across geographic boundaries 
that make ecological sense. Integrated landscape management promotes a 
flexible framework for scaling investments at a landscape scale to maximize 
ecological, economic, and social synergies and minimize negative trade-offs.
Figure 8.1 Core components of integrated landscape management
Source: Sayer et al. 2013
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• Emphasizes that planning and implementation take into account spatial 
components important to rejuvenating and maintaining ecosystem health 
(e.g., hydrological flows, habitat). Integrated landscape management requires 
that land use planners and decision-makers think differently about scale and 
take into account these spatial components.
• Promotes a combination of bottom-up and top-down principles designed to 
encourage local community participation, but at the same time remains 
committed to building appropriate institutional and financial support.
• Promotes an adaptive management approach that tries to build in monitor-
ing and evaluation to generate long-term data needed to truly understand 
whether communities are becoming more resilient and increasing their 
adaptive capacity, and whether landscape-level changes are achieved.
Integrated landscape management has the potential to improve dryland 
development efforts by bringing about the following intermediate results: 
• Increased action and investment from stakeholders. Community-driven 
integrated restoration of small watersheds in Tigray, Ethiopia, for example, 
has motivated farmers to invest in improved soil and water management 
practices. Their coordinated efforts have resulted in recharged groundwater 
tables in valley bottoms, allowing farmers to develop dry season irrigation 
and cultivate higher-value crops.
• Reduced conflict over use of land and other resources. Improved coordi-
nation among stakeholders can help clarify rights and responsibilities and 
improve understanding of landscape goals and objectives. This in turn can 
lead to reduced conflict over land and other resources. Good examples are 
the agreements negotiated between farmers and herders to demarcate cor-
ridors for livestock movement, which have helped to protect farmers’ crops 
and trees from livestock browsing while at the same time safeguarding graz-
ing and water access areas for herders; and the agreements negotiated 
between local communities and firewood and charcoal merchants, which 
have helped merchants source wood from locally managed forests and tree 
farms while at the same time contributing to sustainable management by the 
local communities of what has become an important livelihood source.
• Economies of scope and scale. Land and water users in a landscape sharing 
their skills and assets can achieve economies of scale and exploit cost advan-
tages resulting from integrated production. Some landscape interventions 
also lead to increases in household income associated with the simultaneous 
production of two or more products.
• Capacity building. Integrated landscape management promotes community 
participation and collective action, so that farmers, herders, and other resource 
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users learn about new sustainable practices and technologies. Local institu-
tions are empowered to negotiate and adopt rules to improve environmental 
governance, provide for more equitable benefit sharing, and accelerate the 
adoption of improved natural resource management practices.
• Resilience at the household and landscape level. Collective action by a 
large number of households can affect all three dimensions of resilience, 
depending on the local circumstances: exposure to shocks (e.g., households 
in southern Niger reported experiencing reduced wind speeds at the begin-
ning of the growing season after they increased on-farm tree densities); cop-
ing capacity (e.g., dryland farmers in the Kitengela Plains of Kenya benefited 
from new income sources after they were persuaded to leave wildlife migra-
tion routes unfenced, improving wildlife and tourism benefits for nearby 
Nairobi National Park); and sensitivity to shocks (e.g., households in Tanzania 
diversified their livelihood strategies and were able to buffer dry season risks 
for livestock after they restored woodlands and expanded dry season grazing 
areas through assisted natural tree regeneration).
Benefits of integrated landscape management
Integrated landscape management for drylands typically revolves around revers-
ing land degradation and improving ecosystem health and functionality. As such, 
the benefits of integrated landscape management are intricately tied to the ability 
of ecosystems within a target area to generate services. Dryland ecosystems are 
able to provide a variety of economically valuable goods and services. IUCN-
ESARO (2010) divides the range of ecosystem services provided by drylands into 
four categories: (1) cultural services, (2) provisioning services, (3) regulating ser-
vices, and (4) supporting services. Examples are depicted in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 Ecosystem services provided by drylands in Africa
Cultural Regulating Provisioning Supporting
• Recreation and 
tourism
• Micro-climate 
regulation and 
carbon sequestration
• Pollination and seed 
dispersal
• Water and air 
filtration/purification
• Erosion control
• Food and honey
• Fodder
• Timber and non-
timber forest 
products 
• Freshwater
• Energy
• Medicinal and 
cosmetic products
• Habitat
• Soil development
• Nutrient cycling
• Primary production
Source: IUCN-ESARO (2010)
Note: Biodiversity in drylands provides the foundation for all four types of ecosystem services. Biodiversity is 
generally not defined as an ecosystem service.
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These benefits can be categorized as market and non-market benefits. Cultural 
services are generally non-material, but they can add to well-being (e.g., tourism). 
Cultural services can generate economic value, which can be captured and con-
verted to income for the benefit of local communities (e.g., entrance fees to 
national parks). Regulating services are benefits generated by an ecosystem’s abil-
ity to regulate natural processes (e.g., air and water filtration). Regulating services 
can be more difficult to quantify, especially if biophysical information on these 
processes that links them to human welfare is lacking, and often market prices are 
not available for economic valuation. Provisioning services are benefits that peo-
ple can directly extract from ecosystems (e.g., support to farming and herding). 
Many provisioning services are easily valued, as market prices are readily available 
for things like crops and animals. However, some provisioning services generate 
non-market benefits that are difficult to value (e.g., maintenance of biodiversity). 
Supporting services are those that underlie provisioning and regulating services, 
and as so are generally not valued in an economic analysis.
Beyond enhancing the provision of ecosystem services, integrated landscape 
management provides social benefits related to investments in social or human 
capital, health, and improved access to resources and markets. Many landscape 
management interventions focus on building community-level institutions, such 
as farmer cooperatives or local savings and loan associations. This building of 
social capital generates multiple market and non-market benefits, as it serves to 
diversify income, improve education and equality, and spread awareness of the 
value of sustainable land management, which can help to reduce degradation in 
the future.
An important mechanism through which integrated landscape management 
delivers social benefits is by fostering collective action. Land management prac-
ticed at landscape scale can deliver greater benefits than when practiced at farm 
scale because collective action can: 
• Allow resource users to more easily manage ecosystems across geographical, 
cultural, and political boundaries. 
• Increase uptake of sustainable land-use practices, as resource users are more 
likely to adopt practices if they see their neighbors conducting and benefiting 
from these practices. 
• Make it easier for resource users with different skillsets to collect, share, and 
create knowledge, skills, and assets at a lower cost. 
• Encourage communication and coordination among diverse interest groups 
and stakeholders, reducing conflict over natural resources that can result in 
violence, land degradation, and project disruption. Collective action can 
improve communications between resource users, reducing the costs of con-
flict resolution around local issues. 
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Collective action can result in economies of scale and scope, reducing trans-
action and implementation costs and enhancing benefits. Based on a survey of 
collective action institutions found in East Africa, Mogoi et al. (2009) identified 
a wide range of benefits of integrated landscape management (see Table 8.2).
Challenges
Several barriers need to be overcome before integrated landscape management 
can become part of regular policy making and development planning in Africa’s 
drylands:
• Lack of knowledge and awareness about integrated landscape manage-
ment within national and local governments, private sector, and civil 
society actors. Landscape-level ideas have yet to percolate down to more 
national and local actors. One reason is that many integrated landscape 
management programs lack strong monitoring and evaluation components, 
especially beyond a household and community scale, making the assessment 
of landscape-level benefits difficult.
• Institutional barriers that impede addressing complexities at the landscape 
level. Landscape dynamics are usually very complex, as they involve interac-
tions between diverse groups of stakeholders and different land uses. In most 
Table 8.2 Benefits of integrated landscape management
Market benefits
• Improved agricultural, forestry, fuelwood, fodder productivity
• Carbon sequestration
• Avoided transaction costs 
• Avoided siltation and flooding costs 
• Water quality and quantity regulation
• Pollination services
Non-market benefits
• Avoided costs of travel time to procure water, fuelwood, and other supplies
• Avoided costs of conflict 
• Female empowerment
• Increases in biodiversity and improved habitat
• More opportunities for recreation
• Increases in traditional knowledge 
• Improved access to health services, markets, and education
• Improved resilience (e.g., avoided costs from drought)
• Stronger cultural values
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cases, there are no simple solutions to complex challenges, and “one size fits 
all” approaches do not work. A careful assessment of location-specific chal-
lenges is required, as well as a learning-by-doing approach combined with a 
significant investment in institutional reforms and capacity building. In addi-
tion, ways need to be found to take into account sector-specific mandates of 
different ministries to resolve the challenges of working across sectors.
• Poor availability of and access to location-specific data about land, water, 
and natural resource use. For many dryland areas, local planners have very 
limited access to GIS data relating to land cover, land use, water supply, water 
abstraction, and other natural resource uses. This may be because the data 
do not exist or are not publicly available. Without detailed and reliable data, 
it is difficult to develop effective landscape management strategies. 
• Difficulty in ensuring management of trade-offs and provision of ade-
quate incentives for needed behavior changes and sustainability. In the 
complex agro-pastoral production systems found throughout many parts of 
the drylands, there is a special need to assess trade-offs and synergies 
between different land uses and users. However, capacity for this type of 
analysis among implementing agencies is generally weak. 
• Fragmented financing and planning for dryland restoration to optimize 
land use. Local land use planning capacity is generally low because of a per-
sistent marginalization of drylands. Failure to address local land use plan-
ning can result in conflict over resources and land areas and other costs.
Key messages
By providing a comprehensive framework that can be used to exploit synergies 
among a wide range of more focused interventions, integrated landscape man-
agement can help reverse land degradation and improve ecosystem health and 
functionality in the drylands of Sub-Saharan Africa. Increased investment in 
integrated landscape management programs, which support coordination and 
long-term collaboration among different groups of land managers and stake-
holders within dryland landscapes, can enhance and safeguard land restoration 
efforts, lower risks related to water shortages and soil fertility declines, allow 
local populations to raise their incomes and diversify their livelihood sources, 
support sustainable intensification, and reduce conflicts. In this way, integrated 
landscape management can potentially serve as the unifying framework for 
efforts to enhance the resilience of vulnerable populations in the drylands.
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Chapter 9
Market Connections: 
Promoting Trade to Promote Resilience
John Nash, Paul Brenton, Alvaro Federico Barra 
Current situation
Good trade policy is a crucial ingredient to economic development worldwide, 
but there are reasons to believe that it is especially important in dryland regions 
of Africa. Enhanced trade could contribute to reduced vulnerability and increased 
resilience of poor households living in the drylands in at least three ways. 
Gains in agricultural productivity
First, enhanced trade could help drive productivity gains in agriculture. 
Agricultural productivity in the drylands is already low compared to other 
developing regions, and in the future the gap could widen as a result of global 
warming. Enhanced flows of technology are critical for improving productivity 
and adapting to a changing climate. Technology embodied in imported inputs—
for example, seed of improved crop varieties, fertilizer, agricultural machinery, 
and animal vaccines—would pave the way for the emergence of more intensive 
production systems with increased productivity and greater sustainability 
(Jouanjean 2013). 
In the drylands trade barriers now impede adoption of improved production 
technologies. Africa as a whole has fertilizer usage rates far below those seen in 
other regions, in part because fertilizer prices in many parts of Africa are some 
of the highest in the world. Trade barriers, both official (e.g., tariffs) and indirect 
(e.g., regulations), keep prices high and discourage companies from entering 
African markets. They also impede market integration, keeping markets small 
and preventing the realization of economies of scale in manufacturing and 
importation of fertilizers, which could help reduce prices. In seed markets 
African farmers (outside of South Africa) typically have available an average of 
less than one new variety of maize a year, far less than in other countries outside 
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the region and far below the number that would be needed to trigger transfor-
mational change (Gisselquist et al. 2013).
Positive effects on food prices
Second, enhanced trade could help increase food prices received by producers, 
reduce food prices paid by consumers, and dampen food price variability for 
both groups. Urban and rural poverty rates are high in dryland areas, which 
means that food prices affect many people both in cities (where higher food 
prices punish consumers, disproportionately affecting the poor) and in rural 
areas (where lower prices received for sales of agricultural commodities under-
mine the income of producers). Trade barriers that increase transaction costs 
exacerbate both problems. Improved trade can reduce the wedge between pro-
ducer and consumer prices, increasing the welfare of consumers in structural 
deficit areas where food prices are high and of producers in surplus areas where 
farm gate prices are relatively low. For example, USAID (2011) estimates that in 
West African cereals markets a reduction in transaction costs equivalent to 10 
percent of the farm gate price could stimulate a 4 percent increase in production 
and a proportionally similar increase in the real incomes of farmers, while at the 
same time causing an 8 percent reduction in real consumer food prices. 
In dryland areas, which are particularly vulnerable to both climatic and man-
made disasters and associated food production shocks, increased integration with 
larger regional markets can reduce the magnitude of the price effects from local-
ized shocks, while lower barriers and better trade infrastructure can allow faster 
and more efficient response to localized food shortages due to disasters of all 
types. Badiane, Odjo, and Jemaneh (2014) examined food production variability 
in the countries of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), 
among others, finding that in every country volatility (measured as the coefficient 
of variation) of within-country production is higher than that of the ECOWAS 
region as a whole, and that production is imperfectly correlated across countries. 
The clear implication is that greater intra-regional trade, even within ECOWAS, 
would help stabilize prices in individual countries in the face of local shocks. This 
would hold a fortiori for the larger pan-African regional market.
Currently, food markets in many dryland areas remain fragmented, iso-
lated from regional and global markets. Haggblade (2013) cites numerous 
examples throughout Africa of food surplus areas that are separated from 
nearby deficit areas by political boundaries, which artificially divide these 
natural “market sheds.” In dryland regions, examples include surplus millet- 
and sorghum-producing areas in Mali and Burkina Faso that are separated 
from natural markets in a half dozen neighboring countries, as well as live-
stock producing regions in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger that are separated 
from natural markets in nearby coastal countries. Evidence is strong that bor-
ders do indeed have a substantial negative impact on trade (Map 9.1). In West 
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Africa cereal prices differ dramatically between net producing and net con-
suming markets, providing evidence of this lack of integration. One way of 
quantifying this effect is to evaluate what would be the increased distance that 
would increase costs equivalently to crossing a border. Analysis of prices of 
maize, rice, and cowpeas by Brenton, Portugal-Perez, and Regolo (2014) 
found that crossing the border between Niger and Nigeria is equivalent to 
pushing these countries 639 km further apart; the Nigeria-Chad border effect 
is equivalent to adding 594 km.
Further evidence of the effects of poor integration is found in the volatility 
of relative prices of food staples in neighboring markets, which is much higher 
when the markets are located on opposite sides of a border than when they are 
located within the same country. Figure 9.1 shows the volatility of monthly 
prices of millet, with much greater dispersion between markets in different 
countries than between markets within a country. While some of the volatility 
is due to changes in the cost of transporting goods between countries, a signifi-
cant portion is attributable to other costs associated with crossing borders. As 
an example, crossing the border between Ghana and Togo appears to increase 
the volatility of food staple prices by over 40 percent compared to markets 
within each of the two countries, suggesting a very low level of trade integration 
between these countries. 
Stimulate business development and employment
Third, enhanced trade could help stimulate business development and boost 
employment. Facilitation of trade in crops, livestock, and inputs brings the 
Map 9.1 Maize hotspots where production may be discouraged by trade barriers
Source: Authors’ estimates
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prospect of a significant number of new jobs. A vigorous agriculture and agri-
business sector creates jobs in activities all along the value chain—in producing 
and distributing seeds and fertilizers; in providing extension advisory services; 
in assembling, processing, and storing grains; and in transporting, distributing, 
wholesaling, and retailing agricultural products (Brooks, Zoriya, and Gautam 
2012).
Opportunities
When food markets are not working properly, grain storage strategies are some-
times used in an effort to limit exposure to variability in food prices (Box 9.1). 
But efforts to improve market integration can contribute to the resilience of 
households living in drylands. To see how, it is useful to consider how enhanced 
trade might affect the three determinants of resilience.
Reducing exposure 
To the extent that enhanced trade can reduce the frequency and dampen the 
severity of food price spikes, poor households living in drylands that rely on 
markets to meet some or all of their consumption requirements would be less 
exposed to economic shocks.
Figure 9.1 Relative prices of millet, West Africa markets 2007–13 (in logarithms)
Source: Brunelin and Portugal-Perez (2013)
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BOX 9.1
Limiting exposure to price shocks through grain 
storage strategies
When food markets are not working properly, grain storage strategies are 
sometimes used in an effort to limit exposure to variability in food prices. Such 
strategies may be implemented at the household, community, or national level.
Household level. Farmers sometimes try to protect themselves against 
seasonal food price variability by storing a portion of what they produce to 
bridge the time between harvests. Doing so insulates them against seasonal 
price swings, but it comes at a cost. When crops are stored in traditional bins, 
typically a portion is lost to rodents, insects, mildew, and/or theft. The losses 
can be significant. For example in the case of maize, Tefera (2012) estimates 
that African farmers lose 4–10 percent of what they store. Improved storage 
technologies—for example reinforced polyurethane bags or small-scale metal 
silos—can be effective in limiting on-farm storage losses (Gitonga et al. 2013), 
but these technologies are not always cost-effective. 
Community level. As food markets become more integrated, private com-
panies often emerge to offer storage services. By operating at a larger scale 
with better technologies, they may be able to reduce the cost of storage losses 
while at the same time allowing farmers to hold onto supplies in anticipation of 
higher prices later in the season. This in turn helps smooth out seasonal price 
swings. Since the most cost-effective way of storing grain is to keep the grain 
loose and unbagged, grain from different owners is mixed, so mechanisms 
have to be in place to make sure that the grain farmers take out of storage is 
equal in quality to the grain they put in, and that they are compensated if there 
is a deterioration in quality. In some countries private or public entities now 
offer the insurance, bonding, and quality inspection services needed to back 
private silo operators.
Grain held in certified warehouses can also be used as collateral for credit. 
In a number of African countries warehouse receipts—basically certificates 
showing ownership of stocks held in authorized warehouses—can now be sold 
and bought. Farmers can receive “loans” by selling their warehouse receipts 
while entering into a repurchase agreement with the warehouse or silo to buy 
back their receipts at a price based on prevailing interest rates. Futures con-
tracts, which allow market participants to hedge or speculate on commodity 
prices, are often settled using warehouse receipts as well (Giovannucci, 
Varangis, and Larson 2000).
National level. Governments sometimes try to use grain storage policies to 
try to smooth food prices. Potentially, with the right set of rules, grain import-
ing countries can build up large stockpiles and then release inventories to  
(continued next page)
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Regional trade liberalization. In both East and West Africa, efforts are 
under way to promote market integration at the regional level. The East African 
Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) are playing a leading role in these efforts. The Regional Economic 
Commissions (RECs) are making efforts to forge regional markets by reducing 
formal barriers and lowering technical barriers to trade by harmonizing stan-
dards and regulations. At the same time, individual countries can also act on 
their own when regional efforts bog down. Initiatives undertaken by subre-
gional coalitions of willing members to fast track implementation of agreements 
can in some cases be a more expeditious mechanism to enhance trade among 
participating countries. And in cases when harmonization of regulations and 
standards at the regional level lags, mutual recognition of standards and regula-
tory approvals among a subgroup of countries can provide benefits more 
quickly. 
Reducing or eliminating non-tariff measures. Non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
represent a major obstacle to enhanced trade in food and food products in the 
drylands, restricting the availability of food in the market and driving a wedge 
between producer and consumer prices. In West Africa a number of nongov-
ernmental and advocacy organizations engage on agricultural trade policy 
(Pannhausen and Untied 2010). In the ECOWAS region an effort is under way 
to combat the lack of private sector awareness of regional protocols by inviting 
nonstate actors to participate more actively in regional forums on the imple-
mentation of Economic Community of West Africa Agricultural Policy 
(ECOWAP) (see Harris, Chambers, and Foresti 2011). More generally, however, 
policy making is often still driven by REC authorities, donor agencies, and 
national governments, with other actors exerting little influence. Lack of 
dampen price spikes (Larson et al. 2014). Because the costs of administering 
such programs are usually quite high, this type of price stabilization tends to be 
more expensive than other measures, such as targeted safety nets. Importantly, 
a series of adverse effects can cause public stocks to run out, in which case the 
stabilization schemes are likely to fail just when they are most needed.
In recent years many African governments have revisited policies that use 
inventories or trade rules to manage high prices. During the 2008 global food 
crisis when grain prices spiked dramatically, the policies that seemed to make 
sense for individual countries led collectively to more volatile prices internation-
ally (Martin and Anderson 2012). Recent experience also reconfirms how hard 
it is to anticipate market outcomes. For example, in Malawi recent research 
suggests that the government’s well intentioned efforts to manage food prices 
had the unintended effect of increasing price volatility (Ellis and Manda 2012).
Box 9.1 (continued)
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information is also an issue: there tends to be limited awareness of the scope and 
nature of NTMs. ECOWAS has put in place national committees to deal with 
problems caused by NTMs and has established complaint desks at borders, but 
it remains unclear whether these measures are having a significant impact. In 
East Africa a different approach is being used: Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the 
Southern African Development community (SADC) have set up an online data-
base, which seems to have been effective in focusing policy makers’ attention on 
the problem (see www.tradebarriers.org). What seems clear is that if NTMs are 
to be reduced, governments must ensure that all rules and regulations affecting 
regional trade in food and crop inputs are clearly available at the border, well-
known by traders and officials, and applied in a consistent manner.
Reducing sensitivity 
To the extent that enhanced trade can reduce the cost of using improved pro-
duction technology, poor households in drylands that are dependent on herd-
ing and farming could improve and stabilize their incomes and thereby reduce 
their sensitivity to weather- and disease-related shocks.
Integrate input markets to facilitate technology flows. Improved technol-
ogy such as that embedded in new crop varieties, new breeds of animals, new 
fertilizer types, new crop chemicals, and new types of machinery can reach 
farmers and herders in two ways: the technology can be imported or it can be 
developed domestically. Both channels are discouraged by high regulatory 
costs, particularly costs associated with mandatory performance testing. Faced 
with onerous requirements to put new products through long and expensive 
tests to prove that they work well, companies will choose not to enter the small 
markets represented by most African countries. In many dryland countries legal 
restrictions make it difficult or impossible to distribute improved crop varieties 
or animal breeds without first carrying out expensive and time-consuming test-
ing, even if the varieties or breeds have been imported from a neighboring 
country with similar agro-ecological conditions. Since the risks associated with 
release of ineffective technologies are low, regulatory policy reforms are needed 
to accelerate the introduction of new crop varieties and animal breeds, along 
with other innovative production technologies. Measures to achieve this could 
include: (1) eliminating or at a minimum streamlining performance testing 
(which experience in other countries has shown can be left to the market, with 
increased enforcement of anti-fraud and truth in labeling laws being the focus 
of government agencies); (2) making certification optional, as it is in South 
Africa, Turkey, and the United States, among other countries; and (3) relaxing 
restrictions on international trade. 
As discussed earlier, enhanced trade in improved plant varieties offers par-
ticularly attractive prospects in the drylands for improving the resilience of 
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households that depend on agriculture as a primary livelihood activity. The flow 
of new plant varieties from other countries could be facilitated by regional har-
monization of varietal testing and release requirements, which could be medi-
ated through one of the RECs. One approach would be to establish regional seed 
catalogues with the understanding that any variety entered in the regional cata-
logue could be used throughout the region without further registration require-
ments. Harmonization would create much larger markets for inputs, which 
could be more attractive for private trade and investment. In West Africa the 
members of ECOWAS have agreed in principle to harmonize regulations for 
plant varieties, but progress in implementing the agreement has been slow. 
Many of the benefits of regional harmonization could be achieved more quickly 
if individual countries were to agree to accept varieties that have already been 
tested and approved for release in other countries (“mutual recognition”). 
Unilateral and bilateral agreements of this type could be made consistent with 
the full regional agreement once the latter is agreed and implemented. A similar 
approach is being used by the European Union, where varieties approved by any 
one member state are automatically approved for use in all other member states. 
Lowering of trade barriers similarly could expand markets for fertilizer. 
Many countries in East and West Africa continue to maintain restrictions on 
international trade in fertilizer. The Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for the 
African Green Revolution endorsed by African Union Ministers of Agriculture 
on 12 June 2006 calls for removal of duties on imported fertilizer. Equally 
important is the elimination of regulatory barriers to international trade in fer-
tilizer, such as regulations that each blend must be tested and approved for use 
in every country. These barriers to trade can be reduced by approving fertilizer 
ingredients, rather than finished fertilizer products, and by automatically rec-
ognizing ingredients approved in neighboring countries.
Improving coping capacity
To the extent that enhanced trade can improve the performance of food markets 
after a shock has hit, poor households living in drylands that are dependent on 
herding and farming will have an easier time coping with the effects of the 
shock.
Limit the use of trade barriers to cope with temporary food price spikes 
and localized production shortfalls. In the drylands of Africa as elsewhere, 
governments have tended to respond to food price spikes by enacting pro-cycli-
cal trade policies, such as temporary reductions in import protection or tempo-
rary increases in export barriers during periods of high food prices. A growing 
body of evidence makes clear that such policies have likely amplified food price 
volatility at the global level (for examples, see Anderson, Ivanic, and Martin 
2013; Headey 2010; Karapinar and Haberli 2010; Mitra and Josling 2009; Martin 
and Anderson 2012; Magrini et al. 2013; and Rutten, Shutes, and Meijerink 
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2011). In the face of domestic pressure, it is often difficult for governments to 
make a credible commitment to refrain from such policies when food prices 
spike. But in addition to their collective global impacts, these ad hoc interven-
tions also have perverse local consequences because they discourage investment 
in trade activities and infrastructure. As a result, local price volatility would 
likely be lower without them. In a study of food price volatility in Africa, Minot 
(2012) notes that, “These findings are consistent with a number of studies that 
suggest that unpredictable government intervention in maize markets, and the 
trade restrictions that often accompany these policies, can inhibit private trad-
ers from participating in trade and storage activities, thereby increasing sea-
sonal volatility and exacerbating price spikes associated with supply shortfalls.” 
The findings of Magrini et al. (2013) underscore this lesson. Using propensity 
score matching to control for selection bias, they find that countries that rely on 
trade distortions are more vulnerable to food insecurity, as measured by food 
availability. Similarly, Brenton, Portugal-Perez, and Regolo (2014) show that 
countries in Africa with less integrated domestic markets and thicker borders 
have a higher prevalence of food insufficiency.
Trade barriers are of particular importance in the dryland areas of Africa, 
which are subject to high variability in rainfall and other climatic conditions. 
The highly variable rainfall leads to significant risks to those dependent on agri-
culture and animal husbandry, and it is the reason why a large proportion of 
farmers and herders in the drylands of Africa are small-scale, resource-poor, 
and subsistence-based. Trade policy in these regions should be carefully 
designed and implemented to assist farmers and herders—especially small 
farmers who do not now have access to mitigating strategies such as diverse 
crops or market mechanisms such as weather insurance—to cope with the natu-
ral variation in the weather, rather than increasing the unpredictability and 
uncertainty surrounding agricultural markets and trade. Instruments other 
than trade policies are available to meet the objective of reducing price volatil-
ity; for example, allowing governments or private traders to put a ceiling on 
future import prices. Futures contracts and call options have been available on 
the South African Futures Exchange (Safex) exchange since 1999 (Haggblade 
2013). The World Bank helped arrange a contract with these instruments for the 
government of Malawi, with the premium financed mainly by donors (Slater 
and Dana 2006). This could be a model worth exploring with other countries 
that would agree to commit not to use ad hoc trade barriers.
To make matters worse, ad hoc trade policies often are deployed not because 
a crisis exists, but simply out of fear that a crisis might be coming. For this rea-
son, improvements are needed in national data systems so that governments can 
have access to the information needed to make decisions based on concrete 
evidence and transparent rules. Even though significant efforts have been made 
in recent years to improve the collection and quality of data on prices, food 
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production, and other key indicators, many countries still face substantial data 
gaps that limit the ability to devise evidence-based trade and agricultural poli-
cies, especially in crisis situations. The results have been very ad hoc and unpre-
dictable policy making (Jayne and Tschirley 2009). 
Better data collection at the national level, including data on stocks, and the 
transparent dissemination of data would help break the vicious cycle in which 
governments intervene in food markets when they believe private traders are 
not holding adequate stocks and would be unwilling or unable to import food 
to make up the deficit, and private traders refrain from holding stocks and from 
importing for fear they will be forced to sell at a loss due to government policy. 
Current policies often result in the worst of all worlds—extensive government 
participation in food markets, combined with high price volatility (Jayne and 
Tschirley 2009; Minot 2012). 
Improved agricultural market information can help reduce the damage 
caused by inappropriate trade policies. Badu (2013) highlights the positive 
impacts of the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET), which has 
made food price data continuously available to policy makers in many southern 
African countries through monthly newsletters. For market information sys-
tems to be effective, however, they must be trustworthy, and for that reason it 
can be important for outside agencies to conduct assessments jointly with gov-
ernment departments, as some policy makers lack confidence in externally 
driven monitoring systems. 
Information on food stocks can be especially important in alerting market 
participants in both the public and private sectors to impending crisis (Wiggins 
and Keats 2013). When reliable information is available on a timely basis, gov-
ernment authorities generally are more willing to commit to following transpar-
ent rules, which in turn can provide farmers and private traders greater certainty 
regarding the basis on which to make long-term investment decisions.
Challenges
In the drylands of Africa as elsewhere, the main challenges associated with trade 
policy reform are political, as moves to liberalize trade are likely to have nega-
tive consequences for some vested interest groups. Commitments are often 
made at a regional level to lower trade barriers, but policy reforms agreed at 
regional level must be implemented at country level, and frequently that is 
where things bog down. The frequent failures to implement trade reforms are 
not accidental; rather they are the outcome of domestic political processes, as 
the groups that benefit from the status quo often have the power to resist change. 
Trade reforms designed to reduce the gap between producer and consumer 
prices have the potential to benefit farmers and poor consumers, but 
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intermediaries earning rents—both in public agencies and in established private 
firms—stand to lose. Opening trucking markets to greater competition has the 
potential to reduce marketing margins to the benefit of producers and consum-
ers, but it will also reduce the oligopoly rents being made by incumbent firms.1 
Reducing testing requirements for inputs will increase the availability of new 
cultivars for farmers, but it will reduce the role played by national research 
bureaucracies, potentially reducing their rents, financial or non-pecuniary. To 
facilitate the process of policy reform, one solution is to provide compensation 
for the losers, either financial (in the form of payments) or non-financial (in the 
form of retraining and alternative employment). 
The political dynamics undermining trade policy reform are frequently exac-
erbated by a lack of resources. Many governments do not have separate budgets 
to support activities and programs relating to regional integration. For many 
politicians and civil servants, policy reform is an ad hoc activity, and they will 
allocate resources only when a request is made or political pressure is applied 
(AfDB 2013).
The usual shortcomings of the political process are particularly acute when 
it comes to policies relating to pastoralism. Policy makers generally lack under-
standing of pastoral production systems and do not recognize the economic 
importance of informal cross-border trade, especially for these populations. In 
the case of livestock trade in the Horn of Africa, Aklilu et al. (2013) argue that 
this is the result of a systematic bias, as policy makers tend to come from high-
land regions and prioritize these agricultural regions over the drier pastoral 
lowlands that tend to rely on livestock-keeping. This results in their treatment 
of “the activity as economically marginal and illegal, often resulting in the ran-
dom and punitive enforcement on traders and producers alike, including con-
fiscating livestock and food products from merchants” (Akilu et al. 2013). 
Enhanced efforts to educate influential decision makers about the important 
functions of pastoralist systems—economic, social, and environmental—may 
have a high payoff.
An additional challenge associated with improving the performance of mar-
kets in the drylands is the relatively high financial cost of infrastructure in the 
context of tight budgets. Investments to densify rural road networks in areas of 
high productive potential, but currently low connectivity, as well as investments 
to improve roads connecting net supplier and net demander areas, could sig-
nificantly contribute to enhanced resilience. Of course, all such investments 
would need to be guided by a realistic evaluation of costs and benefits, also 
taking into account environmental and social costs. Spatial analysis can be 
informative in this evaluation. To generate the largest possible returns, it is 
important to prioritize investments on the basis of the best analysis available, 
and spatial analysis is useful as one element in this process.
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Key messages
The potential to develop well-integrated and competitive regional food markets 
in dryland regions of Africa is being thwarted by barriers to trade. Barriers frag-
ment markets, raising food costs in structural deficit areas, lowering producer 
prices in structural surplus areas, and magnifying the effects of local supply 
shocks on prices. During food price spikes, ad hoc policy responses and coun-
ter-responses have often been used in an effort to control prices, but ad hoc 
responses tend to have adverse long-run consequences on food security, as they 
discourage private sector arbitrage trade and investments (e.g., in storage) that 
could help mitigate future price swings. This is particularly detrimental to poor 
consumers in chronic food deficit areas.
Improving productivity is critical to the future of agriculture in the drylands. 
African agriculture in general has on average the lowest rate of input use, lowest 
productivity, and highest yield gaps of any region in the world, and these trends 
are particularly pronounced in dryland areas. The productivity gap will become 
an even greater problem in the future, because advances in productive technolo-
gies will be increasingly focused on instilling resilience to climatic change, so 
lags in adoption will cost farmers their resilience to these shocks. Many factors 
contribute to the low rate of adoption of improved technologies in the drylands, 
but one important factor is the high cost coupled with limited availability of 
inputs that embody these technologies, a situation greatly exacerbated by direct 
and indirect trade barriers.
A number of ongoing initiatives are seeking to reduce barriers to trade in 
food and agricultural inputs. To succeed, these initiatives will have to overcome 
political resistance, as well as entrenched attitudes of mistrust between the gov-
ernment and trade communities. More transparent and better information for 
civil society on the presence and effects of trade barriers, and for government 
on the realities in local food markets, may facilitate reforms. A better under-
standing of the political economy may also help, and efforts to study this topic 
are ongoing. 
When regional processes to reduce trade barriers prove slow and cumber-
some, countries should not hesitate to explore bilateral and plurilateral paths to 
reform, which in turn can demonstrate the benefits from joint policy reform 
and coordination and so help invigorate broader regional integration.
Transport costs are currently very high in the drylands and need to be 
brought down, both through regulatory reform to increase competition, as well 
as by appropriate investments. Spatial analysis can help identify areas of high 
payoff for investments.
Finally, policy makers need to find ways to take advantage of the informal 
trading systems that currently exist in the drylands. For many traders, the 
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alternative to informal trade is not formal trade but rather no trade at all. Given 
the scale of informal trade in dryland regions, and considering the many barri-
ers and costs associated with diverting goods to pass through formal border 
crossings, a better understanding of the unique challenges faced by traders is 
essential. Rather than criminalizing informal commerce, which merely serves 
to drive it underground, it would be advisable to provide traders with safer 
conditions. Delivering transparent and predictable trade rules and procedures, 
decreasing corruption at the border, together with instituting training and mea-
sures to improve access to information and to finance will address the key 
underlying causes of informality and provide a route for successful informal 
entrepreneurs (many of whom are women) into the formal economy.
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Note
1.  In their analysis of transport prices and costs throughout Africa, Teravaninthorn and 
Raballand (2008, p. 8) see the presence of cartels as central to high transport costs, 
but they argue that “deregulating the trucking industry in West and Central Africa 
is less a technical than a political and social issue. The main concern is that under a 
liberalized, competitive market, the demand could be served efficiently by a much 
smaller number of trucks.”
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Chapter 10
Social Protection: Building Resilience 
Among the Poor and Protecting the 
Most Vulnerable
Carlo Del Ninno, Sarah Coll-Black, Pierre Fallavier
Current situation
Social protection programs have been proliferating and expanding in size in 
recent years, reflecting their increased acceptance among policy makers as a key 
component of any national poverty reduction strategy (for a definition of social 
protection programs, see Box 10.1). Yet despite their growing popularity world-
wide, social protection programs in dryland regions of Africa remain under-
funded compared to those in other developing regions, and as a result their 
coverage remains limited. In the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, as in other parts 
of Africa, most social protection programs are small, fragmented, and largely 
donor-driven. Still, countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and more recently 
Uganda have scaled up their investments in social protection with encouraging 
results, providing a model for how other countries can progressively expand 
coverage to poor, vulnerable populations. 
Coverage of social protection programs
In East and West Africa, as in other parts of the world, the oldest form of social 
protection programs are national social security schemes. These schemes typi-
cally provide pensions for civil servants and those employed in the formal pri-
vate sector. Despite their long history, national social security schemes typically 
cover only a fraction of the population and generally do not provide effective 
protection from poverty in old age or following adverse life cycle events. In 
many countries of the region, social security schemes are under-resourced, both 
in terms of staff and funding.1 Even so, they can consume significant resources. 
In Kenya, for instance, expenditure on civil service pensions in 2010 repre-
sented about 1 percent of GDP and 88 percent of total government spending on 
social protection. In Uganda projections show that over time government 
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expenditure on the public service pension scheme is likely to increase more 
than threefold, to 1.1 percent of GDP.2
Safety net programs that aim directly to reduce poverty and vulnerability 
began to appear in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel around 2005. Unlike social 
security schemes, these initiatives are designed to respond to current high levels 
of chronic poverty and vulnerability, rather than to ensure future income 
streams against the loss of employment in old age or as a result of adverse life 
cycle events. In many countries safety nets were introduced as an alternative to 
annual distribution of emergency food aid. More recently there has been a pro-
liferation of safety nets, many put in place to provide short-term responses to 
acute humanitarian needs. The use of food transfers remains common in many 
countries. In South Sudan, for example, 98 percent of beneficiaries receive safety 
net support in the form of food. 
In Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and most recently Djibouti, there has been a 
strong push to establish national safety net programs. In the Sahel, not until 
2010 were safety net initiatives seen as an approach that could be used on a large 
scale. Despite the recent trend toward setting up national programs, spending 
BOX 10.1
Defining social protection
Social protection systems, programs, and policies help disadvantaged people 
recover from shocks and take advantage of opportunities to improve their live-
lihoods. They do this by providing basic income support to the poor, to help 
them cope with the impacts of adverse events and build the resources needed 
for a more prosperous and resilient future. Social protection can be provided in 
different ways through various instruments as follows:
Pension systems provide income during old age. Pension schemes may be 
contributory or non-contributory (the latter are known as “social pensions”). 
Insurance is designed to protect the well-being of individuals, households, 
and businesses in the face of adverse events, particularly those affecting pri-
mary livelihood activities, such as livestock-keeping and crop farming.
Labor programs and policies promote productive employment in the for-
mal and informal sectors. Common interventions include initiatives to enhance 
the skills of the workforce and to support entrepreneurship and self-employ-
ment, particularly among youth.
Safety nets are noncontributory transfer programs targeted to the poorest 
and most vulnerable. They include such things as cash transfers, public works, 
and in-kind support (e.g., fee waivers and school feeding).
Source: Africa Social Protection Strategy (World Bank 2012)
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on safety net programs in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel remains generally 
low, even in comparison to other countries in Africa (Figure 10.1). Within the 
general trend, there is enormous variation across countries, reflecting different 
scales of coverage, varying levels of payments to beneficiaries, different payment 
modalities (e.g., cash versus food), and highly variable administrative costs. In 
all of these countries, a significant proportion of funding for safety net pro-
grams is provided by donor agencies. 
Beyond cash transfer programs, few social protection interventions have been 
used in the drylands of Africa. A growing body of evidence suggests that insur-
ance and labor programs can assist households to better mitigate the impact of 
shocks and diversify their livelihoods, yet such programs have rarely been intro-
duced in drylands, and those that exist tend to be small pilot initiatives.
Capacity of national programs to respond to vulnerability in the 
drylands 
As of 2013 only three safety net programs in the Horn of Africa could be 
characterized as being national in scale, with the Ethiopia Productive Safety 
Net Program (PSNP) being by far the largest (World Bank 2010). Even in 
countries with relatively well-established safety net programs, coverage is low 
in relation to the size of the population needing support. In Ethiopia, PSNP 
reaches less than 7 percent of the population (roughly 24 percent of the poor), 
while in Kenya cash transfer programs provided support to up to 15 percent 
of the absolute poor population in 2014.3 Since safety net programs in the 
Horn of Africa and the Sahel have historically been used to target chronic 
poverty, the coverage of safety nets is often higher in dryland areas than in 
other areas. For example in Kenya, because the government has tried to pri-
oritize poorer areas when extending safety net support, coverage rates among 
Figure 10.1 Government and donor spending on social safety nets as a % of GDP, selected 
countries
Source: Monchuk 2014
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absolute poor households in the four arid- and semi-arid counties in northern 
Kenya exceed 40 percent.4
In the Sahelian countries the coverage of safety net programs is more limited. 
Although some safety net programs reach a large percentage of the population, 
recipients may not be those most in need of support, and as a result, resources 
are inefficiently used. An example can be seen in programs involving large-scale 
distribution of free food or subsidized food. In Burkina Faso, for example, 
although the resources invested in food subsidies theoretically are sufficient to 
assist more than 3.9 million people (60 percent of the poor), surveys suggest 
that the number of poor who actually receive subsidized food is much smaller. 
In Senegal the effective coverage may be even lower: 80 percent of the 4 million 
people receiving some type of safety net assistance obtain it through the national 
food aid system, which distributes free food without proof of need.5
In response to the inefficiencies of earlier safety net systems, more recently a 
number of countries have begun experimenting with new models. In 2011 Niger 
began to provide chronically poor households with regular cash transfers over an 
18–24 month period, with the goal of helping them meet basic consumption needs 
while gradually building their human capital. Over time, similar programs were 
introduced in other Sahelian countries. The model is simple—cash is provided 
along with accompanying measures, such as education, to raise nutritional aware-
ness among mothers, or training to instill employable skills among working-age 
youths and adults. The programs are designed to be flexible, so that the amounts of 
the transfers and the types of accompanying measures can be adapted to local needs 
and so that coverage can be scaled up in times of crisis. While this new generation 
of safety net programs shows signs of promise, most of the programs are still at early 
stages of implementation and are not ready to be scaled up rapidly in response to a 
crisis. The experience in Niger was generally positive, although an important lesson 
that has emerged is that a one-size-fits-all approach is not always effective, as per-
manent programs and emergency responses need to be adapted to the diversity of 
livelihood systems found throughout the country (Map 10.1).
Several countries in East Africa have made efforts to tailor safety net programs 
to meet local needs. In Kenya, for example, the Hunger Safety Net Program 
(HSNP) was designed specifically to respond to the vulnerabilities of people living 
in the arid and semi-arid areas of the northern part of the country. HSNP uses cell 
phone-based technology to support a mobile payment system that is adaptable to 
pastoral livelihoods. Under PSNP In Ethiopia efforts have been made to tailor the 
design and delivery of assistance to the pastoral regions of Afar and Somali. These 
efforts were launched within the parameters of an existing program, however, and 
because certain features of the preexisting program proved inflexible, the results 
were mixed. Despite the variable results, PSNP provides a rare example of a safety 
net program that has attempted to tailor the design and delivery of public works 
to pastoral livelihoods (Lind and Kohnstamm 2014; World Bank 2010). 
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Among African countries, only Ethiopia has established the capacity to 
expand the coverage of its safety net program rapidly in response to shocks. This 
capacity is critically needed in dryland zones, where large numbers of poor 
people are chronically exposed to droughts that can suddenly undermine their 
livelihood strategies. In Ethiopia rapid scalability of PSNP is ensured through 
contingency funds that are held at district (woreda) and regional levels. These 
contingency funds can be used by local officials to respond to transitory food 
insecurity, including food insecurity arising from drought. Since 2008 the con-
tingency funds have been complemented with a risk financing mechanism, 
which allows the federal government to trigger the release of additional 
resources to increase the value or frequency of transfers to existing beneficiaries 
and to provide support to additional people who have been negatively affected 
by drought. The scalability feature of PSNP was designed to provide a first line 
of response to drought, complementing the existing humanitarian appeal mech-
anism, which will continue to be used to respond to needs in areas outside 
PSNP districts or in cases where needs within PSNP districts exceed available 
resources. During the 2011 Horn of Africa crisis, the administrative and logisti-
cal infrastructure of PSNP proved capable of scaling up the coverage of the 
program very rapidly, thereby strengthening the capacity of hundreds of thou-
sands of vulnerable households to withstand a series of unexpected shocks. 
Map 10.1 Diversity of rural livelihoods in Niger
Source: HEA Sahel http://www.hea-sahel.org, retrieved January 2014
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Continued reliance on humanitarian response
Over the next two decades and beyond, large numbers of vulnerable people will 
continue to be exposed to droughts in the drylands of Africa (Table 10.1). Given 
the current limitations in social protection programming, humanitarian assis-
tance is likely to remain a major form of support to households in these areas. 
Because social protection programs in dryland countries are generally very 
small, and because few of the existing programs have the capacity to scale up in 
response to shocks, during times of crisis most governments continue to rely on 
humanitarian appeals (Figure 10.2). The value of humanitarian assistance to the 
Sahel increased from US$37 million in 2000 to US$630 million in 2010. In 2014 
Table 10.1 Projected evolution of vulnerability 2010-2030 among agriculture-dependent 
population in drylands, for different GDP growth scenarios
Population living under 
$1.25 per person per day 
(in million people)
Baseline 
2010
2030 low 
GDP growth
2030 average 
GDP growth
2030 high 
GDP growth
East Africa 25.18 42.39 31.81 22.85
Ethiopia 9.96 18.73 12.04 6.80
Kenya 3.72 5.19 4.50 4.13
Uganda 1.79 2.70 2.00 1.27
United Republic of Tanzania 9.71 15.78 13.27 10.65
West Africa 42.22 86.89 69.53 55.42
Benin 1.07 1.03 0.80 0.49
Burkina Faso 5.53 6.61 5.55 4.46
Chad 2.80 8.03 3.99 3.03
Côte d'Ivoire 0.82 1.26 1.25 1.05
Gambia 0.37 0.77 0.55 0.63
Ghana 0.84 0.99 0.46 0.08
Guinea 0.17 0.26 0.22 0.23
Guinea-Bissau 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
Mali 3.57 6.10 5.48 4.85
Mauritania 0.45 0.77 0.60 0.43
Niger 4.41 16.96 15.18 13.65
Nigeria 19.12 37.98 29.90 21.56
Senegal 1.95 3.90 3.51 3.12
Togo 1.09 2.20 2.00 1.81
Grand Total 67.40 129.27 101.34 78.27
Source: Umbrella modeling estimates
Note: Countries without drylands were excluded: Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan. Liberia and 
Sierra Leone.
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the value of humanitarian assistance totaled US$878 million (45 percent of the 
estimated needs of US$1.95 billion), and for 2015 the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) evaluated the humanitarian 
needs at US$1.96 billion. Of this, about 50 percent would be for food security 
and nutrition, and about 20 percent for support to displaced people and refu-
gees (UNOCHA 2015). 
Humanitarian assistance in the drylands typically involves the provision of 
food, cash, and other in-kind resources and services to help affected households 
cope with the immediate effects of drought. Delivery mechanisms for humani-
tarian aid often consist of food distribution schemes, cash transfer programs, 
feeding programs, purchasing of livestock, and provision of health services and 
water and sanitation services. Humanitarian assistance is an appropriate short-
term response to emergencies, but in many countries it is provided year after 
year in the same areas and to the same recipients, suggesting it is being used as 
a long-term instrument to address chronic poverty. This use of humanitarian 
aid is inappropriate, because the delivery costs tend to be extremely high. Food 
aid, for example, is usually procured internationally and transported across long 
distances, making it very expensive. In Ethiopia prior to 2005 when PSNP was 
introduced, food distribution programs had become the annual response to 
chronic food insecurity, costing on average US$265 million per year. In Kenya 
from 2005 to 2010 spending on food aid accounted for 53.2 percent of all gov-
ernment spending on safety nets. Given the high cost of delivering food aid, it 
is estimated that every dollar spent of food aid could have generated twice as 
many benefits to recipients had it been provided in the form of a permanent 
cash transfer program.
Figure 10.2 Humanitarian aid received, selected countries, Horn of Africa and Sahel, 
2000-2011 (USD million)
Source: Data from Global Humanitarian Assistance 
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/datastore
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In addition to being expensive, protracted use of humanitarian assistance is 
often ineffective. While emergency distribution of food can save lives, the 
implementation challenges are considerable. The food often arrives late, and the 
amount delivered is generally less than what is required. Additionally, given the 
emergency nature of the support, it is often difficult to target the poorest and 
most vulnerable households; the authorities tend to focus mainly on getting the 
resources to communities that have been especially hard hit, but the allocation 
of resources to households within these communities is often done in an ad hoc 
fashion, or the resources are made available to all households regardless of need. 
Finally, because humanitarian aid resources become available only after a shock 
has occurred and donors have had time to respond to appeals, the timing and 
amount of transfers received by the affected households tend to be inadequate 
to meet all of their needs. 
Opportunities
Social protection programs, when correctly designed and effectively imple-
mented, can reduce vulnerability in the drylands by reducing the sensitivity to 
shocks of vulnerable households and improving the capacity of these house-
holds to cope after a shock has occurred. When designing interventions, how-
ever, it is important to distinguish between these two objectives (reducing 
sensitivity and improving coping capacity) and to consider the characteristics—
including the financing requirements—of the different types of interventions 
that can be used to achieve each objective.
Reducing sensitivity
Social protection programs can reduce sensitivity to shocks by enabling poor 
and vulnerable households to invest in human capital, build assets, and diversify 
their livelihood strategies. The social protection programs that perform this 
function are those that target the chronic poor and provide continuous assis-
tance over a sustained period. Sustained, predictable support provides the cer-
tainty households need to be able to take risks that can lead to higher returns 
on investments and enhanced income streams. Predictable, multi-annual social 
protection support to households has also been shown to stimulate investments 
in human capital and assets that can, over the longer term, lift households out 
of poverty. While the assistance is provided over multiple years, the expectation 
is that for individual households it is finite, in the sense that it will be suspended 
once the household has built an asset base and diversified its livelihood strategy, 
because at that point the household will be resilient and will no longer require 
support. These objectives are more effectively achieved when social protection 
support is combined with investments in human capital and livelihoods, and 
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when it is integrated with other development programs, such as those that are 
being proposed for dryland areas.6
Cash transfers. One type of social protection program that allows house-
holds to invest in human capital, build assets, and diversify their livelihood 
strategy involves cash transfers. Cash transfers may be unconditional or condi-
tional. Unconditional cash transfers provide greater flexibility for recipients to 
use the money to address their own priorities, but they bring the risk that the 
resources may be used for immediate consumption instead of being invested in 
ways that would allow the recipients to improve their livelihoods in future years. 
Conditional cash transfers are designed to overcome this problem by requiring 
recipients to engage in activities that are likely to generate benefits over the 
longer term. Increasingly, the delivery of support is complemented with other 
services, such as those that promote nutrition or provide skills training. This 
approach is becoming particularly common in the Sahel. When properly 
designed, these programs can support more productive and potentially more 
diversified livelihoods, and they can help people participate in the growth pro-
cess by taking advantage of the types of investments in livestock production, 
agriculture, and irrigation described elsewhere in this book. 
A large and growing body of evidence shows that cash transfer programs 
work, including in dryland areas. In the arid and semi-arid zones of northern 
Kenya, households receiving regular cash transfer support from the Hunger 
Safety Net Program withstood a severe drought in 2011 without any increase in 
poverty levels, whereas among those not receiving cash transfer support, 5.3 
percent of households fell into the bottom income decile following the drought. 
In Ethiopia the average period during which households participating in PSNP 
reported being food-secure increased from 8.4 months in 2006 to 10.1 months 
in 2012. While it is not possible to disaggregate these findings by aridity zone, 
data from regions in Ethiopia that are predominantly classified as drylands 
show results that are similar to those recorded in more humid regions 
(Hoddinott and Lind 2013). 
Public works. A second type of social protection program that can help 
households reduce their sensitivity to shocks is public works. In addition to 
delivering immediate assistance to participating households by paying wages, 
public works can put in place productive infrastructure that can improve per-
manently the livelihood strategies of recipients. Public works programs are par-
ticularly common throughout the Horn of Africa. More than a decade of 
experience with public works programs in Ethiopia has demonstrated how 
watershed development schemes have the potential to transform the natural 
environment and enhance the resilience of communities and households, espe-
cially when they are designed using community-based planning approaches and 
implemented over multiple years. Through public works initiatives, PSNP has 
constructed 600,000 km of soil and stone bunds that enhance water retention 
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and reduce soil erosion. Public works initiatives supported under PSNP have 
also been used to protect 644,000 hectares of land in area enclosures, leading to 
improved soil fertility and increased carbon sequestration. Within these enclo-
sures, groundwater levels are rising, springs last longer into the dry season, and 
wood and herbaceous vegetation has increased. These results are having a direct 
impact on rural livelihoods (World Bank 2014). 
Insurance programs. A third type of social protection instrument that can 
reduce sensitivity to shocks is a program that facilitates access to insurance 
products that lower the risk associated with traditional livelihood strategies, 
such as farming and livestock-keeping. Typically these products are designed to 
provide protection against extreme weather events, including drought, by link-
ing payouts to weather-based indexes. While these have been tested only on a 
limited scale through pilot schemes, experience suggests that well-designed 
weather indexed insurance programs can be effective in protecting rural house-
holds from shocks. In Kenya, for example, when drought triggered payouts by 
the Index-Based Livestock Insurance, the frequency with which households 
protected by the scheme engaged in negative coping strategies (such as selling 
livestock or reducing the number of meals eaten each day) fell by 33 percent, 
and the frequency with which they engaged in distress sales of livestock fell by 
50 percent. A 33 percent drop in food aid reliance was also observed. In Ethiopia 
evaluations of households insured through the Rural Resilience Initiative con-
cluded that compared with non-participants, farmers who bought insurance 
planted more seeds, used more compost, adopted modern varieties at higher 
rates, used less family labor and more hired labor, diversified their income 
sources, and experienced smaller losses of livestock (Hoddinott and Lind 2013). 
If the experience gained through these pilot schemes can be harnessed to build 
effective large-scale insurance programs, the coping capacity of households liv-
ing in drylands could be further strengthened. Over time as they become con-
fident that insurance products can provide effective protection against the 
negative effects of shocks, households will be encouraged to invest in more pro-
ductive livelihood strategies that will reduce their chances of falling into 
poverty. 
Improving coping capacity
In addition to reducing sensitivity to shocks, social protection programs can 
improve coping capacity and help households recover after a shock has hit by 
providing immediate assistance, usually in the form of food or money. Unlike 
other types of social protection programs that target the chronic poor and pro-
vide continuous assistance over a sustained period, this second type of pro-
gram—often referred to as a “temporary” safety net—is designed to provide 
short-term assistance to help affected households cope with the effects of a spe-
cific shock. Unlike other types of programs that are designed to encourage 
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households to invest in human capital, build assets, and diversity their liveli-
hoods, this type of program allows immediate needs to be met by providing 
consumption support, thereby allowing households to avoid the use of short-
run, negative coping strategies that will undermine their livelihoods over the 
longer term, such as selling livestock or pulling their children out of school.7 It 
is important to note that this type of program is not expected to have a perma-
nent effect on the poverty status of beneficiary households, although these 
households may avoid falling deeper into poverty. Households that receive ben-
efits through this type of program will be made resilient in the year in which 
they receive the benefits, but they will not necessarily be resilient in subsequent 
years, after the flow of benefits has stopped. 
Because this second type of program is designed to improve coping capacity 
by taking action when a shock is imminent or after a shock has hit, it is critically 
important that whatever instruments are used be part of the permanent system 
and that they be rapidly scalable. In addition, it is important that scalable safety 
net programs be linked clearly to humanitarian support, so that humanitarian 
support can be mobilized quickly when the capacities of scalable safety net pro-
grams are exceeded.
National safety set programs
The core of any successful safety net system is the ability to scale up coverage 
rapidly and efficiently. Currently in Africa safety nets are at different stages of 
development (Table 10.2). A number of countries in the Horn of Africa, includ-
ing Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, have made the most progress in putting in 
place national safety net programs. While the rationales for these programs and 
their features differ, each country has established a government-led safety net 
program that is national in scope. These initiatives can serve as examples to the 
many Sahelian countries that have yet to introduce safety net programs, as well 
as Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, whose investments in safety net programs 
have been modest.
Since the incidence, severity, and impacts of many shocks cannot be pre-
dicted, scalability is of paramount importance in the design of safety nets. To be 
effective, a national safety net program must be capable of rapidly expanding 
the provision of transfers to people who have been (or are about to be) nega-
tively affected by a shock. The best scalable safety nets are able to respond 
quickly to an imminent or emerging crisis on the basis of information generated 
through early warning systems and seasonal assessments. 
Scaling up of existing safety net programs allows for a much faster response 
to drought and other emergencies than is possible using the traditional humani-
tarian appeal process. Additionally, transfer systems that are already in place 
can have a greater impact in terms of consumption smoothing and livelihood 
protection per dollar spent than expensive ad hoc programs. Investing in early 
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warning systems is central to this approach, to ensure that there is a reliable and 
transparent stream of information as the basis for triggering any response. 
Recent innovations in delivery mechanisms, particularly the use of informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT), offer opportunities to reach remote 
populations, which is of particular interest to dryland regions. In northern 
Kenya investments in solar panels and smart card technology have enabled the 
Hunger Safety Net Program to create a payment system that is responsive to the 
mobile lifestyles of pastoral populations. In Somalia mobile phone technology 
has played an important role in the Shaqodoon initiative, which uses interactive 
Somali-language audio programs on financial literacy and entrepreneurship to 
link youth to employment opportunities vial mobile phones and the internet 
(Lind and Kohnstamm 2014). 
National safety net programs are often thought to be expensive, but in con-
sidering the cost it is important not to lose sight of the cost of alternative inter-
ventions used to achieve the same objectives. Extending coverage of an existing 
social safety nets program is usually much more cost-effective than relying on 
ad hoc humanitarian responses in times of crisis (Table 10.3). For example in 
Kenya, reorienting existing spending on general food distribution or food aid 
(estimated to cost US$61 million per year) would double the current levels of 
Table 10.2 Country typology based on crisis preparedness and social safety net (SSN) capacity
Strong 
measures to 
improve SSNs 
during a crisis
Moderate 
measures to 
improve SSNs 
during a crisis
Limited or no measures to 
improve SSNs during a crisis
Tier I 
No SSNs in place 
Comoros Central African Republic, Chad,* 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea,* Eritrea,* Gambia, 
Guinea, Mauritania, Somalia,* 
South Sudan, Sudan 
Tier II 
Weak capacity in SSNs
Niger, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe 
Ghana, Liberia, 
Malawi, 
Mozambique, 
Sierra Leone, Togo, 
Uganda
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, DRC, Gabon,* 
Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, 
Nigeria, Sao Tome, Senegal, 
Swaziland, Zambia 
Tier III 
Increasing capacity 
in SSNs
Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda
Cape Verde,* 
Lesotho, Mauritius 
Tier IV 
High capacity in SSNs
Botswana, 
Namibia, South 
Africa 
Note: Countries in bold type are located in dryland regions of the Sahel or the Horn of Africa.
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financing available for cash transfers and make possible high rates of coverage 
of poor and vulnerable households. In Ethiopia since PSNP was launched in 
2005 the government has received US$623.6 million per year on average for 
humanitarian responses, an amount that if allocated to PSNP could extend 
regular support to a significant proportion of the population living below the 
poverty line. In Niger providing regular cash transfer support to the poorest 20 
percent of the population would cost US$83 million per year, compared with an 
average of US$218 million per year spent on humanitarian responses in the 
period 2010–2013. The intuition emerging from these experiences is confirmed 
in a recent comparative study by Venton et al. (2012), who found that building 
resilience and taking early action is far more cost-effective than relying on late 
humanitarian responses. 
National safety net programs may be cost-effective relative to humanitarian 
responses, but they can still require a significant commitment of resources—
with the size of the commitment depending on the scope of coverage and the 
level of support provided. In a world of unlimited resources and perfect target-
ing, national safety net programs theoretically could be used to make all 
drought-affected households in drylands resilient by providing them with cash 
transfers in the amounts needed to bring every household up to the poverty 
line. Alternatively the level of support provided to each household could be 
scaled back, with the objective of reaching larger numbers of people. Figure 10.3 
shows the estimated cost in 2030 of providing safety net support to drought-
affected people at two levels of support in selected dryland countries, expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. The cost of bringing to the poverty line all drought-
affected households ranges from less than 0.5 percent of GDP in countries with 
Table 10.3 Cost of SSN support to poor households compared to humanitarian responses 
Annual cost of regular safety net support to bottom quintile (US$) Avg. cost of 
humanitarian 
response, 
2010–13
Hyper-arid Arid Semi-arid Dry subhumid Total
Burkina Faso 0 1,371,749 88,833,727 11,782,273 101,987,750 48,555,902
Chad 781,398 17,128,141 48,718,180 17,214,163 83,841,882 298,148,319
Mali 210,643 14,643,841 69,557,074 16,788,531 101,200,089 77,423,890
Mauritania 3,107,358 15,568,742 825,661 0 19,501,761 34,784,819
Niger 1,681,344 52,017,414 48,277,168 0 101,975,926 218,221,834
Senegal 0 9,016,207 66,455,931 7,781,703 83,253,841 7,357,294
Total 5,780,743 109,746,094 322,667,740 53,566,670 491,761,248 684,492,057
Note: Number of poor households calculated based on the national poverty line of each country. Annual cost of 
safety net support estimated to be US$300 per household.
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relatively high GDP per capita (e.g., Mauritania) to almost 5 percent of GDP in 
in countries with relatively low GDP per capita and extensive dryland popula-
tions (e.g., Niger). The cost of providing to all drought-affected households a 
minimum assistance package worth US$50/person/year (or US$600/household 
of six people/year8) is more modest, ranging from around 0.1 percent of GDP 
to around 2.1 percent of GDP. A minimum assistance package of this amount, 
which is close to the historical average in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, will 
not have any measurable effect in terms of building resilience over the longer 
term, but experience shows that it can at least help drought-affected populations 
smooth their income and avoid engaging in negative coping mechanisms until 
the following year.
Policy makers do not live in a world of unlimited resources, and in many 
dryland countries, investments in safety net programs, even at the lower of these 
two levels, are not possible. While there is no simple golden rule concerning the 
amount of funding that should be committed to social protection programs, the 
need for which can vary tremendously from country to country, many in the 
development community believe a reasonable reference level of support to 
social safety nets system should be 1 percent of GDP per year. 
The umbrella model was used in the present study to estimate the potential 
extent of safety net coverage in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel in 2030 if every 
country were to invest 1 percent of GDP annually in social safety nets 
programs. 
Figure 10.3 Cost of ensuring resilience through safety net support, selected countries, 2030
Source: Authors’ calculations
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As shown in Figure 10.4, with the exception of Mauritania and Chad, in 
many dryland countries earmarking 1 percent of GDP to social safety nets 
would be sufficient to provide full protection to people affected by drought on 
an average year.
In assessing these findings, it is important to keep in mind that the house-
holds benefiting from social protection programs fall into two very different 
groups. The first group consists of chronically poor households that receive 
assistance through social protection programs designed to help them meet their 
basic consumption needs. Once these basic needs have been met, they are able 
to invest in other things, such as health and education, which allows them to 
acquire skills and build the assets needed to emerge from poverty over the lon-
ger term. These households also are better able to cope in the year in which they 
receive the assistance (i.e., they will be resilient in that year), but crucially their 
vulnerability status is likely to change permanently after they have participated 
in the program for some time. The second group consists of transiently poor 
and chronically poor households that receive assistance through safety net-type 
programs designed to help them recover from shocks in the short run. These 
households are better able to cope in the year in which they receive the assis-
tance (i.e., they will be resilient in that year), but their vulnerability status will 
Figure 10.4 Share of vulnerable population living in drylands that could be covered by 
SSNs with 1% of GDP, 2030
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: Drought-affected population includes people living in drylands, dependent on agriculture, and whose 
income would be below the poverty line following a drought. GDP figures are prorated based on the share of 
people living in drylands. 
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not change for the positive in subsequent years, although it would also not 
become worse as a result of shocks.
Resources invested in social protection will have to be allocated between 
safety net programs designed to help chronically poor households meet their 
consumption needs and develop the skills and build the assets needed to emerge 
from poverty over the longer term and those designed to help transiently poor 
households recover from shocks in the short run. From a development perspec-
tive, the first type of program is clearly preferable, but when a shock has 
occurred and people are suffering, political and humanitarian considerations 
will almost always demand that the second type be funded. The challenge for 
policy makers is to strike an appropriate balance between the two, a task made 
especially difficult by the fact that financing needs for safety nets are inherently 
unpredictable. However, the emerging experience with scalable safety nets sug-
gests that investments made in permanent systems reduce the costs associated 
with delivery support to households negatively affected by drought.
Challenges
Social protection systems can be efficient and cost-effective instruments for 
responding to crises in the drylands of Africa, but they must be well designed. 
Differences in the geographical distribution of the population, the nature of 
predominant livelihood strategies, and the depth of poverty call for different 
design and delivery mechanisms of social protection programs. A recurring 
question is whether vulnerable populations living in drylands will be adequately 
served by a single model applied uniformly across the entire country, or whether 
specialized policies and programs will be needed that are tailored to their spe-
cial needs.
Challenges arise as well in determining trade-offs between programs that 
respond to the needs of the chronically poor, as opposed to programs that pro-
vide temporary support during periods of crisis to both chronic and transient 
poor. These tradeoffs are especially acute in the drylands, which are home to 
many chronically poor but also to many transient poor who fall in and out of 
poverty as a result of their exposure to frequent shocks. For example, in Ethiopia 
some evidence suggests that pastoral populations are generally better off than 
agricultural populations, but pastoral livelihoods are far more exposed to shocks 
and sensitive to shocks, so pastoral populations are far more likely to require 
periodic assistance. In cases such as this, policy makers face the difficult deci-
sion of how best to allocate resources between programs that respond to the 
needs of the chronically poor and programs that respond to the needs of the 
transiently poor (currently in PSNP, 80 percent of the resources go to the 
former). 
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Lack of government capacity can be a real constraint to extending the cover-
age of existing social protection programs. Capacity limitations are particularly 
acute in remote parts of the drylands, where the presence of government agen-
cies is often limited. If social protection programs are to succeed in dryland 
regions, concerted efforts will have to be made to build implementation capac-
ity, starting with the posting of qualified staff to decentralized locations. 
Effective delivery of insurance products will especially depend on the existence 
of well-functioning information systems and far-reaching financial networks, 
since insurance schemes require high-quality, reliable data, as well as decentral-
ized systems for collecting and making cash payments. 
Key messages
Social protection programs will be a key component of strategies to increase 
resilience and reduce vulnerability in the drylands. If present trends continue, 
by 2030 dryland regions of East and West Africa will be home to an estimated 
429 million people, up to 24 percent of whom will be living in chronic poverty. 
Many others will depend on livelihood strategies that are sensitive to the shocks 
that will hit the region with increasing frequency and severity, making them 
vulnerable to fall into transient poverty. Social protection programs thus will be 
needed in the drylands to provide support to those unable to meet their basic 
needs. Some of these people will require long-term support, while others will 
require periodic short-term support because of income losses due to shocks (for 
example, crop failure following a drought) or as a result of life cycle changes (for 
example, loss of a breadwinner). 
Safety net programs can increase resilience in the short term by improv-
ing coping capacity of vulnerable households. Rapidly scalable safety nets that 
provide cash, food, or other resources to shock-affected households can allow 
them to recover from unexpected shocks. Scaling up an existing safety net pro-
gram can be far less expensive than relying on appeals for humanitarian assis-
tance to meet urgent needs. Despite the fact that safety nets are a more effective 
response to poverty and vulnerability than emergency assistance, funding of 
safety nets is low, and flows of humanitarian resources to countries in the Horn 
and the Sahel remain high.
Social protection programs can increase resilience over the longer term 
by reducing sensitivity to shocks of vulnerable households, especially if com-
bined with other development programs. Safety net programs must be com-
plemented by other types of social protection programs that enable chronically 
poor households to build their productive assets and expand their income-
earning opportunities. Providing predictable support to chronically poor 
households and enabling them to invest in productive assets and access basic 
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social services can effectively reduce their sensitivity to future shocks and help 
them participate in the growth process and take advantage of investments made 
in improving existing livelihood strategies. Households covered by well-func-
tioning social protection programs are less likely to resort to negative coping 
strategies, such as pulling their children out of school and selling productive 
assets. 
Safety net programs must be able to scale up in response to shocks. The 
dynamic nature of vulnerability in dryland areas draws attention to the need for 
safety net programs to be able to scale up in the face of shocks and then to scale 
back down when these pass. In dryland areas such instruments may be even 
more important than in non-dryland areas, given the levels of vulnerability and 
exposure to shocks. Emergency support should be provided on an occasional 
basis whenever a set of predefined triggers are met and in a manner that com-
plements, rather than replaces, the support extended through scalable safety 
nets. Effective early warning and monitoring systems are needed to alert policy 
makers and guide the response.
Social protection programs must be tailored to address the unique cir-
cumstances of dryland populations. The needs of poor households living in 
drylands often differ from those of poor households living in more favorable 
environments or in urban areas. For this reason, one-size-fits-all programs 
implemented at the national level often fail to adequately address the needs of 
dryland populations. Interventions designed to strengthen the livelihood strate-
gies of dryland populations and build their resilience will not be effective if they 
fail to account for their specific needs. Program delivery mechanisms similarly 
need to respond to the specific needs of dryland populations, for example, by 
accommodating the mobility of pastoral populations. 
Capacity constraints will need to be overcome to ensure effective imple-
mentation of social protection programs in the drylands. Effective imple-
mentation of social protection programs in the drylands is made difficult by the 
limited presence of public agencies and the lack of infrastructure. Incentives are 
needed to attract and retain qualified staff in hardship posts. Investments in 
transportation systems and information technology are needed to improve 
mobility and reduce transactions costs associated with implementing social 
protection programs in remote dryland areas. 
Investing in scalable safety net programs is extremely cost-effective over 
the longer term. While it saves lives in the short run, humanitarian assistance 
generally does little to build resilience and help cushion the impacts of future 
shocks. Policy makers and development partners must find ways to redirect 
resources away from short-term emergency responses, including possibly inef-
ficient humanitarian assistance, to build scalable safety net programs that will 
build the resilience of vulnerable populations and reduce future needs for emer-
gency responses. 
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Notes
1.  In assessing the effectiveness of social security schemes in the Sahel, one fact stands 
out: In all countries except Senegal, the age at which people become eligible to 
receive benefits is higher than the average life expectancy.
2.  World Bank PROST Model assumes no change to the system and its governing 
parameters over the next 50 years. It should also be noted that this estimate does not 
include spending on military pensions, as data are not available to include this cat-
egory in the forecasts.
3.  This assumes perfect targeting of the programs. From 2015, the coverage of PSNP 
will increase to roughly 11 percent of the population.
4.  Unless otherwise referenced, estimates of safety net coverage in East Africa are based 
on primary data collected expressly for this book from service providers (e.g., gov-
ernment agencies and aid agencies). Estimates of safety net coverage in the Sahelian 
countries come from World Bank social safety nets studies, as well as from updated 
data provided by the World Food Programme and UNICEF.
5.  The government of Senegal is the first in the region to have measured and acknowl-
edged the inefficiency of universal subsidies. Senegalese officials agree with aid part-
ners that a better system of targeted safety nets will be more efficient in addressing 
vulnerabilities. Before universal subsidies are phased out and replaced by cash trans-
fers, however, efforts will be needed to improve the performance of markets for fuel 
and imported staples (see World Bank 2013a).
6.  Even so, for some households, depending on the context, this process can take a long 
time.
7.  The costs of not protecting poor populations from the negative effects of shocks are 
high and long lasting. Ethiopian households that suffered during the 1984–85 
drought continued to experience 2–3 percent less annual per capita growth in the 
1990s. Children in households in Burkina Faso that experience a negative income 
shock are less likely than other children to enroll in school. The negative conse-
quences of reducing investments in children can be irreversible: malnutrition alone 
lowers GDP growth by 2–3 percent.
8.  The cost of basic coverage estimated in the umbrella model is equal to US$261 per 
household, which includes a blend of cash transfers, cash for work, and insurance 
subsidies. A per capita transfer of US$60 includes a 15 percent administration fee 
and 20 percent leakage to non-poor households.
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Chapter 11
Disaster Risk Management: Being 
Prepared for Unforeseen Shocks
Carl Christian Dingel, Christoph Putsch, Vladimir Tsirkunov, Jean 
Baptiste Migraine, Julie Dana, Felix Lung
Current situation
Dryland regions of Sub-Saharan Africa frequently are hit by extreme weather 
and climate events, notably droughts and floods. Between 1970 and 2014, 
around 1,000 disasters were reported across the region, of which approximately 
one-third occurred in 17 countries that have a predominately dryland charac-
ter.1 In many of these dryland countries—particularly those located in the Sahel 
and the Horn of Africa—a large portion of the population is exposed to multiple 
hazards (World Bank 2006) and has limited capacity to manage disasters 
(Shepherd et al. 2013). 
The population in drylands disproportionately suffers from disasters. Although 
dryland countries contain only about one-third of the population in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, they account for more than 50 percent of those affected by disasters and 
nearly 80 percent of all casualties from disasters. The disproportionately large 
casualties suffered by dryland countries can be attributed to the fact that these 
countries contain large numbers of vulnerable people who are chronically exposed 
to drought, combined with the fact that many of these countries have limited 
capacity to prepare effectively for unforeseen shocks. Droughts have been respon-
sible for the largest number of people affected by far, but during the past two 
decades the number of flood events has increased noticeably (Table 11.1). 
Globally droughts and floods are high-frequency and relatively low-severity 
events, in comparison to earthquakes and cyclones. Droughts are slow- or 
delayed-onset events, usually stretching over several years and exacting high eco-
nomic losses, but causing limited infrastructure damage. Floods tend to be fast-
onset disasters, often causing substantial infrastructure damage. In many dryland 
countries of Africa, a large proportion of the population is at risk from two or 
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more hazards (usually drought and floods), including Niger (76 percent), Ethiopia 
(69 percent), Kenya (63 percent), and Burkina Faso (63 percent) (World Bank 
2006). Projections for 2030 indicate that these countries will have very high levels 
of vulnerability to disasters and poverty (Shepherd et al. 2013).
Impacts of disasters 
Natural disasters impose a large financial burden on governments in two ways: 
(1) by causing immediate economic losses and (2) by forcing resources to be 
redirected to short-term humanitarian assistance and away from longer-term 
development activities. The costs of disasters show up clearly in macroeconomic 
indicators, both in the short run as GDP losses and over the longer term as last-
ing declines in GDP growth. Total economic losses caused by disasters are mod-
est in Sub-Saharan Africa relative to other regions, but when they are considered 
taking into account the size of the economies of many African countries and the 
fiscal budgets, the financial impact of disasters is extremely high. Furthermore, 
macroeconomic indicators do not always reflect the pain and suffering caused 
by disasters at the micro level: extreme weather and climate events dispropor-
tionately affect the poor, meaning that disasters tend to have severe impact on 
the livelihoods of the most vulnerable households and have the effect of pushing 
additional people into poverty. As discussed earlier, in dryland regions of Africa 
many of those affected by extreme weather events (Figure 11.1) are often poor 
livestock-keepers and farmers (Table 11.2). 
Table 11.3 presents data on the damage and losses suffered in several dryland 
countries in which the World Bank has recently supported Post Disaster Needs 
Assessments (PDNA). In Kenya, for example, the overall damage from the 2008–
11 drought was estimated at US$12.1 billion (Government of Kenya 2012), with 
the majority (72 percent) of the losses falling on individuals, households, or 
Table 11.1 Number of disaster events, people affected, and casualties per disaster type,
Sub-Saharan Africa and “dryland countries,” 1970–2014
Population 
2013 Drought Flood Storm Earthquake Volcano
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
(n = 49)
938
Events 232 512 163 29 15
Affected 332.2 m 58.3 m 16.1 m 0.5 m 0.3 m
Deaths 545,081 16,496 4,404 2,201 786
Predominantly 
dryland 
countries 
(n = 17)
293
Events 114 194 19 3 4
Affected 197.4 m 15.2 m 0.3 m 0.1 m > 0.1 m
Deaths 443,186 7,585 517 299 69
Source: EMDAT 2015
Note: Predominantly dryland countries include Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Gambia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan
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businesses owning livestock, mostly in the northern drylands. During this period 
average GDP was reduced by 2.8 percent/year. In addition, from 2007–08 until 
2010–11, humanitarian relief expenditure of the Government of Kenya rose to 
US$125 million/year, complemented by US$241 million/year from international 
Table 11.2 Direct and indirect financial impact of natural disasters on different groups 
Government Farmers/Herders The Poorest
Direct 
Impacts
• Emergency response and 
recovery expenditures 
• Expenditure on social and 
economic recovery 
programs 
• Realization of contingent 
liabilities to state-owned 
enterprises, to firms critical 
to economic recovery
• Reconstruction costs for 
mostly uninsured assets
• Restocking/replanting/
rehabilitation of productive 
assets 
• Reconstruction costs for 
damaged assets
• Replacement of livestock
Indirect 
Impacts
• Decreased tax revenue due 
to economic disruption and 
declines in GDP growth
• Opportunity cost of 
diverting funds to disaster 
response and 
reconstruction
• Increased domestic/ 
international borrowing 
costs 
• Potential negative impact 
on sovereign credit ratings
• Increased expenditures for 
social support programs 
(safety nets)
• Migration due to disaster 
impact 
• Loss of income due to 
interruption of crop/ 
livestock/ fish stock 
production
• Loss of income due to 
economic decline and/or 
lack of access to markets 
• Increased borrowing costs
• Increased risk aversion to 
new and innovative 
investments 
• Decreases in expenditure 
on food, accommodation, 
and human capital
• Loss of social support due 
to breakdown in informal 
safety net systems such as 
family support
• Loss of income and 
employment
• Increased borrowing costs
Figure 11.1 Population affected by droughts, floods, storms, earthquakes, and volcanos in 
dryland countries, 1970–2013
Source: EMDAT 2015
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donors (up from decade averages of US$57 million/year and US$102.2 million/
year, respectively) (Government of Kenya 2012).
Limited capacity to manage unforeseen shocks
The capacity of countries to reduce disaster risk and prepare for unforeseen 
extreme weather and climate events is limited in many parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Shepherd et al. (2013) summarized the disaster risk management capac-
ity of countries in a composite score designed to capture the capacity of each 
country to prevent disasters from causing impacts, now and in the future. Many 
dryland countries fare poorly according to this scale: Very poor: Chad, Sudan, 
and Somalia; Poor: Niger and Mauritania; Average: Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mali; 
Better than average: Burkina Faso and Senegal; and Relatively good: Namibia 
and Botswana. 
Following the severe droughts and resulting food crises of the 1960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s, many dryland countries in East and West Africa started to collaborate 
on monitoring and managing drought and food security. Two regional organiza-
tions took the lead in these functions: the Permanent Interstate Committee for 
Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), established in West Africa in 1973, and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), established in the Horn 
of Africa in 1983. Since then, regional policies, operational monitoring frame-
works, and systems to improve regional climate projections have been instituted. 
In 2006 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formulated 
a regional disaster risk reduction policy (ECOWAS 2006), and in 2010 the African 
Union together with the World Food Programme initiated the African Risk 
Capacity (ARC) as a regional climate insurance mechanism (see Box 11.1). 
Despite these advances, however, no harmonized framework is as yet in 
place for monitoring and response that integrates multiple hazards—droughts, 
floods, food security, and other hazards, including locusts, extreme tempera-
tures, and fires. The underlying data, hydrometeorological, and production 
forecasts remain weak, and capacity to deal with rapid onset hazards is yet to be 
developed. In some countries flood forecasting systems have been put in place, 
but they tend to have a local focus. 
Table 11.3 An overview of damages and losses from recent PDNAs, selected countries
Event Country Year People affected (thousands)
Damage 
(US$ mill)
Losses 
(US$ mill)
Recovery cost 
(US$ mill)
Floods Namibia 2009 350 136 78 622
Floods Burkina Faso 2009 150 102 33 266
Floods Senegal 2009 485 56 48 204
Drought Kenya 2008–11 3,700 8 11,300 17,700
Floods Sudan 2013 340 134
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BOX 11 . 1
African Risk Capacity (ARC)
African Risk Capacity (ARC) is a Specialized Agency of the African Union.2  
ARC’s mission is to help African Union (AU) member states improve their 
capacities to better plan, prepare, and respond to extreme weather events and 
natural disasters and to assist those affected in a timely and effective manner. 
As a continental sovereign risk pool, ARC provides cost-effective contingency 
funding to African governments to execute preapproved contingency plans 
should severe events occur. Developed as a joint project of the AU and the 
United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), the ARC became a Specialized 
Agency of the AU in November 2012. It currently counts 25 AU countries as 
members and is supervised by a governing board of African ministers and 
experts chaired by Nigeria’s Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Dr. Ngozi 
Okonjo-Iweala.3 
While the ARC agency provides member states capacity-building services 
for insurance, contingency planning, and operations, a nationally regulated 
financial affiliate, the ARC Insurance Company Limited (ARC Ltd), was estab-
lished to execute the risk transfer operations. ARC Ltd was registered in 
Bermuda in December 2013 and started operations in 2014. A specialist 
hybrid mutual insurance company and Africa’s first-ever disaster insurance 
pool, ARC Ltd aggregates risk by issuing insurance policies to participating 
governments and transferring some of that risk to the international market. It 
uses the satellite weather surveillance software Africa RiskView, developed by 
WFP, to estimate the impact of drought on vulnerable populations—and the 
response costs required to assist them—before a season begins and as it pro-
gresses, so that index-based insurance payouts, based on Africa RiskView, are 
triggered at or before harvest time if the rains are poor. With a US$200 mil-
lion initial capital commitment provided by the governments of Germany 
(KfW) and the United Kingdom (DFID), ARC Ltd issued drought insurance 
policies totaling US$129 million for a total premium cost of US$17 million to 
a first group of African governments for five rainfall seasons—Kenya, 
Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal—in May 2014, marking the launch of the 
inaugural ARC pool. Seven additional countries are in the queue to join the 
next pool in 2015, with a target of up to 20 countries receiving coverage for 
drought, flood, and cyclones totaling over US$600 million in the next five 
years. In addition to insurance for weather events, ARC has recently been 
mandated by its member states to develop coverage for disease outbreaks 
and epidemics, such as Ebola, and is developing a climate change adaption 
financing mechanism for its insured countries to respond to the impacts of 
increased climate volatility.
(continued next page)
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Reliable hydrometeorological systems and services are needed to ensure 
timely early warning and preparedness, yet such systems and services are lack-
ing in many dryland countries. A recent survey carried out by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) concluded that in Sub-Saharan Africa 
“there are wide-spread deficiencies in hydrometeorological observation net-
works, tele-communications, and informatics systems…and very limited capac-
ity in data management and product customization. The national hazard 
warning capacities are uneven, even nonexistent in some countries, while warn-
ing programs often do not address all significant meteorological and hydrologi-
cal hazards.” According to WMO standards, Sub-Saharan Africa ranks last 
among all regions in terms of land-based observation networks, meeting only 
about one-eighth of the minimum requirements (Rogers and Tsirkunov 2013). 
Even if national policies for disaster response can be strengthened, and even 
if substantial supporting investments can be made in resilience-building mech-
anisms, it is likely that livelihoods and economies throughout the region will 
continue to be adversely affected by droughts and floods. This in turn means 
that governments will continue to be exposed to disaster-linked expenses, such 
as the costs of mounting humanitarian responses when disasters strike. To cover 
such costs, most African countries have historically relied on funding mobilized 
post-disaster, such as loans or donor assistance. Figure 11.2 shows the trend of 
humanitarian assistance spending for crises, conflicts, and disasters provided by 
donors between 2000 and 2011 to predominately dryland countries in Africa 
(Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015), along with the number of peo-
ple affected by droughts and floods. While post-disaster financing can some-
times be accessed on more favorable terms than prearranged financing, it may 
take a long time to negotiate (e.g., emergency loans) or turn out to be highly 
unpredictable (e.g., donor assistance), with the result that development pro-
grams that may have been under implementation for many years can end up 
being threatened. 
One strategy for reducing the uncertainties associated with relying on post-
disaster funding is to institute risk financing instruments that can be established 
In January 2015, ARC issued payouts totaling US$25 million to Senegal, 
Mauritania, and Niger as a result of drought conditions during the 2014 rainfall 
season to implement pre-prepared response plans to assist affected popula-
tions. These payouts were triggered before the UN Sahel Humanitarian Appeal 
in February 2015 and will be used to implement targeted food distributions, 
subsidized fodder sales and scale cash transfer, and school feeding programs in 
the recipient countries.
Box 11.1 (continued)
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before a disaster hits, such as insurance against disasters or reserve funds. Such 
instruments allow governments to shoulder the financial burden of dealing with 
disasters before they occur. Risk financing instruments that can be established 
before a disaster hits can avoid certain drawbacks, but they require considerable 
advance planning, they can be expensive, and they may be limited in scope 
(Mahul and Cummins 2009). An additional problem is that the types of risk-
financing instruments of greatest relevance to disasters (e.g., weather indexed 
agricultural insurance) are still in their infancy in many dryland countries and 
hence are poorly understood.
Opportunities
Disaster risk management strategies and programs, when correctly designed 
and effectively implemented, can play an important role in reducing vulnerabil-
ity and increasing resilience of people living in drylands. They can do this by 
reducing exposure to shocks of vulnerable households, reducing sensitivity to 
shocks, and especially by improving the capacity of shock-affected households 
to cope after a shock has occurred. 
Reducing sensitivity
Disaster risk management focuses on reducing risks and better preparing for 
extreme weather and climate events (i.e., better managing any residual risk). 
Risk reduction includes (1) reducing vulnerability, (2) better understanding 
Figure 11.2 People affected by droughts and floods in dryland countries and costs of 
humanitarian interventions, 2000–11
Source: EMDAT 2015, globalhumanitarianassistance 2015
Note: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan.
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hazards, and (3) managing exposure. A strong disaster risk management capac-
ity is essential to minimize the potential for long-term losses resulting from the 
impacts of hazards on vulnerable, exposed people (Shepherd et al. 2013). 
Early warning systems and hydromet services. Early warnings, climate out-
looks for the rainy season, and extreme weather event forecasts are important 
elements for reducing exposure and sensitivity to extreme weather and climate 
events in drylands. Following the droughts of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the 
WMO regional climate centers—the African Center for Meteorological 
Applications for Development (ACMAD), the IGAD Climate Prediction and 
Applications Center (ICPAC), and the SADC Climate Service Center (SADC 
CSC)—successfully initiated seasonal climate outlook forums for West Africa 
(PRESAO),4 the Greater Horn of Africa (GHACOF),5 and Southern Africa 
(SARCOF).6 Climate outlook forums provide consensus-based, region-specific, 
seasonal climate forecasts for upcoming cropping cycles and have become an 
important instrument for understanding the weather risks in drylands (WMO 
2009). Pilot projects have demonstrated the ability to help farmers who formerly 
relied on seasonal forecasts to reduce the sensitivity of their cropping activities 
to extreme climate events, thereby raising or at least stabilizing their agricultural 
income. Benefits realized by vulnerable farmers include better planning, more 
efficient utilization of inputs, avoidance of crop damage from extreme weather 
events and pests, and better management of stocks (WMO 2005; Archer et al. 
2007). Humanitarian agencies have taken notice of these gains and are increas-
ingly using climate outlook information to plan interventions and take early 
actions, such as stocking up goods for relief operations (Coughlan de Perez and 
Mason 2014). 
The WMO regional climate centers are working with national hydrometeo-
rological services to link local observation capacity with global and regional 
weather prediction models. By mobilizing a wide range of actors at many differ-
ent levels, they can forecast severe weather using a cascading approach in which 
information passes from regional centers to national hydrometeorological ser-
vices. In this way the global products of the major numerical prediction centers 
can be used by even the most capacity-limited national hydrometeorological 
services; these services can use the information to improve their alerting and 
warning services while avoiding the cost of stand-alone investments in high-
end computing infrastructure and staffing. The WMO Severe Weather 
Forecasting Demonstration Project has successfully piloted this approach, 
increasing the lead time and reliability of alerts related to high-impact events, 
such as heavy precipitation and severe winds (WMO 2010). 
The potential benefits from establishing effective hydrometeorological sys-
tems and early warning capacity are often underestimated. Hallegatte (2012) 
estimates that upgrading all hydrometeorological information systems and 
early-warning capacity in developing countries worldwide would prevent 
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between US$300 million and US$2 billion annually in disaster-related losses, 
save 23,000 lives annually on average, and provide between US$3 billion and 
US$30 billion in additional economic benefits. Studies carried out in Switzerland 
and the United States show high returns to investments in improved meteoro-
logical and hydrological services, with cost-benefit ratios ranging from 1:4 to 
1:6 (Rogers and Tsirkunov 2014). A recent World Bank study focusing on 
Europe and Central Asia generated similar results, reporting estimated cost-
benefit ratios ranging from 1:2 to 1:10 (Tsirkunov et al. 2007). The benefits of 
high-priority hydrometeorological investments in Africa alone would likely 
exceed US$1 billion over the next 10–15 years (World Bank 2014). 
Improving coping capacity
Being well prepared can reduce exposure and sensitivity to shocks, but it will 
not eliminate vulnerability completely. Even if substantial investments are made 
in risk reduction mechanisms, disasters will likely continue to occur in the dry-
lands, with adverse impacts on the livelihoods of people who live there. 
Preparing for the unforeseen is therefore important, so that instruments will be 
available to help disaster-affected households cope after a disaster has occurred. 
Measures to strengthen coping capacity include: (1) pooling, transferring, and 
sharing risks; (2) effectively preparing for extreme events; and (3) managing 
resilient recovery and reconstruction. 
Risk finance and insurance to pool and transfer risk. Governments can 
take steps to reduce the negative financial effects of disasters in a way that pro-
tects both people and assets. This requires short-, medium-, and long-term 
policy interventions focused equally on risk reduction and on financial risk 
management. Disaster risk financing and insurance solutions can help countries 
minimize the cost and optimize the timing of post-disaster funding needs with-
out compromising development goals, fiscal stability, and well-being. Disaster 
risk financing and insurance therefore must be an integral part of the disaster 
and climate risk management agenda in dryland regions. Disaster risk financing 
and insurance complement disaster risk management activities by securing 
adequate financial resources to cover residual risks that cannot be mitigated and 
by creating the right financial incentives to invest in risk reduction and 
prevention. 
Instruments that offer the greatest potential benefits for dryland countries 
can be grouped into three categories: 
• Sovereign disaster risk financing aims to increase the capacity of national 
and subnational governments to provide immediate emergency funding as 
well as long-term funding for reconstruction and development. 
• Agricultural insurance aims to protect farmers, herders, and fishermen 
from loss arising from damage to their productive assets. For example, the 
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Government of Kenya is in the process of establishing a national agricultural 
insurance scheme for agricultural producers against drought.
• Disaster-linked social protection helps governments strengthen the resil-
ience of the poorest and most vulnerable to the debilitating effects of natural 
disasters. It does this by applying insurance principles and tools to enable 
social protection programs such as social safety nets to scale up and scale out 
assistance to beneficiaries immediately following disaster shocks. 
While governments may not need to pursue all of these policy options, a 
comprehensive disaster risk financing strategy typically would build on some 
combination of them. Together they help to clarify, reduce, and manage public 
contingent liabilities to natural disasters, thereby making financing of disaster-
linked expenses more cost-effective, timely, and reliable. The elements of such 
a strategy are as follows:
• Cost-effectiveness. The more quickly financing can be made available fol-
lowing the onset of a disaster, the more costs can be contained. In the case 
of droughts, losses continue over time, extending far beyond short-run agri-
cultural production losses. They can include, for example, loss of produc-
tive assets, reduced food consumption, lower rates of educational enrolment, 
higher incidence of disease, and ultimately loss of lives. 
• Timeliness. Rapid mobilization of funds to support scalability in response 
to drought is crucial in order to limit the negative impacts that a population 
experiences and contain contingent liabilities to finance the required relief 
efforts. An early, well-targeted response—for example through the scaling up 
of a social safety net—can cost a fraction of the emergency aid required after 
a famine evolves.
• Reliability. Clear, predefined rules of disbursement, as typically encountered 
in risk financing instruments, can make the provision of needed funds more 
predictable and more dependable. Insurance policies that emit payments 
based on objective and easily measurable rules can make budgetary planning 
much easier for government agencies and relief organizations.
A comprehensive ex-ante financing strategy, as depicted in Figure 11.3, 
involves layering various types of risk, where the “lower layers” refer to more 
frequently occurring, low-impact disaster events, while the “upper layers” rep-
resent infrequent but more extreme events. Depending on the layer, different 
risk financing mechanisms tend to be most cost-effective. For example, for 
lower layer natural disasters, reserve funds often present the most cost-effective 
solution (Mahul and Cummins 2009). 
Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa, similarly to governments in other 
developing regions, often rely on ad hoc measures to respond to the incremental 
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financing needs that arise in the case of disasters, including dipping into disaster 
funds, undertaking emergency budget reallocations, and launching urgent 
appeals for donor assistance. Such measures tend to be unreliable and often 
inadequate. In many countries, therefore, a shift is taking place, and efforts are 
being made to draw on a wider range of financial instruments, including many 
that can be lined up in advance. The policy objective being pursued by these 
countries is to build financial resilience at the national level, which requires 
paying attention to a series of considerations as follows:
• Appropriate risk information. Appropriate risk information allows public 
and private decision makers to assess the underlying price of risk and clarify 
costs and benefits of investing in risk reduction or risk financing. 
• Ownership of risk. Clarifying who is responsible for a certain risk, establish-
ing the contingent liability of the governments, donors, private sector, and 
other groups is an important starting point. Furthermore, clearly established 
rules under social protection programs give predictability to vulnerable pop-
ulations and enable better planning and budgeting.
• Cost of capital. Access to capital at different costs is necessary for effective 
emergency response, reconstruction, and risk reduction and prevention. 
• Timeliness. Different types of funds need to be available at the appropriate 
time following a disaster to cover relief, response, and reconstruction efforts. 
The rapid mobilization of funds to support relief efforts is crucial to limit 
humanitarian costs. 
• Discipline. Disaster risk financing helps affected groups plan in advance of 
a disaster and agree beforehand on rules and processes for securing funds 
(budget mobilization) and spending funds (budget execution). This creates 
greater discipline, transparency, and accountability in post-disaster 
spending. 
Figure 11.3 Catastrophic risk layering and respective cost-effective risk financing
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Insurance for farmers, herders, and fishermen. Agricultural insurance can 
protect farmers, herders, and fishermen from losses arising from damage to 
productive assets. This helps farmers and herders increase their awareness and 
understanding of financial vulnerability to agricultural risks; to possibly adopt 
riskier, but higher yielding production methods; and to have in general a better 
understanding of the financial services suitable for low-income households. 
Responding to recurring extreme drought events in northern Kenya, the 
Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (MALF) recently con-
ducted a diagnostic study investigating options for large-scale crop and live-
stock insurance in Kenya. For livestock, the study proposed insurance based on 
a satellite-based index of ground cover. The objective of the insurance would be 
to provide asset protection through a policy that provides financial compensa-
tion in times of severe drought. Payouts could be used to mobilize access to 
fodder and other life-saving services. 
Resilient recovery
In considering how to improve coping capacity, it is important to highlight the 
importance of building back better so as to increase resilience in the future. In 
addition to quantifying losses and assessing damage to the economy, many 
PDNAs assess the needs for reconstruction and recovery. By making concrete 
recommendations for building back better and strengthening disaster risk man-
agement, they can lay out a roadmap for strengthening resilience in the future. 
Despite their adverse impacts, disasters can create opportunities for planning 
and rebuilding more resilient livelihoods and economies.
PDNAs are anchored by the joint declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments 
and Recovery Planning —a 2008 tripartite agreement between the EU, UNDP 
and the World Bank to coordinate all post-crisis interventions under the lead of 
the affected country’s government (EU, UNDG, and World Bank 2008). The 
PDNA process is complemented by comprehensive, integrated recovery plans 
that prioritize and sequence recovery interventions and help governments 
improve their readiness for future disasters, as outlined by the Global Facility 
for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR 2015). In this way the interna-
tional community can provide support for transitioning swiftly from response 
to recovery and reconstruction. 
In summary, a comprehensive disaster risk management framework must 
include measures designed to reduce risks by limiting exposure and sensitivity to 
shocks before they occur, as well as measures designed to manage residual risks 
and improve coping capacity after a shock has occurred. The complementary rela-
tionships between these two sets of measures are illustrated in Figure 11.4.
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Challenges
Efforts to reduce risk and prepare for unforeseen weather and climate shocks 
are challenged in many dryland countries by the use of inappropriate instru-
ments, capacity constraints, lack of coordination, resource limitations, lack of 
political leadership, and underdeveloped markets. 
Limited use and application of information. Interventions to manage risk 
often end up failing to address the particular circumstances or dynamics of 
poverty and vulnerability of the drylands. For example, weather and climate 
information should be provided in a way that it is meaningful to farmers and 
livestock herders, but also to women and other user groups, and it should enable 
them to take appropriate action. Similarly early warning systems are only as 
good as the action that follows the warning. Contingency plans, interventions, 
and recovery activities need to be tailored to different vulnerable groups and to 
take their specific livelihoods into account (e.g., the sedentary livelihood of 
herders).
Lack of coordination and integration. Climate forecasting in dryland regions 
and early warning mechanisms so far have focused on drought and related food 
security issues, but the systems currently in place lack an integrated (multi-haz-
ard) and regionally harmonized approach for effective early warning.
Regional capacity constraints. The national hydrological and meteorologi-
cal services would benefit from more coordinated support from global, regional, 
and subregional centers to better use resources available within a cascading 
process and to increase the benefits to end users, that is, people and economies. 
A recent institutional assessment of ACMAD (African Centre of Meteorological 
Applications for Development) and AGRHYMET7 (a drought-monitoring and 
Figure 11.4 Disaster risk management framework adopted from IPCC (2012)
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capacity-building center in the West Africa Region) showed that even though 
these regional technical centers provide essential services, their ability to deliver 
is severely constrained by inadequate budgets, the lack of qualified staff, and 
weak infrastructure.
Resource limitations. Weather and climate services in the drylands remain 
largely underfunded. Even though substantial investments have been made in 
some cases in state-of-the-art infrastructure, additional resources need to be 
committed to cover operating costs, which typically run on the order of 10–15 
percent of the investment costs annually (Rogers and Tsirkunov 2013). Without 
operating budgets, many national hydrometeorological services lack the capac-
ity to conduct effective forecasting for extreme events and to communicate the 
information in a timely manner.
Lack of political leadership. Courage is required on the part of governments 
and traditional aid agencies to move away from a system funded through inter-
national appeals and toward a system based on ex-ante funding that incorpo-
rates mechanisms for transferring and pooling risk. 
Underdeveloped insurance markets. The insurance market for vulnerable 
groups, notably farmers and herders, remains underdeveloped. Although 
weather indexed insurance has the potential to provide much needed protection 
to keep farmers out of extreme poverty and to support the ability to make 
investments in the future, pilot insurance schemes have often failed.
Repeating vulnerabilities. Recovery and reconstruction efforts often do not 
pay sufficient attention to underlying vulnerabilities and exposure to risk. 
Communities often rebuild their houses and assets with the same materials, 
move to other vulnerable areas, and lack the resources, for example, to retrofit 
their houses to make them more flood-resilient or manage their livestock herds 
better following a drought.
Key messages
Disaster risk management can play a key role in strengthening resilience and 
reducing vulnerability in the drylands. Initiating a disaster risk management strat-
egy that will be effective in the drylands requires action along the following lines.
Investing in knowledge. Understanding hazards and effective preparedness 
to extreme weather and climate events are the basis for most decisions on reduc-
ing risk and preparing for disasters. This requires more accurate forecasts and 
better weather, climate, and hydrological services. Hallegatte (2012) recom-
mends investment in five domains: (1) local observation systems; (2) local fore-
cast capacity; (3) increased capacity to interpret forecasts and translate them 
into warnings; (4) communication tools to distribute and disseminate informa-
tion, data, and warnings; and (5) institutional capacity building and increased 
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decision-making capacity by the users of warnings and hydrometeorological 
information. 
Paying attention to local circumstances. The design and delivery of disaster 
risk management interventions should be tailored to the livelihoods of the dry-
lands and should integrate food security and other disasters in an effective man-
ner. Forecasting and early warning should build upon existing experience and 
institutions related to food security monitoring and integrate droughts, floods, 
and other disasters into disaster risk management strategies. 
Strengthening regional institutions. Scaling up projects and tailoring 
national programs to deliver effective support in drylands requires creative 
responses to limited delivery capacity in many of these areas. Regional organi-
zations play an important role in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa 
as “knowledge centers” by facilitating data exchange, coordinating responses, 
and building capacities of member states. There is a need to identify sustainable 
financing solutions for these institutions. 
Empowering national governments. Financial protection requires strong 
leadership by a country’s ministry of finance. Strong stewardship is required, as 
disaster risk financing brings together disaster risk management, fiscal risk and 
budget management, public finance, private sector development, and social pro-
tection. Disaster risk financing and insurance is a long-term agenda that 
requires political will, technical expertise, and time. While simple measures can 
quickly support improved financial protection, more complex financial solu-
tions and institutional change require technical expertise and political will. 
Mobilizing the capacity of the private sector. The private sector is an essen-
tial partner in disaster risk management. It can bring capital, technical exper-
tise, and innovative financial solutions to better protect the government and 
society against natural disasters.
Building back better. Disasters present opportunities for engagement on 
risk reduction, and this should be reflected in all post-disaster engagement. The 
aftermath of a disaster often focuses resources and political will on reducing 
existing risk and preventing future risk, creating opportunities to “build back 
better” and begin systematic engagements.
Notes
1.  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia, 
Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan.
2.  http://www.africanriskcapacity.org
3.  WFP continues to provide administrative services support to the ARC agency, 
including procurement and trust fund management, through an administrative ser-
vices agreement.
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4.  PRESAO – Previsions Saisionnaieres en Afrique de l’Ouest 
5.  GHACOF – Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum
6.  SARCOF – Southern African Regional Climate Outlook forum
7.  AGRHYMET = AGRrometeorology, HYdrology, METeorology
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Chapter 12
Evaluating Options: 
Assessing the Relative Merits of 
Resilience Interventions
Raffaello Cervigni, Michael Morris, Federica Carfagna, Jawoo Joo, 
Joanna Syroka, Zhe Guo, Hua Xie, Balthazar de Brouwer, Elke Verbeeten
The scale of the development challenge
Returning to the projections presented in Chapter 4, it is useful to recap the 
scale of the challenge facing policy makers. The baseline projections generated 
under the business as usual scenario of the numbers of vulnerable people likely 
to be living in the drylands of East and West Africa in 2030 provide a convenient 
yardstick that can be used to assess the attractiveness of the various interven-
tions discussed in this book that are designed to improve resilience. 
Across the 10 dryland countries for which sufficient data are available to 
allow modeling of resilience interventions, it is estimated that in 2010 about 30 
percent of the population living in dryland zones was vulnerable to droughts 
and other shocks. While this number is quite large, fortunately not all vulner-
able households experience a drought every year, and even those households 
that experience a drought do not necessarily see their income fall below the 
poverty line (the study’s definition of “drought-affected”). Assuming historical 
climate patterns, the modeling simulations show that in any given year, approxi-
mately 20 percent of the vulnerable households are affected by drought, equiva-
lent to about 6 percent of the total population in the 10 countries. Of course 
these are not the same people every year, as droughts occur in different loca-
tions and strike with different intensities. 
The size of the drought-affected group is of interest because it determines the 
amount of resources to be mobilized every year—in the form of safety nets, 
international humanitarian assistance, or other forms of support—to assist 
people unable to cope with the effects of drought. The size of the 
PART C. Toward policy priorities
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drought-affected group also influences the mix of assistance that can be offered: 
for a given budget, the larger the group of drought-affected households, the 
larger the share of resources needed for short-term emergency response activi-
ties and the smaller the share of resources available to build longer-term resil-
ience. Because it has important implications for policy making, the size of the 
drought-affected group is a key output of the umbrella model. 
A second group of significance for the analysis consists of pastoralist house-
holds living in arid zones who own herds smaller than the minimum size 
needed to provide enough income to meet household consumption needs (esti-
mated to be 5 TLU/household). For these households day-to-day survival 
appears extremely precarious, even in the absence of droughts and other shocks. 
This group—which accounts for 7 percent of the population across the entire 
sample of 10 countries but makes up a much larger share of the population in 
some countries, for example Niger (Figure 12.1)—will come under increasing 
pressure to abandon pastoralism as its primary livelihood strategy and turn to 
other activities. In the umbrella model 2030 projections, it is assumed that pas-
toralist households owning fewer animals than the critical minimum level of 5 
TLU will transition from pastoralism to crop farming.
In 2030 the umbrella model projects a 60 percent increase on average in the 
number of vulnerable people and a proportionally similar increase in the 
Figure 12.1 Share of 2010 population likely to drop out of pastoralism by 2030 
Source: Authors’ calculations
Note: The figures refer to pastoralists whose herds are below a minimum critical herd size; these pastoralists 
are expected to move out of pastoralism, and in the analysis are assumed to become farmers by 2030.
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number of drought-affected people (Figure 12.2). With the exception of Burkina 
Faso, by 2030 all of the countries in the sample are projected to experience 
increases in the number of vulnerable and drought-affected people. The increase 
is projected to be especially high in Niger, where the number of vulnerable and 
drought-affected people is expected to triple.
The projected increases by 2030 in the number of vulnerable and drought-
affected people reflect the combined effects of several key drivers, including 
rapid population growth, relatively slow and inequitable economic growth, and 
binding bioclimatic and social constraints that limit the ability of the natural 
resource base to support greater numbers of animals. Most importantly, in pas-
toral areas prospects for expanding herd sizes at rates fast enough to keep pace 
with population growth are limited by the size of accessible grazing area. 
To put the magnitude of the resulting challenge in perspective, the annual 
cost of bringing all drought-affected people up to the poverty line by providing 
support through social safety nets would range from 0.3 percent to almost 5 
percent of GDP (Figure 12.3). In interpreting these results it is important to 
keep in mind two points. First, these cost estimates are annual averages; in 
Figure 12.2 People vulnerable/affected by drought in 2030 (2010=100%)
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The total number of 2030 vulnerable people (proxied by the population living below the international 
poverty line) was estimated based on UN medium fertility population projections, as well as the average GDP 
growth scenario as defined in the umbrella modeling background paper (Fallavier and Cervigni 2014). The 
average number of drought-affected people was estimated through the ARC model using crop yield simula-
tions (see Appendix for details).
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reality, financing needs would fluctuate dramatically and unpredictably, falling 
in years of normal rainfall and rising in drought years when the number of 
drought-affected people surges. Second, the cost estimates implicitly assume 
that social safety net support can be perfectly targeted to drought-affected 
households; in practice it is very difficult to ensure that safety net support 
reaches all drought-affected households and only those households, and in the 
presence of leakages, overall financing needs would be considerably higher.
In conclusion, it is safe to assume that for most dryland countries, relying on 
social protection instruments to protect vulnerable populations against the 
effects of drought shocks will likely be beyond their fiscal means and institu-
tional capacity. 
Estimating the potential for enhancing resilience
The umbrella model results show that it would be prohibitively expensive for 
governments in dryland countries to rely on social safety nets to protect vulner-
able households from the adverse effects of droughts and other shocks. In that 
context, policy makers will want to know to what extent the coming challenge 
can be mitigated by making current livelihood strategies more resilient.
Figure 12.3 Share of 2030 GDP required to protect drought-affected population
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The chart shows the cost (expressed as a percentage of 2030 GDP for drylands, assumed proportional 
to the share of the population living in drylands) of bringing all drought-affected people to the international 
poverty line through cash transfers. The cost is calculated taking into account the country-specific depth of 
poverty, as proxied by 2010 poverty gap index obtained from the World Bank PovCalnet database. Figures for 
2030 GDP are based on the average growth scenario as defined in the umbrella modeling background paper 
(Fallavier and Cervigni 2014).
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To help determine the answer, a set of best-bet interventions was selected 
from among the many resilience-enhancing interventions reviewed in previous 
chapters (Table 12.1), and the umbrella model was used to assess the extent to 
which these interventions would be able to reduce vulnerability among popula-
tions living in drylands by improving the productivity and sustainability of cur-
rent livelihood strategies.
Because of technical limitations in the umbrella model, which does not have 
the capacity to capture complex interactions that occur when multiple interven-
tions are implemented simultaneously, only the livestock-related interventions 
were considered in hyper-arid and arid zones, and only the crop farming-related 
interventions were considered in semi-arid and dry subhumid zones. This 
approach ignores the significant scope for implementing livestock-related inter-
ventions in agropastoral systems found in semi-arid and dry subhumid zones. 
For this reason, while the modeling results indicate the order of magnitude of 
the likely resilience benefits of the different interventions, they represent con-
servative lower bound estimates of the full potential. 
The results of the modeling exercise suggest that the best-bet interventions, by 
improving the productivity of livestock and crop farming systems in the drylands, 
could considerably slow the projected increase in the number of drought-affected 
people (Figure 12.4). Without the interventions, by 2030 the number of drought-
affected people is projected to increase by 60 percent compared to 2010. With the 
interventions, the number of drought-affected people is projected to increase by 
Table 12.1 Coverage of resilience interventions in umbrella model
Livelihood Intervention
Dryland type
Hyper-arid, 
arid
Semi-arid,  
dry subhumid
Livestock-based Improved animal health services þ
Early offtake of young male animals þ
Farming-based and mixed Drought-tolerant germplasm þ
Heat-tolerant germplasm þ
Soil fertility management þ
Agroforestry/FMNR þ
Heat-tolerant germplasm and FMNR þ
Drought-tolerant germplasm and soil 
fertility management þ
Drought-tolerant and heat-tolerant 
germplasm þ
Irrigation þ
Note: FMNR = Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration.
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only 27 percent (an improvement of 43 percentage points). In some countries, 
notably Ethiopia and to a lesser extent Kenya and Nigeria, by 2030 adoption of 
improved management of livestock and crop farming systems could reduce the 
absolute number of drought-affected people relative to the 2010 baseline. In other 
countries, particularly Niger but also Senegal and Mauritania, the best-bet inter-
ventions would have a more modest impact, and the number of drought-affected 
people in 2030 would still be considerably larger than in 2010.
In pastoral areas, where only livestock-related interventions were considered 
(specifically, improved animal health services and early offtake of young male 
animals), the most important benefit is to slow the exit of the poorest herders 
who otherwise would be forced to abandon pastoralism and take up other liveli-
hood activities (mainly crop farming). By increasing livestock productivity, the 
livestock-related interventions reduce the minimum number of TLU needed to 
generate the amount of income required by livestock-dependent households to 
remain above the poverty line. In this way, the livestock-related best-bet inter-
ventions are projected to reduce the number of exits from pastoralism by 6 
percent on average. The effect is much higher in some countries: Kenya (13 
percent fewer exits), Burkina Faso (14 percent fewer exits), Mali (16 percent 
fewer exits), and Ethiopia (19 percent fewer exits) (Figure 12.5). 
Figure 12.4 Contribution of technical interventions to resilience in 2030 (2010=100%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The vertical axis in the figure has been trimmed to accommodate Niger, an extreme outlier. The number 
of drought-affected farmers was estimated using the ARC model, based on the yields obtained for a set of 
reference staple crops (maize, sorghum, millet) grown with and without the interventions, and evaluating the 
number of years (over a 20-year simulated time series reflecting historical climate) in which yields fall below a 
certain threshold. The number of drought-affected herders was estimated based on the number of households 
that are able to sustain—for a given amount of biomass determined by historical climate patterns—a minimum 
herd size; herders lacking the minimum herd size were assumed to take up crop farming (which may or may 
not have made them resilient).
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With respect to crop farming interventions, the biggest impact on reducing 
the number of drought-affected people is projected to come from improvements 
in soil fertility management, followed by irrigation development, adoption of 
drought-resistant varieties, and uptake of tree-based systems. The benefits of the 
different crop farming interventions vary considerably by location, and the mix 
of optimal interventions is quite variable across countries, pointing to the 
importance of carrying out location-specific assessments and tailoring inter-
ventions to meet local circumstances (Figure 12.6).
Figure 12.5 Reduction in exits from pastoralism due to technical interventions, 2030
Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 12.6 Relative contributions of technical interventions in the reduction of 
vulnerability, by country, 2030
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Not surprisingly, the mix of optimal crop farming interventions varies by arid-
ity zone (Figure 12.7). In the drier parts of the semi-arid zone (Aridity Index 
0.2–0.35), irrigation development is likely to have the largest impact, followed by 
adoption of soil fertility management practices and drought-tolerant varieties. In 
the wetter parts of the semi-arid zone and the dry subhumid zone (Aridity Index 
0.36–0.65), adoption of fertility management practices is likely to have the biggest 
impact by far. Adoption of tree-based systems/FMNR is likely to have a larger 
impact in the dry subhumid zone compared to more arid zones.
One important positive message emerging from the umbrella modeling work 
is that when accurately targeted, the best-bet crop farming interventions have 
considerable potential to reduce the impacts of droughts. Accurate targeting 
was ensured in the umbrella modeling work by restricting implementation of 
the interventions only to locations in which their adoption was determined to 
be profitable (i.e., simulated yield gains remain positive after yields have been 
adjusted downward to reflect the cost of adopting the technology).
A second important message emerging from the umbrella modeling work—
admittedly less positive—is that it is critically important to accurately target the 
crop farming interventions to the locations where they will have maximum 
impact. The importance of accurate targeting was determined by rerunning the 
umbrella model and allowing the interventions to be implemented in all loca-
tions regardless of profitability. The results of this second set of model runs 
(summarized in Figure 12.8) make clear that the cost of inaccurate targeting can 
be high. 
Figure 12.7 Relative contributions of technical interventions in reducing vulnerability, by 
aridity zone, 2030 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: IRR = internal rate of return
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In Figure 12.8 the vertical axis represents the projected number of drought-
affected people living in drylands in 2030, expressed as a percentage of the BAU 
scenario. Values above 100 percent represent an increase in the number of 
drought-affected people relative to the BAU scenario, and values below 100 
percent represent a decrease in the number of drought-affected people relative 
to the BAU scenario. As shown in Figure 12.8, many of the best-bet crop farm-
ing interventions are expected to reduce the number of drought-affected people 
only in selected locations. In many other locations the cost of adopting the crop 
farming intervention does not justify the expected benefits, resulting in a net 
loss in income and leaving adopting households more likely to be adversely 
affected by droughts. This means that careful assessments will need to be made 
to ensure that the best-bet crop farming interventions are promoted only in 
locations in which they will actually deliver benefits (i.e., increasing resilience 
to drought shocks).
Figure 12.8 Importance of targeting technical interventions 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The Y-axis values indicate for each technology the distribution across polygons (intersections of sub-
national administrative units and aridity zones) of the number of drought-affected people, expressed as a 
percentage of the Business As Usual (BAU) case. Values above 100% indicate poorer performance than BAU 
(more drought-affected people, suggesting that in the corresponding areas it is thus better not to adopt the 
technology; values below 100% indicate better performance than BAU (fewer drought-affected people, sug-
gesting that in those areas it makes sense to adopt the technology). The larger the portion of the box above 
the 100% line, the larger the chance that the corresponding technology will result in an increase of the aver-
age annual number of drought-affected people.
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Evaluating the costs of resilience interventions
Dryland development policies must take into account not only the extent to 
which interventions can reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, but also 
the cost of implementing those interventions. Since the best-bet interventions 
considered in this book are already available “on the shelf ” and are ready for 
implementation, research and development costs are sunk costs and can safely 
be ignored. Additional costs that need to be considered include: 
1. Private costs associated with technology adoption (e.g., the costs incurred by 
herders and farmers when purchasing inputs and/or hiring additional labor), 
2. Public costs associated with technology transfer (e.g., the costs of extension 
campaigns and farmer training), and 
3. Miscellaneous overhead costs. 
Because technology transfer costs vary considerably depending on the accu-
racy of targeting, costs were estimated for three scenarios:
1. Zero targeting: All technologies are promoted in all polygons having non-
zero cropping area.
2. Intermediate targeting: All technologies are promoted only in polygons hav-
ing non-zero cropping area and in which farm-level benefits exceed technol-
ogy transfer costs (see the Appendix for details).
3. Perfect targeting: Among the technologies having positive farm-level bene-
fits, the only technology that is promoted is the one with the greatest impact 
on resilience, i.e., the one producing the largest reduction in the number of 
drought-affected people. 
Depending on accuracy of targeting, the average annual cost across the entire 
sample of dryland countries ranges from US$0.14–1.31 billion (Table 12.2).
Costs on this order of magnitude compare favorably with current levels of 
development assistance provided in dryland countries.
Do investments in resilience pay off?
How cost-effective are these best-bet interventions compared to alternative 
strategies for reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience in the drylands? 
To answer this question, a simple benefit/cost (B/C) assessment was carried out 
in which the cost of the interventions was compared to the benefits, measured 
in terms of the savings that would be achieved in the amount of safety net cash 
transfers that would be needed to bring all drought-affected people to the pov-
erty line. The B/C analysis assumed the following:
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• In the no-intervention scenario, the number of drought-affected people would 
increase in linear fashion over 15 years, as would the corresponding increase 
in cash transfers needed to lift these people out of poverty; meanwhile, no 
expenditure would be made in the best-bet interventions (see Figure 12.2). 
• In the intervention scenario, the cash transfers needed to lift drought-
affected people out of poverty would increase more slowly, commensurate 
with the slower increase in the number of drought-affected people; mean-
while, public investment in the best-bet interventions would increase in lin-
ear fashion, with the cumulative expenditure over the 15 years equaling the 
sum of the annual averages. The total public investment was calculated as the 
sum of the technology transfer cost and the overhead cost, plus 25 percent 
of the private cost (representing subsidies needed to encourage adoption).
• In the intervention scenario, intermediate targeting was assumed; this 
implies that public agencies will be able to prescreen investments and avoid 
promoting technologies that are poorly suited to local agro-climatic circum-
stances, but they will lack the ability to identify and exclusively promote the 
best performing technology in any given location.
• In the intervention scenario, a cost escalation factor was used to carry out 
sensitivity analysis in recognition that technology transfer costs have been 
crudely estimated and could change significantly in future; the cost escala-
tion factor varies from 1 (no cost escalation) to 4 (four-fold increase in tech-
nology transfer costs).
• In both scenarios, the discount rate was set at 10 percent.
The results of the B/C assessment suggest that the benefits—expressed in 
terms of reduced cash transfers needed to support drought-affected people—far 
exceed the costs of implementing the best-bet interventions (Figure 12.9). In 
most countries (the only exceptions are Mauritania and Niger), the results are 
robust under a wide range of cost assumptions: even if costs are increased four-
fold, the B/C ratio remains well above 1. 
Table 12.2 Estimated annual costs of resilience interventions (US$ billions)
Cost Item No targeting
Partial 
targeting
Perfect 
targeting Other
Private – livestock and crops 1.09 0.36 0.12
Private – irrigation 2.18
Public 0.21 0.06 0.02
Total 1.31 0.43 0.14
Note: Irrigation costs are reported separately because the targeting of irrigation investments is “built-in” to the 
analysis, which assumes that irrigation development occurs only in locations where the investment is expected 
to generate an IRR of 12% or more (see Chapter 5 for details). 
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Are investments in existing livelihoods sufficient to 
ensure resilience?
Will the best-bet interventions identified in this book be able to solve in a last-
ing manner the challenge of resilience in drylands? 
Before addressing this question, it is important to agree on what might be 
considered an acceptable outcome. The policy objective in drylands cannot be 
to eliminate completely the need to provide support to people who have been 
adversely affected by droughts: drylands will always be subject to droughts, and 
for the foreseeable future, significant numbers of people will be exposed to 
droughts, sensitive to their effects, and unable to cope in their wake. 
In that context, a reasonable policy objective would be to ensure that support 
is adequate (in the sense of covering those in need) and manageable (in the 
sense of remaining within the country’s long-term fiscal capacity). Using again 
the metric of the cost of providing cash transfer support to drought-affected 
people, it is useful to see how implementation of the best-bet interventions 
compares to the BAU scenario (Figure 12.10).
In considering the potential of the best-bet interventions to reduce vulner-
ability and increase resilience among populations living in the drylands, it is 
worth noting that the interventions will have two types of effects—a direct effect 
Figure 12.9 Benefit/cost ratios of resilience interventions 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: B/C ratios above 1 (the horizontal line on the chart) indicate that the benefits of resilience interventions 
exceed the costs.
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and an indirect effect. Investments in livestock and crop farming systems will 
directly reduce the number of drought-affected people by improving the pro-
ductivity and sustainability of current livelihood strategies. In addition, these 
investments will indirectly contribute to improved resilience in the drylands by 
freeing up public resources that would otherwise have to be used for emergency 
responses; these resources can instead be redirected to other programs to 
strengthen the resilience of vulnerable segments of the population.
The overall impact of the resilience-enhancing interventions varies consider-
ably across the different countries. Three main outcomes can be distinguished, 
as follows.
• In Niger, Mali, and Senegal the resilience-enhancing interventions reduce 
the cost of having to rely on safety nets to support the drought-affected pop-
ulation, but the cost of safety nets remains well above the 1 percent of GDP 
mark so that a wide resilience deficit persists. 
• In Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Nigeria the resilience-enhancing interventions 
reduce the cost of having to rely on safety nets to support the drought-
affected population to approximately the 1 percent of GDP mark, so the 
Figure 12.10 Cost in % of GDP of supporting drought-affected people in drylands (with 
and without interventions)
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: The vertical axis has been trimmed to avoid the distorting effect of the outlier (Niger). The chart indicates 
the cost (expressed as a percentage of 2030 GDP for drylands, assumed proportional to the share of the popu-
lation living in drylands) of bringing all drought-affected people to the international poverty line, without inter-
ventions (BAU), and with interventions. The cost is calculated taking into account the country-specific depth of 
poverty, as proxied by the 2010 poverty gap index obtained from the World Bank PovCalnet database. Figures 
for 2030 GDP are based on the average growth scenario as defined in the umbrella model (see Appendix for 
details). 
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drought-affected population is covered in the short run, but very little 
financing is left from the 1 percent of GDP for investment in programs that 
can build resilience over the longer term and reduce the need for future 
safety net expenditures. 
• In Kenya, Chad, Ethiopia, and Mauritania the resilience-enhancing interven-
tions reduce the cost of having to rely on safety nets to support the drought-
affected population to well below 1 percent of GDP, meaning that 
drought-affected populations can be covered in the short run even as 
resources are freed for investment in programs that can build resilience over 
the longer term and reduce the need for future safety net expenditures. 
These findings have implications for the mix of policies and instruments that 
each group of countries will want to consider in seeking to ensure that dryland 
populations remain resilient in the face of droughts and other shocks (see also 
Table 12.3).
Niger, Mali, and Senegal (referred to here as Group A). The resilience-
enhancing interventions discussed in this book, albeit cost-effective in terms of 
reducing the number of drought-affected people, will likely be insufficient to 
bring drought management down to a fiscally sustainable footing. An important 
priority for policies in these countries will be to identify additional interven-
tions to strengthen existing livelihoods beyond those that the limited scope of 
this book permitted. But perhaps more importantly, public policies could 
actively explore opportunities to develop alternative livelihoods, both inside 
and outside of drylands (more on this in the next chapter).
Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Nigeria (referred to here as Group B). The 
resilience-enhancing interventions discussed in this book, while capable of 
reducing the numbers of drought-affected people, will leave significant numbers 
of drought-affected people reliant on safety net support. If the governments in 
these countries are willing to allocate 1 percent of GDP on average to safety net 
support, it should be possible to provide assistance to all drought-affected peo-
ple. However these resources will have to be managed carefully because the 
actual financing needs will fluctuate significantly from year to year. An impor-
tant priority for these countries, in addition to exploring a wider range of 
options for strengthening existing livelihoods, will be to develop mechanisms 
for mobilizing contingent finance (e.g., sovereign insurance) when social pro-
tection needs exceed their ability to finance it.
Kenya, Chad, Ethiopia, and Mauritania (referred to here as Group C). The 
resilience-enhancing interventions discussed in this book will be able to signifi-
cantly reduce the number of drought-affected people, leaving a relatively small 
number reliant on safety net support. If the governments in these countries are 
willing to allocate 1 percent of GDP on average to social protection programs, 
a “dividend” will remain that could be invested in activities designed to improve 
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their livelihood strategies and achieve permanent income gains. Key priorities 
for these countries are to scale up investments in resilience-enhancing interven-
tions, as well as to define strategies for sustainably reinvesting the additional 
dividends that these interventions will generate.
Table 12.3 Policy priorities to ensure resilience, selected dryland countries
Countries Priority interventions
Safety net 
coverage 
achieved with  
1% of GDP
Fiscal 
dividend 
remains
Importance 
of promoting 
alternative 
livelihoods
Group A
Mali
Niger 
Senegal
Semi-arid zones
• Livestock health
• Livestock early offtake
• Drought tolerance
• Irrigation
• Tree-based systems
Dry subhumid zones
• Fertilizer
• Irrigation
• Tree-based systems
Drought-affected 
people not fully 
covered
No High
Group B
Burkina Faso
Nigeria
Uganda
Semi-arid zones
• Livestock health
• Livestock early offtake 
• Drought tolerance
• Irrigation
• Tree-based systems
Dry subhumid zones
• Fertilizer
• Irrigation
• Tree-based systems
Drought-affected 
people just 
covered
No Medium
Group C
Chad
Ethiopia
Kenya
Mauritania
Semi-arid zones
• Livestock health
• Livestock early offtake
• Drought tolerance
• Irrigation
• Tree-based systems
Dry subhumid zones
• Fertilizer
• Irrigation
• Tree-based systems
Drought-affected 
people amply 
covered
Yes Low
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Chapter 13
The Road Ahead: Toward a Shared 
Dryland Development Agenda
Michael Morris, Raffaello Cervigni, Karen Brooks
Scope of the dryland development challenge 
The chronic vulnerability of people living in drylands stands at the forefront of 
Africa’s development challenge. Drylands make up 43 percent of the total land 
area in Sub-Saharan Africa, account for 75 percent of the area used for agricul-
ture, and are home to about 50 percent of the region’s total population. Poverty 
is heavily concentrated in drylands: about 75 percent of Africans living on less 
than US$1.25 per day live in countries in which at least one-quarter of the pop-
ulation lives in dryland zones. 
In the drylands today frequent and severe shocks, both natural and human-
induced, limit the livelihood opportunities available to millions of households 
and undermine efforts to eradicate poverty. In the absence of robust social pro-
tection systems and rapidly scalable safety nets, these shocks regularly cause 
large drains on government budgets and consume a significant portion of the 
region’s international development assistance. They have also contributed to a 
pronounced development gap: the people living in drylands are less wealthy 
than those living outside of drylands, less healthy, less educated, and less secure.
Over the next two decades, if current trends continue, dryland regions of 
Africa will experience strong population growth. By 2030 the population in 
drylands is expected to grow by 58–74 percent (depending on the fertility sce-
nario), putting increased pressure on a resource base that is already stretched. 
Over the same period, climate change could result in an expansion of the area 
classified as drylands (by as much as 20 percent under some scenarios), bring-
ing more people into an ever more challenging environment. Higher population 
density in the drylands will put additional pressure on a fragile natural resource 
base, pushing it in some cases beyond its natural regenerative capacity. As 
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competition for resources intensifies, conflicts over land, water, and feed 
resources are likely to multiply.
These trends lead to an inevitable conclusion: Business as usual is not an 
option. Thus there is a need for African governments and the broader develop-
ment community to bring fresh thinking and new ideas to a longstanding prob-
lem that continues to defy conventional development solutions. This book has 
attempted to make a modest contribution toward that objective.
Demographic trends will bring new opportunities
In considering the development prospects for the drylands, it is important not 
to let preoccupation over short-term problems crowd out thinking about even-
tual long-term solutions. Many of the challenges the drylands are likely to face 
in future are linked to the projected rapid increase in population. Rapid popula-
tion growth will exacerbate many existing challenges, but population growth 
will also bring new opportunities for profitable commerce and trade, for 
increased economic specialization, and for enhanced value addition. Similarly, 
increased population density in the drylands will reduce the cost of providing 
essential public services, such as education, health care, water and sanitation, 
communications, and security. For these reasons population growth in the dry-
lands could prove vital in overcoming the traditional problem that has contrib-
uted to the underdevelopment of the drylands—namely, that the sparse 
population distributed over vast areas has made markets thin and costly, dis-
couraging both public and private investment in goods and services.
Seizing the emerging opportunities will be possible only to the extent that 
higher population density does not lead to increased competition for natural 
resources, especially land, water, and biomass. Increased competition would 
likely lead to erosion of the resource base and eventually give rise to conflict. 
For this reason, as population growth outstrips the ability of current livelihood 
strategies to provide adequate incomes for all, public policy will have to focus 
on the creation of new livelihoods, less reliant on natural capital, and more on 
human and physical capital.
Demographic trends will require new livelihood strategies
Evidence presented in this book suggests that the predominant livelihood strat-
egies in the drylands will have to change. Higher population density is not con-
sistent with continued widespread reliance on traditional dryland livelihood 
strategies such as livestock-keeping and agriculture, which are based on har-
vesting of ecosystem services and are very heavily reliant on natural capital. The 
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natural resource base will not be able to support denser populations without 
degradation and competition for resources leading to conflict.
As population growth outstrips the carrying capacity of the natural resource 
base on which most current livelihoods depend, livelihood strategies will have 
to shift to activities more reliant on human and physical capital, and that com-
plement use of natural resources with other inputs. This shift implies a gradual 
transition, not an abrupt wholesale conversion of large numbers of people from 
one set of activities to a different set of activities. Traditional livelihood strate-
gies will need to evolve by adding human and physical capital to make use of 
natural resources more productive and sustainable.
As part of the larger transformation, significant numbers of people will have 
to exit from agricultural and natural resource-based livelihoods to seek employ-
ment in other sectors. Among other things, this means that the solution to dry-
land problems will come to a large extent from outside the drylands. 
Impacts of climate change
Adding to the uncertainty about the future prospects for drylands is the pros-
pect of climate change. While difficult to predict with certainty, the preponder-
ance of evidence suggests that climate change is likely to have a significant 
impact on Sub-Saharan Africa. The effects are likely to include shifts in the 
distribution of drylands, expansion in the size of drylands, and increases in the 
frequency and severity of extreme weather events experienced within drylands. 
Depending on the rate at which these projected impacts of climate change man-
ifest themselves, over time the number of vulnerable people living in dryland 
regions of Africa is likely to increase even further. 
Climate change will exacerbate the need for a shift in livelihood strategies, 
but the shift would have been needed anyway. Climate change will mainly shift 
the angle of the trajectory and accelerate the rate of needed changes. 
Public policy priorities: Short term
The coming transformation of the drylands will not happen overnight. In the 
short run, possibilities for migration are severely restricted, because few high-
quality jobs are being created outside the rural sector. The implication is that for 
the foreseeable future, many people will have to remain in the drylands, relying 
primarily on agriculture and natural resource-based livelihoods.
The fact that current livelihood strategies will remain vital for the foreseeable 
future has important implications for policy priorities in the short to medium 
term. Information and analysis presented in this book show clearly that oppor-
tunities exist to make agricultural and natural resource-based livelihoods more 
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productive, more stable, and more sustainable. Governments and their develop-
ment partners must act quickly to make certain that these opportunities are 
fully exploited.
This book has: identified a series of best-bet interventions with the potential 
to improve the productivity and sustainability of current livelihood strategies; 
estimated the extent to which these interventions could reduce vulnerability 
and strengthen resilience among people living in drylands; and calculated the 
approximate cost of fully implementing these interventions. The most promis-
ing of these interventions, along with the key policy recommendations needed 
to ensure their successful implementation, can be summarized as follows.
Livestock
Livestock systems in the drylands can be made more productive and more prof-
itable, but ensuring the resilience of all pastoralists and agro-pastoralists will 
require the addition of new income sources.
Key recommendations:
1. Increase production of meat, milk, and hides in drylands by developing sus-
tainable delivery systems for animal health, promoting increased market 
integration, and exploiting complementarities between drylands and higher 
rainfall areas. 
2. Enhance the mobility of herds by ensuring adequate and equitable year-round 
access to grazing and water and by improving security in pastoral zones.
3. Develop Livestock Early Warning Systems (LEWSs) and early response sys-
tems to reduce the adverse impacts of shocks.
4. Identify additional and alternative livelihood strategies, because feed and 
animal resources will be insufficient in the drylands to enable the minimum 
level of herd ownership needed to provide adequate income, food security, 
and asset-building opportunities for all livestock-keeping households.
Rainfed agriculture
Improved crop production technologies can deliver sizeable resilience benefits 
by boosting productivity in rainfed agriculture, but only if barriers to adoption 
can be overcome.
Key recommendations:
1. Accelerate the rate of varietal turnover.
2. Increase availability of hybrids.
3. Improve soil fertility management.
4. Improve agricultural water management.
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Irrigated agriculture
Irrigation can provide an important buffer against drought in dryland areas, but 
only for a relatively small share of the population. Irrigation development is 
technically feasible and financially viable on 5–10 million hectares in the dry-
lands (the number varies depending on assumptions made about capital invest-
ment costs and the minimum required level of financial returns). Prospects are 
brighter for small-scale irrigation, due in large part to the more modest invest-
ment costs.
Key recommendations:
1. Give a more prominent role to agricultural water management in develop-
ment planning.
2. Promote development of small-scale irrigation, especially in areas where 
cash crops are produced and farmers have access to markets where they can 
sell their production. 
3. Triple the area developed for large-scale irrigation, rehabilitating existing 
capacity that is currently underutilized and adding a further 10 million hect-
ares of irrigation development to the current 5 million hectares.
Tree-based systems
Tree-based systems include both those based on farmer management of natu-
rally occurring species (generally more appropriate in drier zones), as well as 
those involving deliberate planting of economically useful species (generally 
more appropriate in more humid zones). 
Key recommendations:
1. Promote farmer managed natural regeneration (FMNR) to establish a range 
of beneficial trees throughout the drylands.
2. Invest in tree germplasm multiplication and promote planting of location-
appropriate high-value species especially in dry subhumid areas.
3. Develop value-added opportunities for the many valuable tree products pro-
duced in the drylands.
Social protection
Even under optimistic assumptions about the spread of resilience-enhancing 
interventions such as those described above, a significant share of the popula-
tion living in drylands will remain vulnerable to shocks. Since it is unlikely that 
the entire dryland population can be made resilient in the face of every type of 
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shock, social protection programs including safety nets will be needed to sup-
port the most disadvantaged households and those affected by disasters. 
Key recommendations:
1. Establish and gradually expand the coverage of national adaptive safety net 
programs that promote resilience of the poorest households.
2. Use social protection programs to build capacity of vulnerable households to 
climb out of poverty, but maintain the ability to provide humanitarian assis-
tance in the short run.
3. Respond to emergencies by scaling up existing programs, rather than relying 
on appeals for humanitarian assistance.
4. Tailor social protection programs to address the unique circumstances of 
dryland populations.
Public policy priorities: Medium to long term
Short- and medium-term measures designed to improve the productivity and 
stability of current agriculture and natural resource-based livelihood strategies 
and to ensure their sustainability will have to be complemented with long-term 
measures to facilitate the transformation. Two broad sets of interventions will 
be needed as follows.
Public policy will need to encourage investment in human capital:
• Education and vocational training
• Health and nutrition
• Fertility management
Public policy will also need to encourage investment in physical capital:
• Transport infrastructure
• Communications
• Housing (urban focus)
Roles and responsibilities of non-state actors
Governments will have to play a leading role in managing the coming transfor-
mation, but governments will need help. Changing the trajectory will require 
cooperative efforts on the part of development partners, the private sector, and 
civil society.
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Development partners can contribute through investments designed to 
facilitate sustainable intensification of dryland livelihoods, as well as through 
implementation of supportive policies relating to improvement of health care 
services/fertility control, education, migration and foreign investment, among 
others. 
The private sector can contribute primarily through investments designed 
to facilitate sustainable intensification of dryland livelihoods, especially by cre-
ating jobs in non-dryland areas to absorb exits from drylands.
Civil society leaders can play an important role in encouraging behavior 
change and attitudinal adjustment, for example by building support for girls’ 
schooling and secular education generally, facilitating changes in traditional 
land use patterns of pastoral peoples, and mediating conflicts at local level over 
competition for natural resources.
Final thoughts
Today in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa frequent and severe shocks, both 
natural and human-induced, limit the livelihood opportunities for millions of 
poor and vulnerable households, undermining efforts to eradicate poverty and 
break the recurring cycle of humanitarian crises. This book has focused on 
quantifying the dimensions of the challenge likely to confront African govern-
ments in the coming decades, as well as assessing the scope for public policy 
interventions to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience of dryland popula-
tions by improving the productivity and ensuring the sustainability of current 
livelihood strategies. The impact of these interventions must be understood 
within a wider context of the long-term transformational change that drylands 
are already experiencing. 
Interventions such as those discussed in this book will be able to reduce the 
vulnerability of many people living in drylands, but they will not be sufficient. 
Additional measures that generate employment opportunities outside of agri-
culture and equip rural populations with the skills to take advantage of those 
opportunities will be needed as well. Over time these additional measures will 
provide relief by helping to accelerate the inevitable structural transformation 
of dryland economies.
Successful management of the ongoing structural transformation will allow 
socially desirable outcomes to be realized, but the challenges are very large, and 
without constructive engagement of public officials, development partners, and 
civil society at many levels, adverse outcomes are possible and even likely.
The stakes are high. Opportunities are emerging to build vibrant societies 
incorporating both the traditional and the new, but if these opportunities are 
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missed, there is a very real possibility that the people living in the drylands will 
be condemned to many more decades of poverty, immiseration, and conflict. 
Appendix
Technical Note on the Drought 
Impacts Model
Raffaello Cervigni, Michael Morris, Federica Carfagna, Joanna Syroka, 
Balthazar de Brouwer, Elke Verbeeten, Jawoo Koo, Pierre Fallavier, Hua 
Xie, Weston Anderson, Nikos Perez, Claudia Ringler, Liang You
How many people live in dryland zones of Sub-Saharan Africa, and what are 
their livelihood strategies? How many of these people are vulnerable to droughts 
and other shocks, and of those who are vulnerable, how many are actually 
affected in an average year? How are the numbers of vulnerable and drought-
affected people living in drylands likely to evolve as the population increases 
and national economies grow and transform? To what extent can the impacts of 
drought be mitigated through policy interventions that improve the productiv-
ity and sustainability of livelihood strategies or provide protection in the form 
of safety nets? And how much would these policy interventions cost?
These questions are hard to answer, for two main reasons. First, because 
national statistical reporting services in many dryland countries are weak, 
detailed information is not always available either about the people who cur-
rently live in the drylands or about their livelihood activities. Second because 
events in the drylands are influenced by a complex set of agro-climatic, demo-
graphic, economic, and political drivers, projecting future trends is technically 
difficult. 
Despite these challenges, the research team made an effort to quantify the 
scope of the challenge facing policy makers, with the objective of providing 
insight into the likely impacts and fiscal costs of alternative resilience-enhanc-
ing interventions. Answers to the above questions were generated with the help 
of a diverse set of modeling tools. 
The modeling effort proceeded in four stages:
1. Estimation of the 2010 baseline population [umbrella model]
2. Projection of population growth to 2030 [umbrella model]
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3. Modeling likely effects of resilience interventions targeting:
 a) Livestock systems [livestock model]
 b) Rainfed cropping systems [cropping model]
 c) Irrigation systems [irrigation development model]
4. Consolidation of results [umbrella model]
This appendix provides details of the modeling tools, describes the data used 
for the simulations, explains key assumptions underlying the analysis, and dis-
cusses strengths and weaknesses of the approach.
Geographical coverage
Before considering the modeling tools, it is useful to review the geographical 
coverage of analysis. 
Definition of drylands
For reasons of simplicity and for consistency with widespread common practice, 
“drylands” are defined on the basis of the Aridity Index (AI). Under this approach, 
which has been endorsed by the 195 parties to the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and which also is being used by the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), drylands are defined as 
regions having an AI of 0.65 or less. Drylands are furthermore subdivided into 
four zones: hyper-arid, arid, semi-arid, and dry subhumid. In this book, the semi-
arid zone is divided into a “dry semi-arid zone” and a “wet semi-arid zone.” The 
Aridity Index ranges used to define these zones appear in Table A.1. 
Country coverage
Because the various analyses required different types of information, the cover-
age varied depending on data availability (see Table A.2). 
The data required for the overall population projections were available for all 
or almost all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table A.1 Aridity Index ranges used to define dryland zones
Aridity Class Definition Aridity Index range
1 Hyper-arid 0.00–0.03
2 Hyper-arid 0.03–0.05
3 Arid 0.05–0.20
4 Dry semi-arid 0.20–0.35
5 Wet semi-arid 0.20–0.50
6 Dry subhumid 0.50–0.65
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Table A.2 Coverage of the different modeling approaches
Region Country
Included in
Irrigation model Crop model Livestock model
East Africa Djibouti ü
Eritrea ü
Ethiopia ü ü ü
Kenya ü ü ü
Somalia ü
South Sudan
Sudan ü
Uganda ü ü ü
United Republic of 
Tanzania ü ü
West Africa Benin ü ü
Burkina Faso ü ü ü
Chad ü ü ü
Côte d'Ivoire ü ü
Gambia ü ü
Ghana ü ü
Guinea ü
Guinea-Bissau ü
Liberia ü
Mali ü ü ü
Mauritania ü ü ü
Niger ü ü ü
Nigeria ü ü ü
Senegal ü ü ü
Sierra Leone ü
Togo ü ü
Central Africa Burundi ü
Cameroon ü
Central African Republic ü
Congo ü
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo ü
Equatorial Guinea ü
Gabon ü
Rwanda ü
Southern Africa Angola ü
Botswana ü
Lesotho ü
Madagascar ü
Malawi ü
Mozambique ü
Namibia ü
South Africa ü
Swaziland ü
Zambia ü
Zimbabwe ü
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The data required for the vulnerability analysis were not available for all 
countries. For East and West Africa, the two subregions on which the analysis 
concentrates, the coverage was quite limited for East Africa and much more 
complete for West Africa.
The data required for the resilience analysis similarly were not available for all 
countries, although the extent of coverage varied depending on the intervention:
• Irrigation development: Data were available for all countries.
• Rainfed cropping systems: Data were available for most of the countries clas-
sified as dryland countries.
• Livestock systems: Data were available only for a sub-set of dryland countries.
The coverage of the overall resilience modeling analysis is thus defined by the 
coverage of the livestock systems model, which is the narrowest among the vari-
ous components. The countries included in the overall resilience analysis 
account for 85 percent of the projected 2030 population in West Africa and 
nearly 70 percent of the projected population in East Africa (Figure A.1). 
Estimation of 2010 baseline population
As discussed at length in the main text of the book, in the World Bank analysis, 
resilience is determined by three key factors: (1) exposure to droughts and other 
Figure A.1 Coverage of the umbrella model: Drylands population equivalent of countries 
included in the analysis
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shocks, (2) sensitivity to droughts and other shocks, and (3) ability to cope with 
the effects of droughts and other shocks. The estimation of the 2010 baseline 
population was designed to generate estimates of the numbers of people falling 
into each of the three categories.
People exposed to droughts and other shocks
These are defined as people living in dryland areas, that is, areas with aridity 
classes ranging from hyper-arid to dry subhumid. UN population data were 
spatialized using gridding methods routinely used in the literature (in particular 
the GRUMP dataset developed at the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network—CIESIN—at Columbia University).
People sensitive to droughts and other shocks
This group is defined as the share of people dependent on agriculture, estimated 
using recent IMF (International Monetary Fund) estimates (Fox et al. 2013) of 
the employment shares of agriculture, and assuming that people below working 
age depend on agriculture in the same proportion as people above working age. 
All those working in agriculture are assumed to be equally sensitive to drought 
shocks. This is admittedly a simplification, since the income share derived from 
agriculture varies across households. However, data needed to assess consis-
tently across countries the income shares derived from agriculture are not read-
ily available. Survey-based evidence suggests, however, that in dryland areas the 
share of income coming from farming and livestock is at least 60 percent of the 
total, so this assumption should not excessively bias the analysis.
People unable to cope with the effects of droughts and other shocks
This group is defined as the proportion of exposed and sensitive people living 
below the international poverty line of US$1.25 per day. Since separate esti-
mates are rarely available for the rural population only, the national poverty rate 
was used. The resulting estimates of the number of vulnerable people are prob-
ably conservative, because: (1) poverty is usually higher in rural areas than in 
urban areas and (2) poverty is usually higher in dryland areas than in non-
dryland areas.
Recognizing that in drought years, people dependent on agriculture experi-
ence income losses, in some of the analyses in this book the number of people 
unable to cope is estimated using different poverty lines. Based on WFP (United 
Nations World Food Programme) survey evidence, it is assumed that house-
holds with incomes exceeding the international poverty line of US$1.25 per 
person per day by 15 percent, 30 percent, and 45 percent become unable to cope 
in the event of mild, moderate, and severe droughts, respectively. In each case, 
the corresponding poverty headcount is estimated based on income distribu-
tion data obtained from the PovCalnet database. 
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Using these definitions, the dimensions of vulnerability and resilience in the 
drylands of Sub-Saharan Africa were estimated in the baseline year of 2010.
Resilience analysis for livestock systems
Five simulation models were used to estimate the likely impacts of resilience-
enhancing interventions on feed balances, livestock production, and household 
income resilience, under different climate scenarios (baseline, mild drought, 
severe drought).
1. The BIOGENERATOR model developed by Action Contre la Faim (ACF) 
uses NDVI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index) and DMP (Dry Matter 
Productivity) data collected since 1998 from Spot 4 and 5 (Ham and Filliol 
2012). The model was used to estimate spatially referenced usable biomass 
(i.e., biomass that is edible by livestock) in the drylands.
2. The Global Livestock Environmental Assessment Model—GLEAM developed 
by Gerber et al. (2013) calculates at pixel and aggregate level: (1) crop 
byproducts and usable crop residues; (2) livestock rations for the different 
types of animals and production systems, assuming animal requirements are 
first met by high-value feed components (crop byproducts if given, and crop 
residues), and then by natural vegetation; (3) feed balances at pixel and 
aggregate level, assuming no mobility at pixel level and full mobility at graz-
ing shed level; and (4) Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emission intensity.
3. On the basis of the feed rations provided by GLEAM, the IMPACT model 
developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was 
used to calculate the production in drylands of meat and milk and to esti-
mate how production will affect overall supply of and demand for these 
products in the region. 
4. The CIRAD/MMAGE model consists of a set of functions for simulating 
dynamics and production of animal or human populations that are catego-
rized by sex and age class. It was used to calculate the sex/age distribution of 
the four main ruminant species (cattle, camels, sheep, and goats), the feed 
requirements in dry matter, and milk and meat production.
5. The ECO-RUM model developed by CIRAD under the umbrella of the 
African Livestock Platform (ALive) is an Excel-supported herd dynamics 
model based on the earlier ILRI/CIRAD DYNMOD. The ECO-RUM 
model was used to estimate the socioeconomic effects of changes in the 
technical parameters of the flock or herd (e.g., return on investments, 
income, and contribution to food security). The modeling exercise ben-
efitted from livestock distribution data contained in the Gridded 
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Livestock of the World (GLW) database (Wint and Robinson 2007) and 
its most recent update GLW 2.0 (Robinson et al. 2014). The analysis was 
informed as well by information and analysis produced by the FAO live-
stock supply/demand model (Robinson and Pozzi 2011). For details, see 
de Haan et al. (forthcoming).
The results of the models were used as inputs into the final step of the analy-
sis, namely the assessment of the number of households falling into each of 
three categories: (1) resilient, (2) vulnerable to shocks, and (3) likely to move of 
out of livestock-based livelihoods. These three groups were estimated based on 
their ownership of livestock, measured in terms of Tropical Livestock Units 
(TLU). The values of the thresholds used to classify households into one of the 
three categories were estimated using ECO-RUM, and the corresponding popu-
lation shares were calculated using a log-normal estimate of the TLU distribu-
tion, which approximates quite well (Figure A.2) actual TLU distributions 
emerging from survey data (SHIP database).
The share of household pt estimated to own less than a certain TLU threshold 
t is estimated as follows:
p_t= ∫_0^t▒f(τ,μ,σ)dτ 
Figure A.2 Burkina Faso: Cumulative distribution of cattle ownership
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where f (τ, μ, σ) is the lognormal probability distribution function; and the 
two parameters σ and μ are estimated as follows:
σ= √2  Φ^(-1) ((G+1)/2) 
where Φ-1 () is the inverse of the standard cumulative normal distribution; G 
is the Gini coefficient, calculated from SHIP survey data (Table A.3); and:
μ=ln▒▒ (t ▒ )▒-  σ^2/2 )
where t is the average number of TLU/household, calculated by dividing the 
estimate of the total TLU for the relevant country/production system by the 
corresponding estimated number of households. 
Details on the TLU estimates by country and livestock production systems are 
contained in the background paper on livestock prepared for this study (de Haan 
et al. 2014).
The critical TLU thresholds are as follows:
• Below 5 TLU per household: households are assumed to feel pressure to drop 
out of pastoralism.
• 5–19 TLU per household: households are assumed to continue as pastoral-
ists, but are expected to be vulnerable to drought and other shocks.
• Above 19 TLU per household: households are assumed to be resilient to 
drought and other shocks.
Table A.3 Gini coefficient of livestock ownership
Country Survey 
year
Income 
Gini
Livestock 
Gini
Notes
Burkina Faso 2003 39.60 52.07 Survey did not include medium-size livestock
Chad 2011 39.78 73.99 Source: Troisieme Enquete sur la Consommation 
et le Secteur Informel
Ethiopia 2011 33.60 55.42
Kenya 2005 47.68 78.13 Excluded TLU > 2,000 (considered outliers)
Mali 2010 33.02 57.81 Estimated based on Income Gini 
Mauritania 2008 40.46 66.49 Estimated based on Income Gini 
Niger 2007 43.89 67.26
Nigeria 2004 42.93 76.63 Excluded TLU > 1,500 (considered outliers)
Senegal 2005 39.19 76.05
Tanzania 2007 37.58 67.32 Survey did not include medium size livestock; 
excluded TLU >5,000 (outliers)
Uganda 2005 42.62 54.70 Calculation only includes medium-size livestock 
(figures on large-size livestock appear dubious)
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In addition to the Gini coefficient (which is assumed constant throughout 
the simulation, with the exception of parametric reductions used to simulate the 
effect of redistribution policies), the other key parameter that determines the 
number of households below or above the thresholds is the average number of 
TLU/household.
The average number of TLU/household is estimated by dividing the total num-
ber of TLU in the drylands by the total number of households. The numerator in 
this expression is the maximum number of TLU that the existing biomass can 
support (on average), estimated through feed balance and herd modeling, based 
on different levels of access to feed as determined by herd mobility, access to 
water, insecurity, and urban and crop expansion (further details are provided in 
de Haan et al. 2014). The denominator in the expression is the number of house-
holds estimated to be living in the drylands, based on population growth and 
projected economic transformation (as explained elsewhere in the book).
The effect of the livestock interventions on vulnerability (and thus indirectly 
on the number of drought-affected people) is captured by running the model 
with different values of the TLU resilience threshold (Table A.4), estimated 
through ECO-RUM herd modeling. Lower TLU thresholds imply that for a 
given distribution of livestock assets, more households will be above the thresh-
old, and fewer households will be below the threshold, compared to the Business 
as Usual/no intervention scenario.
Interventions that result in the improvement of animal health reduce the 
mortality rate and increase the number of animals that can be sold, thereby 
reducing the number of TLU needed to reach a certain level of income (in par-
ticular, the international poverty line of US$1.25/ day). Similarly, interventions 
that promote the sale of animals at a younger age for fattening in high rainfall 
areas increase the price received per animal and reduce overall mortality, simi-
larly reducing the number of TLU needed to reach a certain income level.
Resilience analysis for rainfed cropping systems
Similarly to the case of livestock, potential impacts on resilience of interventions 
targeting rainfed cropping systems are modeled. The analysis is carried out in 
two stages. In the first stage the objective is to estimate the potential impact of 
Table A.4 Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) required to attain resilience
Livestock 
system
Business as usual Health and early offtake
Baseline 
weather
Mild 
drought
Severe 
drought
Baseline 
weather
Mild 
drought
Severe 
drought
Pastoral 21.1 23.3 24.8 15.7 17.4 18.7
Agro-pastoral 12.9 14.2 15.3 7.4 8.3 8.5
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the adoption of best-bet crop farming technologies on the yields of crops grown 
by agro-pastoralist and crop farming households. In the second stage the objec-
tive is to estimate how these yield changes are likely to translate into income 
changes and how these income changes impact agro-pastoralist and crop farm-
ing households.
Modeling impacts of best-bet technologies on crop yields
The potential impact of the adoption of best-bet crop farming technologies on 
the yields of crops grown by agro-pastoralist and crop farming households is 
estimated using IFPRI’s grid-based crop modelling platform. Because it would 
have been impractical to model the full range of crops grown in the drylands, 
the analysis is carried out using the dominant cereal crop grown in any given 
location, identified with the help of IFPRI’s Spatial Production Allocation 
Model 2005 (You et al. 2015) in 2,294 grid cells distributed across 16 countries. 
The dominant rainfed crops are millet and sorghum in arid and dry semi-arid 
zones, and maize in wet, semi-arid, and dry subhumid zones. 
The crop yield simulations were carried out using three crop models that 
are part of the (Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer) 
DSSAT Cropping System Model v4.5 (CERES-Maize, CERES-Sorghum, and 
CERES-Millet). Yields were simulated at the level of each grid cell over a 
25-year period. Using the assumption that weather in the drylands during the 
next 25 years will not be significantly different from weather experienced dur-
ing the past 25 years, daily weather data 1984–2008 were used as input (Ruane, 
Goldberg, and Chryssanthacopoulos 2015). Soil properties in each grid cell 
were represented using IFPRI’s HC27 Generic Soil Profiles Database (Koo and 
Dimes 2013). Planting date windows for the three representative crops were 
synchronized with the cropping calendar of the ARV model (described 
below). A representative variety of each crop was selected and used across the 
region. Additional details on the modelling platform setup are available in 
Rosegrant et al. (2014).
Best-bet crop farming technologies
The DSSAT framework was used to assess the potential impact on yields likely 
to result from the adoption of five best-bet crop farming technologies: (1) 
drought-tolerant varieties, (2) heat-tolerant varieties, (3) additional fertilizer, 
(4) agroforestry practices, and (5) water harvesting techniques. The potential 
impact on yields was modeled separately for each technology, as well as for 
several combinations of technologies expected to have synergies (e.g., varieties 
with drought tolerance and heat tolerance, drought- or heat-tolerant varieties 
grown with additional fertilizer, and drought- or heat-tolerant varieties grown 
in combination with agroforestry). 
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1. Drought-tolerant varieties
To simulate the likely impacts of adoption of drought-tolerant varieties, 
which are known to have superior rooting ability in the presence of low levels 
of soil moisture, the model was adjusted by increasing the soil root growth fac-
tor parameter in each soil layer. Enhanced water extraction capability was also 
simulated by lowering the lower limit parameter in the soil profile. In the case 
of maize, the sensitivity was reduced by the anthesis-silking interval (ASI) to 
soil moisture content. 
2. Heat-tolerant varieties
The species characteristics definition for each of the three indicator crops 
includes parameters regarding the response of plant growth and grain filling 
rates to temperature. In the case of maize, for example, the CERES-Maize model 
defines the optimum and maximum temperatures for grain filling as 27°C and 
35°C, respectively. To mimic the ability of heat-tolerant varieties to continue 
growing and filling grain at higher temperatures, the values of these two param-
eters were increased by 2°C for the heat-tolerance simulations.
3. Additional fertilizer
The baseline, no-intervention scenario includes an inorganic nitrogen fertil-
izer application rate that is specific to each region, input system, and crop, 
which was obtained by calibration of simulated raw yields to FAOSTAT-
reported country-level yields. For the best-bet fertilizer intervention, the base-
line fertilizer application rate was increased by 50 percent.
4. Agroforestry
To simulate the improvements in soil fertility expected to result from 
decomposing leaves from faidherbia trees planted in the same field as the 
indicator crops, for each cropping cycle an additional input of organic soil 
amendments was implemented 10 days before planting. The trees were 
assumed to be 20 years old in year 1, so that the amount of organic matter 
contributed throughout the simulation period remains constant. Each tree is 
assumed to produce 100 kg of leaves, of which 4.3 percent is nitrogen. These 
values are taken from scientific studies in West Africa. Two tree density values 
were simulated (5 trees/ha and 10 trees/ha), to test the sensitivity of crop 
yields to tree density. Canopy coverage, which determines the area within 
each field that actually benefits from the decomposition of tree-contributed 
organic matter, is assumed to be 10 percent and 20 percent for tree densities 
of 5 trees/ha and 10 trees/ha, respectively. These densities have been observed 
in many locations in the semi-arid drylands where farmer-managed natural 
regeneration (FMNR) is practiced. It is useful to recall, however, that while 
faidherbia is distributed throughout the drylands of Africa, it will not emerge 
through regeneration in all locations. 
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5. Water harvesting
To simulate the potential effects of harvesting runoff and storing it in situ for 
use in supplementary irrigation, a two-stage approach was implemented. The 
model was first run without any water management practices, and the output 
was analyzed to identify periods during the growing season when yields are 
constrained by lack of water. These periods represent opportunities for imple-
menting improved water harvesting and supplementary irrigation practices. 
The simulation results were also used to determine when supplementary irriga-
tion can have the largest impact on yields (e.g., immediately after germination 
and before flowering), and also to estimate how much of the harvested water 
would be available from the in situ storage. The model was then run again 
including harvested runoff water in the form of supplementary irrigation.
Modeling impacts of crop yield gains on vulnerability
In the second stage of the analysis, the objective is to estimate how changes in 
the mean level and distribution of yields associated with adoption of the best-
bet technologies are likely to translate into income changes and how these 
income changes could impact agro-pastoralist and crop farming households. 
This analysis was carried out using the Africa RiskView (ARV) model devel-
oped by the African Risk Capacity.
The ARV model uses static drought vulnerability profiles of the population 
in each area unit to measure the impacts of drought under different scenarios. 
More precisely, the ARV model estimates the proportion of the population that 
is likely to be affected by drought in the presence of drought of different magni-
tudes. The frequency, intensity, and duration of drought is measured in terms 
of deviations of a rainfall-based drought index (WRSI) below a defined bench-
mark multiplied by a scaling factor that translates negative WRSI deviations 
into potential household income deviations. 
Noteworthy features of the ARV model include the following: 
• Three different threshold WRSI deviations allow the definition of three lev-
els of vulnerability: (1) vulnerability to mild drought, (2) vulnerability to 
medium drought, and (3) vulnerability to severe drought. For each analysis 
unit, the overall vulnerability profile is calculated based on the percentages 
of the population vulnerable to each of the three levels of droughts.
• The scaling factor used determines the impact of WRSI deviation on crop 
yields, which in turn translates into impacts on agricultural income of 
households. 
• The vulnerability profiles are defined based on household survey data, which 
reveal the extent to which households in a specific area unit are both (1) 
exposed to drought (defined by their percentage of total income generated 
by agriculture-related activities) and (2) able (or not) to absorb and recover 
206  CONFRONTING DROUGHT IN AFRICA’S DRYLANDS 
from income shocks (defined by their ranking on a wealth scale compared 
to the national poverty rate). 
Using the outputs of the DSSAT crop modeling simulations (described in the 
previous section) as an input instead of WRSI, the ARV model can simulate the 
impact of drought without and with the best-bet technologies. To avoid poten-
tial distortions associated with using yield estimates instead of WRSI values, it 
is assumed that the differences in crop yields attributable to adoption of the 
best-bet technologies translate into equivalent difference in agricultural income 
(in the ARV model, this is tantamount to setting the scaling factor to a value of 
1:1). The threshold deviations from WRSI that define mild, medium, and severe 
drought are therefore adjusted accordingly for the use of DSSAT-based input 
data.
Specific vulnerability profiles at Admin1 level (the first level of sub-national 
jurisdiction) are created for 2010 and 2030. The 2030 profiles are based on a 
number of assumptions about demographic increases, economic growth, and 
structural transformation (described above) that determine how the number of 
people below the poverty line and the percentage of people employed in agri-
culture will change by 2030. Within each Admin 1 level unit (i.e., the first sub-
national level of administrative jurisdiction), the vulnerability profiles can be 
broken down further by aridity zone. Vulnerability profiles for 2010 and 2030 
under the medium fertility scenario are available for the majority of East and 
West African countries. As an example, Table A.5 shows for Mauritania the 
vulnerability profiles for 2010 and 2030 for the three drought cases.
Table A.5 Mauritania: Drought Vulnerability Profile for mild, medium, and severe drought 
(population, millions)
Region Aridity Mild drought Moderate drought Severe drought
2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030
Assaba Arid 0.101 0.141 0.122 0.170 0.140 0.196
Brakna Arid 0.094 0.132 0.113 0.159 0.131 0.183
Gorgol Arid 0.095 0.134 0.115 0.161 0.133 0.186
Gorgol Dry semi-arid 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Guidimaka Arid 0.031 0.044 0.038 0.053 0.044 0.061
Guidimaka Dry semi-arid 0.043 0.060 0.052 0.073 0.060 0.084
Hodh Ech Chargui Arid 0.115 0.161 0.139 0.195 0.160 0.224
Hodh El Gharbi Arid 0.087 0.123 0.106 0.148 0.122 0.171
Tagant Arid 0.021 0.029 0.025 0.035 0.029 0.041
Trarza Arid 0.092 0.129 0.111 0.155 0.128 0.179
Total 0.680 0.953 0.821 1.150 0.947 1.327
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The definition of mild, medium, and severe drought is kept the same in both 
the 2010 and 2030 profiles. Furthermore, since the poverty line of US$1.25/day 
is used in both the 2010 and 2030 vulnerability profile definitions, a comparison 
of these two baseline profiles (BAU) gives an indication of how economic 
growth and structural transformation are likely to impact the proportion of the 
population vulnerable to drought as defined by the ARV model. For example, 
in Mauritania, even though the share of the poor in total population is projected 
to decline, the absolute number of people vulnerable to drought will actually 
increase by some 40 percent.
It is important to note that the definitions of drought associated with the 
vulnerability profiles—mild, medium, and severe—are not linked to return 
periods of drought, nor necessarily to the risk of drought occurring in a particu-
lar Admin 1 unit. Rather, the terms are related to levels of household income 
loss resulting from drought events. For this reason, adoption in an Admin 1 
level unit of one of the best-bet crop farming technologies does not change the 
vulnerability profile prevailing in that unit. Rather, the changes in the mean 
level and distribution of crop yields registered in that unit following the adop-
tion of the technology affects the impact on incomes of a mild, medium, or severe 
drought, and therefore affects the probability of hitting the drought-specific 
threshold. To capture the impact in 2030 of adopting one or more of the best-bet 
technologies, it is necessary to maintain the definition of drought in the model 
(in terms of the benchmark and thresholds) and then to calculate the changes 
in expected number of people affected by drought, given likely yield projections 
for the various intervention and non-intervention scenarios.
For example, consider first the non-intervention scenarios and the medium 
fertility scenario. Assume that the rainfall and the resulting crop yields that can 
occur in an area in 2010 and 2030 come from the same distribution, that is, that 
there is no change in climate. The DSSAT model can be used to generate yields 
for 25 years for each Admin 1 level/aridity zone unit. Assume these 25 values 
represent a sample from a yield distribution for both 2010 and 2030. These 25 
yield values can be imposed on the 2010 and 2030 vulnerability profiles to esti-
mate possible drought-affected populations in those scenarios. Figure A.3 
shows the estimated number of drought-affected people in Mauritania using the 
25 yield values.1 
To estimate the impacts of the best-bet crop farming technologies on vulner-
able populations, the DSSAT model was used to simulate how the various tech-
nologies impact the mean level and distribution of yields. Distributions of the 
drought-affected population estimated using the yield values from the 25 simu-
lation years for each best-bet technology can be compared to distributions of 
drought-affected populations estimated under the baseline scenario in which 
yields do not benefit from the adoption of any of the best-bet technologies. The 
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differences show the impact of each technology on the drought affected popula-
tion, or in other words, on household resilience.
Figure A.3 shows, again for the case of Mauritania, the effects of adopting 
one of the best-bet interventions considered in the analysis (specifically, the 
adoption of a crop variety that is both drought-tolerant and heat-tolerant). 
Compared to the 2030 no-intervention scenario (BAU), the number of drought-
affected people declines in many years; in some years, the result is only to slow 
down the increase in the number of drought-affected people, while in other 
years the number of drought-affected people actually falls below the 2010 base-
line. Overall, adopting the drought- and heat-tolerant variety leads to an 11 
percent decrease in the number of drought-affected people. This example shows 
the benefit of a single intervention adopted in all polygons where it is effective. 
In the model, benefits are maximized when the entire set of interventions is 
considered, and in each polygon the intervention is selected that yields the larg-
est reduction in the number of drought-affected people. The results presented 
in the main text of the book are based on the latter approach.
Irrigation resilience analysis
The final intervention modeled is irrigation development. The assessment of the 
potential impacts of irrigation development on the population living in 
Figure A.3 ARV estimates of drought-affected people in Mauritania expected for each of 
25 simulated yield years
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drylands builds on the same drought characterization method used for the 
analysis of impacts of interventions in rainfed cropping systems (see the pre-
vious appendix section, Resilience analysis for rainfed cropping systems), 
combined with work done by IFPRI on irrigation investment potential in 
African drylands (Xie et al. 2015). In the IFPRI work, the potential for 
expanding large-scale irrigation (LSI) and small-scale irrigation (SSI) in dry-
land areas of Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030 are modeled separately. (See Box 
A.1 for details on the SSI modeling exercise.)
It is important to note that the area identified as having irrigation investment 
potential should be interpreted as “physical area equipped with irrigation infra-
structure,” since the water balance figures used to make the projections are long-
term averages. In drought years when water becomes scarce, irrigation can not 
be delivered everywhere, leaving part of the area equipped with irrigation infra-
structure unused. This becomes important in the latter stages of the analysis, 
when the impacts of irrigation on drought-affected people are estimated in the 
face of weather variability and climate change.
The impact of irrigation development on reducing vulnerability and increas-
ing resilience in the drylands was assessed using a two-step procedure. The first 
step involved estimating the area that is actually irrigated, taking into account 
climatic variability. The second step was to estimate, based on the results of the 
first step, the population that can be considered no longer affected by drought 
for each Admin 1 level/aridity zone unit. 
The key steps and assumptions used in the analysis are shown below:
SSI can use either surface water or groundwater. Groundwater acts as a buf-
fer against the impact of drought. The abundance of groundwater storage and 
accessibility to groundwater in African drylands is evaluated through geo-
graphic information system (GIS) analysis using groundwater depth and stor-
age data developed by British Geological Survey (Table A.6).
Table A.6 Aquifer classification in British Geological Survey groundwater data
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Depth to groundwater 
(m) 0-7 7-25 25-50 50-100 100-250 >250
Groundwater storage 
(mm) 0 <1,000
1,000-
10,000
10,000-
25,000
25,000-
50,000 >50,000
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BOX A.1
Estimating the expansion potential for small-scale 
irrigation (SSI)
The method used to assess SSI development potential begins with an irrigation 
suitability analysis. Within each pixel, various criteria are used to score the envi-
ronmental suitability of each pixel, including topography (slope), groundwater 
accessibility, distance to perennial surface water, proximity to existing irrigation, 
and market access. 
For the ex-ante suitability analysis, the criteria parameters are divided into 
three classes, and linear interpolation is used within the classes to calculate the 
scores. Such a classification is similar to a stepwise function, which provides 
flexibility to adjust the threshold values after consulting with experts and stake-
holders. The overall rating of the irrigation suitability is the average of all scores 
for all applicable criteria. Since groundwater and surface water provide the 
same water resource to irrigation, overall suitability is calculated as the larger of 
the two scores. In other words: 
S=(S1+max⁡⁡(S2,S3)+S4+S5⁡)/4
where: S = irrigation suitability score, S1 = score for slope, S2 = score for surface 
water access, S3 = score for ground water access, S4 = score for ground distance 
to existing LSI, and S5 = score for market access. 
The ex-ante suitability analysis is done on a 0.5 x 0.5 km grid. The suitability 
score is then used as a percent of the pixel suitable for irrigation. In other 
words, the area with SSI development potential in a pixel is calculated as:
A_(irr,exante)=A_pixel×S/100
where: Airr,exante = area suitable for irrigation development (ha), and Apixel  = pixel size 
(=25 ha).
Next, the expansion of SSI is simulated. The starting point for the analysis is 
the current cropping pattern. Data on area harvested, production, and yield 
under irrigated and rainfed systems on a grid of approximately 10 x 10 km 
were obtained from the IFPRI Spatial Production Allocation Model (SPAM) data-
base (for details, see You, Wood, and Wood-Sichra 2009). Prior to the simula-
tion, the results of the ex-ante suitability analysis were incorporated into the 
SPAM grid. The suitability score for each SPAM pixel was calculated as the aver-
age of the pixels in the coarser grid used for the suitability analysis, and the 
total area within each SPAM pixel deemed suitable for irrigation was calculated 
as the sum of the areas within the pixels used for the suitability analysis. 
To account for the expansion in cultivated area and changes in cropping 
patterns that may be caused by irrigation development, the following key 
assumptions were made: 
(continued next page)
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• Irrigation can occur during both the wet and dry seasons (both seasons are 
recognized in the analysis). Based on empirical evidence from past studies (Xie 
et al. 2014), the following 10 crops can be irrigated during the rainy season: 
(1) wheat, (2) rice, (3) maize, (4) sorghum, (5) millet, (6) potatoes, (7) sweet 
potatoes, (8) groundnuts, (9) sugarcane, and (10) vegetables. Wheat, maize, 
rice, and vegetables are assumed to be the dry-season irrigated crops. 
• During the irrigation expansion, (1) the currently existing rainfed cultivated 
area in a country will first be converted to irrigated area before new area is 
brought into cultivation/irrigation; (2) irrigation will expand according to the 
overall rating of the irrigation suitability, that is, irrigation development first 
takes place in the pixels with the highest suitability scores and is followed by 
development in pixels with the second highest ranking; and (3) irrigation 
expansion is constrained by water availability and national-level food demand 
for irrigated crops. 
The detailed simulation algorithm is described in Xie et al. (2015). It is 
assumed that the area cultivated for a given crop c (    ) on irrigated land, either 
converted from existing rainfed land or expanded from non-farming area, is 
proportional to the profitability of cultivating that crop.
A_c^i=A_total×⁡profit⁡_c/(∑_c⁡⁡profit⁡_c ) 
where: Atotal = total irrigated area (ha), profitc = annual profit farmers receive 
from cultivating crop c ($/ha), 
Profit is calculated as follows:
⁡Profit⁡_c=Y_c^i∙P_c∙⁡ProfitRatio⁡_c
where:     = yield of crop under irrigation (ton/ha), derived from FAO’s Global 
Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database (http://www.fao.org/nr/gaez/en/) 
under an assumption that the irrigated yields would be 50 percent of the GAEZ 
potential yields for the 2050 analysis; for 2030 it is assumed that 80 percent of 
the 2050 yields can be achieved; Pc = producer price of crop c ($/ton), derived 
from the FAO PriceSTAT database, ProfitRatioc  = profit margin (0 ~1) of crop c 
(Appendix Table 1.3). 
To calculate IRR, first annual net revenues from the irrigation expansion are 
calculated without taking into consideration irrigation costs. 
The net revenue in the rainy season on converted rainfed land in a SPAM 
pixel ($/yr) is calculated as:
⁡NetRevenue⁡_wet=∑_c⁡⁡Y_c^i∙P_c∙⁡ProfitRatio⁡_c∙A_c^i ⁡-∑_c⁡⁡Y_
c^r∙P_c∙⁡ProfitRatio⁡_c ⁡∙A_c^r  
where:     = rainfed yield of crop c (ton/ha) and     = rainfed area of crop c in the 
pixel (ha).
Box A.1 (continued)
(continued next page)
pt = ∫   f (τ,μ,σ)dτ 
σ =  
S =  
A
irr,exante
A
totalAi
Profi c
NetRevenue
wet
ProfitRatioc
c
Aic
Y i P c• •c
ProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c
A
pixel
=
=
=
=
x
S1 + max (S2,S3) + S4 + S5
4
σ2 
2
μ = ln  -
-
2 2
G+1(
(t) )
)Φ√
_
t
0
-1
S
100
x
profitc
profitcΣc
Σc
NetRevenue
wet AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c= Σc
NetRevenue
dry AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• •
•
•c=
NetRevenue_per_ha
Ai
I if = Y Yi otherwise I=0;>
Y Yibenchmark
benchmark
Y benchmark
AO e
αI
NetRevenue_per_ha
Popi Ai 10 η= x x
Bt IRR Costc CtAt* **
NetRevenue
wet
NetRevenue
dry=
=
=
+
-
-
-
-- IRR COSTO-
Σc
A icΣc
ArcProfitRatiocY 
r P c• • •cΣc
pt = ∫   f (τ,μ,σ)dτ 
σ =  
S =  
A
irr,exante
A
totalAi
Profitc
NetRevenue
wet
ProfitRatioc
c
Aic
Y i P c• •c
ProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c
A
pixel
=
=
=
=
x
S1 + max (S2,S3) + S4 + S5
4
σ2 
2
μ = ln  -
-
2 2
G+1(
(t) )
)Φ√
_
t
0
-1
S
100
x
profitc
profitcΣc
Σc
NetRevenue
wet AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c= Σc
NetRevenue
dry AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• •
•
•c=
NetRevenue_per_ha
Ai
I if = Y Yi otherwise I=0;>
Y Yibenchmark
benchmark
Y benchmark
AO e
αI
N tRevenue_p r_ha
Popi Ai 10 η= x x
Bt IRR Costc CtAt* **
NetRevenue
wet
NetRevenue
dry=
=
=
+
-
-
-
-- IRR COSTO-
Σc
A icΣc
ArcProfitRatiocY 
r P c• • •cΣc
pt = ∫  f (τ,μ,σ)dτ 
σ =  
S =  
A
irr,exante
A
totalAi
Profitc
et evenue
wet
ProfitRatioc
c
i
c
Y i P c• •c
rofit atioc 
i  c• • •c
A
pixel
=
=
=
x
S1 + max (S2,S3) + S4 + S5
4
σ2 
2
μ = ln  -
-
2 2
G+1(
(t) )
)Φ√
_
t
0
-1
S
100
x
profitc
profitcΣc
c
et evenue
wet
i
crofit atiocY 
i  c• • •cc
NetRevenue
dry AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• •
•
•c=
NetRevenue_per_ha
Ai
I if = Y Yi otherwise I=0;>
Y Yibenchmark
benchmark
Y benchmark
AO e
αI
NetRevenue_per_ha
Popi Ai 10 η= x x
Bt IRR Costc CtAt* **
NetRevenue
wet
NetRevenue
dry=
=
=
+
-
-
-
-- IRR COSTO-
Σc
A icΣc
ArcProfitRatiocY 
r P c• • •cΣc
pt = ∫   f (τ,μ,σ)dτ 
σ =  
S =  
A
irr,exante
A
totalAi
Profitc
NetRevenue
wet
ProfitRatioc
c
Aic
Y i P c• •c
ProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c
A
pixel
=
=
=
=
x
S1 + max (S2,S3) + S4 + S5
4
σ2 
2
μ = ln  -
-
2 2
G+1(
(t) )
)Φ√
_
t
0
-1
S
100
x
profitc
profitcΣc
Σc
NetRevenue
wet AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c= Σc
NetRevenue
dry AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• •
•
•c=
NetRevenue_per_ha
Ai
I if = Y Yi otherwise I=0;>
Y Yibenchmark
benchmark
Y benchmark
AO e
αI
NetRevenue_per_ha
Popi Ai 10 η= x x
Bt IRR Costc CtAt* **
NetRevenue
wet
NetRevenue
dry=
=
=
+
-
-
-
-- IRR COSTO-
Σc
A icΣc
ArcProfitRatiocY 
r P c• • •cΣc
pt = ∫   f (τ,μ,σ)dτ 
σ =  
S =  
A
irr,exante
A
totalAi
Profitc
NetRevenue
wet
ProfitRatioc
c
Aic
Y i P c• •c
ProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c
A
pixel
=
=
=
=
x
S1 + max (S2,S3) + S4 + S5
4
σ2 
2
μ = ln  -
-
2 2
G+1(
(t) )
)Φ√
_
t
0
-1
S
100
x
profitc
profitcΣc
Σc
NetRevenue
wet AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c= Σc
NetRev nu
dry AicProfitRati cY 
i P c• •
•
•c=
NetR venu _p r_ha
Ai
I if = Y Yi otherwise I=0;>
Y Yibenchmark
benchmark
Y benchmark
AO e
αI
NetRevenue_per_ha
Popi Ai 10 η= x x
Bt IRR Costc CtAt* **
NetRevenue
wet
NetRevenue
dry=
=
=
+
-
-
-
-- IRR COSTO-
Σc
A icΣc
ArcProfitRatiocY 
r P c• • •cΣc
pt = ∫   f (τ,μ,σ)dτ 
σ =  
S =  
A
irr,exante
A
totalAi
Profitc
NetRevenue
wet
ProfitRatioc
c
Aic
Y i P c• •c
ProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c
A
pixel
=
=
=
=
x
S1 + max (S2,S3) + S4 + S5
4
σ2 
2
μ = ln  -
-
2 2
G+1(
(t) )
)Φ√
_
t
0
-1
S
100
x
profitc
profitcΣc
Σc
NetRevenue
wet AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c= Σc
NetRevenue
dry AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• •
•
•c=
NetRevenue_per_ha
Ai
I if = Y Yi otherwise I=0;>
Y Yibenchmark
benchmark
Y benchmark
AO e
αI
NetRevenue_per_ha
Popi Ai 10 η= x x
Bt IRR Costc CtAt* **
NetRevenue
wet
NetRevenue
dry=
=
=
+
-
-
-
-- IRR COSTO-
Σc
A icΣc
ArcProfitRatiocY
r P c• • •cΣc
pt = ∫   f (τ,μ,σ)dτ 
σ =  
S =  
A
irr,exante
A
totalAi
Profitc
NetRevenue
wet
ProfitRatioc
c
Aic
Y i P c• •c
ProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c
A
pixel
=
=
=
=
x
S1 + max (S2,S3) + S4 + S5
4
σ2 
2
μ = ln  -
-
2 2
G+1(
(t) )
)Φ√
_
t
0
-1
S
100
x
profitc
profitcΣc
Σc
NetRevenue
wet AicProfitRatiocY 
i P c• • •c= Σc
NetRevenue
dry AicProfitRatioY 
i P c• •
•
•c=
NetRevenue_p r_ha
Ai
I if = Y Yi otherwise I=0;>
Y Yibenchmark
benchmark
Y benchmark
AO e
αI
NetRevenue_per_ha
Popi Ai 10 η= x x
Bt IR Costc CtAt* **
NetRevenue
wet
NetRevenue
dry=
=
=
+
-
-
-
-- IRR COSTO-
Σc
A icΣc
ArcPr fitRatiocY 
r P c• • •cΣc
212  CONFRONTING DROUGHT IN AFRICA’S DRYLANDS 
It is assumed that SSI in areas with groundwater depth below 25 m and stor-
age greater than 10,000 mm is primarily groundwater-based and not influenced 
by drought.
The variation of actual area under surface water-based SSI and LSI is mod-
eled as a function of the drought index I.
A_i=▒A_0∙e▒^(-αI)
where Ai is actual area of irrigation in year i; AO is physical area equipped 
with irrigation; I is the drought index. Its value may vary between 0 and 1. Ai = 
AO if I= 0; and in a drought year, I > 0 and Ai < A0, α is a parameter controlling 
the contraction rate of irrigation area under drought. The higher the value of α, 
the larger the reduction in irrigation area in drought years.
The drought index is calculated as follows:
I=(Y_(benchmark)- Y_i)/Y_(benchmark)  if I=Y_(benchmark)>Y_i; otherwise I=0
where:
Ybenchmark is the benchmark yield defined in the ARV model, and Yi is the crop 
yield in a given year t. Given that large reservoirs likely have multi-year storage 
capacity, LSI tends to be more resilient to drought than surface-water-based SSI. 
The net revenue in the rainy season on newly cultivated, irrigated land in a 
SPAM pixel ($/yr) is calculated as:
⁡NetRevenue⁡_wet=∑_c⁡⁡Y_c^i∙P_c∙⁡ProfitRatio⁡_c∙A_c^i ⁡  
The net revenue on converted rainfed land or newly cultivated irrigated land 
in dry season is calculated as:
⁡NetRevenue⁡_dry=∑_c⁡⁡Y_c^i∙P_c∙⁡ProfitRatio⁡_c∙A_c^i ⁡ 
The net revenue per unit area (without consideration of irrigation costs) is 
calculated as:
NetRevenue_per_ha =(⁡NetRevenue⁡_wet+⁡NetRevenue⁡_dry)/(∑_c⁡A_c^i )
With the calculated net revenue per unit area, the cash flow in year t 
required for the IRR calculation is calculated as:
 NetRevenue_per_ha ⁡ ⁡⁡ − ⁡⁡ ⁡ Irr_⁡⁡⁡⁡c ⁡ ⁡⁡− Irr_costo 
where: IRR_Costc ($/ha) = the capital investment cost for SSI expansion,  
IRR_Costc = SSI operating costs ($/ha-yr). The calculation assumes a five-year 
investment cycle and a 50-year investment horizon. 
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Therefore, a smaller value of α is specified for LSI in the simulation. α is set to 
0.5 for LSI and 1.0 for SSI.
The simulation of “actual” LSI and SSI irrigated areas is conducted at 5-arc 
minute resolution (approximately 10km by 10km). The calculated pixel-wise 
values of “actual” areas of irrigation are aggregated to the Admin 1 level/aridity 
zone unit. The number of poor people in each unit is calculated under the 
assumption that “0.5 hectares of irrigated land supports one household (HH) 
comprising 5 people” and accordingly vulnerability shares are developed from 
the ARV model as:
▒Pop▒_i=A_i×10×η
where Popi is population in a unit and in year i is rendered resilient to drought 
through irrigation, Ai is actual area of irrigation in the unit, and year i, η is the 
vulnerability share of population obtained from the ARV model. A key assump-
tion underlying the analysis is that where there is potential for irrigation devel-
opment, vulnerable people will be able to take advantage of the opportunity and 
equip their farm with SSI equipment, regardless of their income level. In other 
words, the ability to take advantage of opportunities to invest in irrigation is 
assumed to be the same for every household located in areas with irrigation 
development potential, irrespective of their income level.
Consolidating the results of the resilience analysis
Estimated reductions in the numbers of drought-affected people likely to result 
from interventions in livestock systems and rainfed cropping systems, as well as 
from investments in irrigation, are consolidated in a set of figures presented in 
the book. 
Key elements of the consolidation process include the following:
• The livestock model was used to generate estimates of the number of vul-
nerable people (without and with the interventions) in hyper-arid and arid 
zones only (aridity classes 1 to 3, see Figure A.4), using the model’s param-
eters for pastoral livelihoods.
• Results expressed in terms of number of households were converted into 
numbers of people by assuming an average household size of six people.
• The number of drought-affected people was estimated applying country-
specific drought incidence factors (average number of drought-affected peo-
ple as percentage of vulnerable people) obtained from the crop model. This 
is justified on account of the likely significant correlation between drought 
impacts on the staple crops modeled (maize, millet, sorghum) and impacts 
on the grasses found in rangelands.
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• The livestock model estimates of the number of households below the critical 
threshold of 5 TLU/household (Figure A.4) were used to calculate the number 
of people who are likely to transition from pastoralism to farming; these 
households were then added to the number of vulnerable people engaged in 
crop farming. Country-level estimates of the number of people who are likely 
to transition from pastoralism to farming were distributed across the country’s 
polygons (intersection of administrative units and aridity zones) using each 
polygon’s share in the country’s total number of vulnerable people.
• The number of drought-affected people engaged in crop farming in aridity 
classes 4 to 6 (including both the original crop farmers as well as the people 
who are likely to transition from pastoralism to farming) was estimated 
using the crop model.
The approach used in this book does not consider the significant scope for 
implementing livestock-related interventions in agro-pastoral systems found in 
semi-arid and dry subhumid zones. For this reason, while the modeling results 
indicate the order of magnitude of the likely resilience benefits of the different 
interventions, they represent conservative lower bound estimates of the full 
potential. 
Cost estimates
Livestock
Cost estimates for the analysis of livestock systems are based on cost projections 
from five recently launched internationally funded projects dealing with pasto-
ral areas.2 These data were complemented with data obtained through a review 
of the literature. Table A.7 provides a summary of the cost per pastoral/agro-
pastoral person associated with these projects. 
Figure A.4 Schematic of livelihood modeling
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Crop model
Livestock model applying coefcients from crop model
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The range of values is significant, particularly for health improvement. 
However, the average is in line with the estimates of the World Organisation for 
Animal Health (OIE)-sponsored study (CIVIC Consulting 2007) for Uganda.
For development decision making, it is important to know the distribution 
between technology adoption-related and non-adoption-related costs, as well as 
between investment and recurrent costs. The assumptions used are based on the 
projects analyzed and the authors’ experience; they are provided in Table A.8.
In aggregate, these figures seem high, at a total of about US$10 billion over 
the 20-year period (Table A.9) or about US$500 million/year (about US$200 
million/year for the public sector.
They look more reasonable when calculated per beneficiary (number of 
people made resilient), as shown in Figure A.5. 
Table A.7 Average cost/person/year (weighted according to number of beneficiaries) of 
the main interventions in five dryland livestock development projects
Intervention Average cost/person/year (US$)
Number  
of projects
Range  
(US$)
Health improvement 3.95 3 3.37-20.12
Market improvement  
(early offtake of bulls) 6.00 3 3.67-8.33
Early warning systems 3.72 2 1.79-2.09
Social services, etc. 5.30 2 2.39-5.82
Table A.8 Assumptions about the allocation of adoption- and non-adoption-related costs 
and of investments and recurrent costs for animal health and early offtake interventions
Item Allocation
Animal health non-adoption-related Of total health improvement budget, 20% in investments and 25% in recurrent costs 
Animal health adoption-related Of total health improvement budget, 25% in investment and 30% in recurrent costs
Animal health improvement adoption-
related by livestock system 10% higher/person (higher delivery costs) in pastoral systems
Early offtake (market integration) 
Of total budget, 70% in investment and 30% in recurrent costs 
(high capital investment needed in infrastructure such as transport, 
processing facilities)
Early offtake non-adoption-related 
costs Nil, because of its currently nascent character
Adoption rate 70% for pastoral and 80% for agro-pastoral households for health improvement and 60% and 70%, respectively, for early offtake 
Public and private sector contribution
Public sector: 80% for cross-cutting costs, 60% for adoption costs 
in animal health improvement, and 20% for early offtake; the 
remainder belongs in the private sector 
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Figure A.5 shows that with the exception of Niger, the costs per person made 
resilient are significantly below the US$100–135 normally calculated for food 
aid. As expected, the annual cost per person made resilient is higher in pastoral 
areas. In general, the costs in East Africa seem to be lower than in the Sahel. At 
an average cost of US$27 per person per year, they are half the US$65 per per-
son per year estimated by Venton, Fitzgibbon, and Shitarel (2013).3
Rainfed crops
The cost of adopting the rainfed cropping technologies includes public costs 
borne by the public sector during an initial period when a technology is first 
being introduced (e.g., costs associated with extension campaigns, demonstra-
tions, free samples; see Table A.10 ), as well as private costs borne by the adopt-
ing farmers themselves (e.g., the cost of purchasing seed or fertilizer, or the cost 
of performing additional operations such as planting fertilizer trees or building 
water harvesting structures). 
Table A.9 Summary of costs (2011–14 prices, US$ billion) of health and early offtake 
interventions and their distribution between the public and private sectors (2011–30)
 Cross-cutting  costs
Adoption costs 
animal health
Early offtake 
costs Total
Public sector 1.14 1.69 1.18 4.01
Private sector 0.29 1.13 4.71 6.12
Total 1.43 2.82 5.88 10.14
Figure A.5 Estimated unit cost (US$/person made resilient/year, expressed on a log scale) 
under baseline climate and health and early offtake scenarios
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Private costs (i.e., costs borne by farmers themselves) were included in the 
analysis by adjusting downward the yield gain associated with adoption of the 
technology by a discount factor estimated to represent the cost of adopting the 
technology. To reflect the fact that farm households will use part of their income 
to purchase the inputs required for adopting the technology (e.g., labor, seed, 
fertilizer), costs were expressed in terms of the crop equivalent of purchasing 
the required inputs, with production valued at country- and crop-specific farm-
gate prices calculated as averages of the corresponding FAOSTAT values over 
the period 2000–12.
The cost (estimated on the basis of the literature and expert judgment) varied 
by technology (Table A.11). In some cases it was modest (e.g., adoption of 
drought-tolerant and heat-tolerant varieties, adoption of FMNR), whereas in 
other cases it was more substantial (e.g., additional fertilizer, water harvesting). 
In recognition that technology adoption costs may be borne by the farmer or by 
the state (in the form of subsidies), sensitivity analysis was carried out to explore 
the impacts on adoption incentives of differing levels of private costs. 
To reflect the fact that the best-bet crop farming technologies will not all be 
profitable in every location, a switch was built into the model to determine 
which technology is adopted in any given polygon. The switch works as follows: 
if adoption of a given best-bet technology has the effect of reducing the number 
of drought-affected people, that technology is deemed effective and retained, 
Table A.10 Public costs of technology transfer (US$/hectare)
Description Millet Sorghum Maize
1: Drought tolerance 1.25 1.35 1.50
2: Heat tolerance 1.25 1.35 1.50
3: More fertilizer 10.00 10.00 10.00
4_5: Agroforestry 5 trees/ha 45.00 45.00 45.00
4_10: Agroforestry 10 trees/ha 45.00 45.00 45.00
5: Water harvesting 20.00 20.00 20.00
Table A.11 Private costs of technology adoption (US$/ hectare)
Description Millet Sorghum Maize
1: Drought tolerance 3 3 15
2: Heat tolerance 3 3 15
3: More fertilizer 30 30 30
4_5: Agroforestry 5 trees/ha 7 7 7
4_10: Agroforestry 10 trees/ha 9 9 9
5: Water harvesting 45 45 45
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but if adoption of that technology has the effect of increasing the number of 
drought-affected people, the technology is deemed ineffective and discarded.
In addition, because synergies resulting from the simultaneous adoption of 
multiple best-bet technologies are not captured well by the DSSAT model, the 
analysis used the simplifying assumption that only the most effective technol-
ogy is adopted in a given location. Because simultaneous adoption of multiple 
technologies would certainly result in additional benefits (in terms of yield 
increases and income gains), the resilience-enhancing impacts of adoption of 
improved rain-fed cropping technologies should be considered conservative.
Irrigation
Given the considerable uncertainty and wide range of irrigation technology and 
expansion costs, three sets of cost assumptions were considered in the analysis 
of irrigation development, ranging from US$8,000–US$30,000 per ha for LSI, 
and from US$3,000–US$6,000 per ha for SSI (Table A.12). The medium-cost 
assumptions were used for the baseline scenario.
Notes
1.  The national population affected is the sum of the populations affected in each 
Admin 1/aridity zone.
2.  The Ethiopia-Drought Resilience & Sustainable Livelihood Program in the Horn of 
Africa (PHASE I), funded by the African Development Bank (US$48.5 million, 
2012); the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)- and World 
Bank-funded Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project for Kenya and 
Uganda (US$132 million, 2014); the World Bank-funded Regional Sahel Pastoralism 
Support Project (US$250 million, under preparation); the World Bank/IFAD-
funded Ethiopia Pastoral Community Development Project–Phase II (US$133 mil-
lion, 2013); and the IFAD-funded Sudan Livestock Marketing and Resilience 
Program (US$119 million under preparation).
3.  US$54/person/year for Kenya and US$77/person/year for Ethiopia. No data are 
available for the Sahel.
Table A.12 Irrigation development unit cost assumptions (US$/ha)
Low Medium High
Capital Operation and maintenance Capital
Operation and 
maintenance Capital
Operation and 
maintenance
LSI 8,000 800 12,000 1,200 30,000 3,000
SSI 3,000 100 4,500 125 6,000 150
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“Drylands represent the front line in the battle for poverty eradication and resource conservation in Af-
rica. While we know that millions of people in drylands are exposed to the threat of land degradation 
and periodically fall victim to droughts and other shocks, actions to address these challenges have been 
fragmented, too many times prompted only by humanitarian crises, and in the end largely inadequate. 
This book provides a solid, evidence-based assessment of the potential for the many interventions that 
can improve crop and livestock production and allow better stewardship of natural resources, thereby 
significantly lowering the numbers of people exposed to risk. The analysis is sound, and it will help to 
provide empirical content to the debate about solutions, which up until now has all too often been based 
on anecdotal evidence. The book’s overall message is clear: unless we move quickly to step up actions for 
enhanced governance, land tenure and integrated ecosystem management, African drylands will soon 
face unmanageable challenges.”
 
Inger Andersen, Director-General, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
 
 
“It is well known that a major obstacle to Africa’s development is its vulnerability to climate related 
shocks, which are expected to become more frequent and more severe with climate change. Droughts, 
in particular, claim lives, dissipate household assets and savings, and drain governments’ budgets and 
international development assistance. This book provides a sound assessment of the ability of different 
interventions to make rural livelihoods more resilient to droughts, generating quantitative, location 
specific estimates that will be very helpful in informing policies. It shows that millions of people can 
become more resilient through better programs and projects in agriculture, natural resources manage-
ment and social protection. But risks cannot be eliminated altogether, and the book clearly points to the 
importance to develop complementary policies to mitigate them, through instruments for risk-pooling 
and management, and through programs for livelihoods diversification. I am glad that the African Risk 
Capacity, a new African instrument to enhance resilience, was able to contribute to this valuable and 
innovative study.”
 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Chairperson, Governing Board of African Risk Capacity (ARC)
“Keeping of livestock, the traditional livelihood source for 40 million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists 
in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, is increasingly threatened by intensifying weather-related shocks, 
proliferating civil conflict, and rising criminality. This important new book offers decision makers and 
the international donor community a number of options to seize the opportunity for increasing live-
stock productivity and production in drylands. It comprehensively analyzes present and future chal-
lenges to drylands livestock systems, estimates the costs of alternative interventions, and assesses the 
likely effectiveness of those interventions in improving the resilience of the concerned populations. The 
authors lay out a comprehensive analytical framework that can help to structure the ongoing intensive 
policy dialogue between local governments, the international donor community, and livestock keep-
ers and thereby contribute to the identification of viable options for promoting more productive and 
resilient livelihood strategies.”
 
Antonio Rota, Senior Livestock Advisor, International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD)
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